Mediavigil believes that without democratisation of communication and the right to communicate, the freedom of expression is meaningless.It attempts to take note of environment and public health issues where governments and corporations provide sanitised information. It also keeps track of ecology and health issues. To know more about it, visit :www.toxicswatch.com, toxicswatch.blogspot.com, banasbestosindia.blogspot.com

Friday, August 31, 2007

Ministry of Environment Facilitates Dumping of Hazardous Wastes

Gopal Subramanium, Additional Solicitor General of India in the Supreme Court continued his arguments today in the matter of Hazardous wastes/ship-breaking/Blue Lady case. He argued on the general recommendations of Technical Experts Committee (TEC) on Management of Hazardous Wastes relating to Ship breaking. The bench of Justice Arijit Pasayat and Justice S H Kapadia heard the matter. Subramanium is representing of Ministry of Environment in the case.

Subramanium prayed that the recommendations of TEC may be accepted as a procedure henceforth applicable for ship-breaking. This committee came into being as result of an order of R K Vaish, Joint Secretary, Union Ministry of Environment and Forests issued an order dated 24th March, 2006 for the "Constitution of a Committee of Technical Experts with respect to the directions of this Hon'ble Court dated 17.2.2006 in the matter of W.P. (C) No. 657 of 1995 on Management of Hazardous Wastes". Secretary, Union Ministry of Environment and Forests was made the Chairman of the Committee and the Chairman, Central Pollution Control Board, Union Ministry of Environment and Forests was made its Member Convenor.

Counsel for the petitioner, Sanjay Parikh, pointed out that the recommendations of the TEC are not in compliance with the essential conditions, which were part of Supreme Court order of 14th October, 2003. The recommendations of the TEC does not mention anything about prior decontamination in the country of export, which were recommended by the High Power Committee (HPC) with Prof. MGK Menon as its Chairman. This Committee was constituted to examine all matters in depth relating to hazardous waste. by apex court's order dated13th October, 1997. This Committee had fourteen Terms of Reference (TOR) and the 14th TOR was "Decontamination of ships before they are exported to India for breaking." Any ship that comes to India without prior decontamination is a clear case of dumping of hazardous wastes, which is impermissible under international law as well as the directions of the court. He stressed on the fact that India being a party to Basel Convention on transboundary movement of hazardous wastes and their disposal must be comply with its provisions.
The counsel also pointed out that Prior Informed Consent procedure is a part of global environmental jurisprudence where a developing country is entitled to know what material is being sent by the developed country and whether for environment and other concerns is ready to accept it. The ship should be decontaminated and the importing country should know the amount of hazardous wastes in advance before the ship is allowed to sail from the exporting country. A ship cannot enter the Indian territorial waters for dismantling till verification as per the records already done. If on verification of the documents, the country finds it that it is not a correct declaration and the amount of waste is much more than is declared it becomes a case of illegal traffic and the ship is liable to be go back to the exporting country.
The court has reserved its orders on the general recommendations of the ship breaking and the specific issue of Blue Lady will be heard again on 5 September, 2007. The hazardous wastes management matter is before the apex court since 1995.

Dr Vidyut Joshi, former Vice-Chancellor, Bhavnagar University who has co-authored "Industrial safety concerns in the ship breaking industry / Alang-India", a report for UNESCO says, "GMB manages ports of Gujarat, which is its primary task. Ship-breaking requires industrial management, which GMB does not have. Ship-breaking is not a port activity and Maritime Board officials are trained not meant for such industrial activity ship-breaking. If GMB should have a role it must be restructured for the same and there should be a separate Alang Authority."

It is becoming clearer that the Blue Lady can be sent back. In November, 2006 Priya Blue Industries Private Ltd based in Sosiya Ship-breaking yard, Bhavnagar, Gujarat filed an application in the court seeking permission for dismantling of vessel Blue Lady ship in the aftermath of the anchoring permission granted to Hariyana Ship Demolitions Pvt Ltd on humanitarian grounds. The ship in question needs to be decontaminated by its original owner, Star Cruise Ltd as per the Supreme Court orders and the international laws.

Thursday, August 30, 2007

Asbestos hazards issue in Blue Lady case

Senior Advocate Gopal Subramanium who was appointed Additional Solicitor General of India in the Supreme Court on 8th April, 2005 began his arguments today (on 30 August) in the matter of Hazardous wastes/ship-breaking/Blue Lady case. He dwelt on the use, reuse and safe use of asbestos, asbestos containing material and asbestos wastes. He was assisted by former Additional Solicitor-General Mukul Rohatgi who explained to the bench that there is difference between hazardous waste and hazardous material but forgot to tell what is the status of hazardous material meant for disposal. The arguments began at 2 PM and it was abruptly stopped at 2.30 PM. The arguments will continue tomorrow wherein the impermissibility, illegal traffic of Blue Lady and the recommendations of the Committee of Technical Experts on Hazardous wastes pertaining to ship-breaking will come up for discussion. It may be noted that the issue of asbestos is quite pertinent since this will set precedent of continued use of asbestos in India. Sanjay Parikh, a well known environmental lawyer who has been arguing the hazardous wastes case since 1995 will put his arguments after the submission of the Additional Solicitor General of India and the former Additional Solicitor-General.

Asbestos issue in Blue Lady case

Senior Advocate Gopal Subramanium who was appointed Additional Solicitor General of India in the Supreme Court on 8 April, 2005 began arguments in the matter of Blue Lady dwelt on Asbestos issue of उसे and रयूसे and सफे of Asbestos taining Material (ACM), Asbestos Wastes and the ir Impact on Worker’s Health
All forms of asbestos except Chrysotile Asbestos is banned in India. Mining of asbestos is also banned since no new lease for asbestos mining is allowed. The export and import of asbestos waste (dust and fiber) is also banned as per Hazardous Waste (Management & Handling) Rules, 2003. But import of Canadian and Chrysotile asbestos is still allowed despite ban in some 40 countries due to incurable but preventable cancer caused by this killer fiber in the name of its continued mythical “safe and controlled use”.
No accurate figures can be stated about the total number of asbestos victims in India as quantification has never been done despite ongoing global asbestos crisis. No has such attempt has been made till date. Constraints of finance, technical know-how and competence regarding the environmental pollution control and to some extent, lack of preference of health in relation to financial gains are some of the important factors which influence the appropriate development of health and safety strategy. Other factors include migratory nature of workers and non maintenance of medical or other records by the factory owners for the migrant labourers which makes it difficult to track the exposure-related diseases.
Given the fact that largest manmade epidemic of asbestos related diseases have become a reality and even reputed medical journals like British Medical Journal (January 31, 2004) have acknowledged it, Government of India should provide the names, addresses and photographs of the asbestos handlers including those who have been examined by the NIOH. This will enable future generations to ascertain for whether or not asbestos exposure was avoidable by preventing its use.
Asbestos is a proven human carcinogen (a substance which can cause cancer). No safe level can be proposed for asbestos products because a threshold is not known to exist. The greater the exposure, the greater the risk of developing lung disease (and cancer). The exposures of workers installing, maintaining and handling asbestos-cement products are quite high, and this exposure defies regulatory control efforts. Asbestos has however, one very dangerous quality, as it accumulates in the body; the microscopic fibers lodged in tissues can remain like little time bombs and cause cancer years later. Since asbestos exposure is cumulative, young people are in particular need of protection. The empirical research says "Adults have three or four decades to develop cancer after exposure". "The kids have six or seven. This means that a smaller dose of a carcinogen is as dangerous to the kids as a larger dose of it is to adults".
“Why is it that the concern of the countries which have banned asbestos not relevant to India?” While asbestos imports and use continues to grow in countries like India, its use has decreased significantly in the developed countries. Canada exports almost all of the asbestos (more than 96%) mined in the country, especially to Asia, including India, whereas asbestos use in Canada is almost non-existent. In the US, demand for asbestos has continued to decline. The developed world has responded to the asbestos health catastrophe with bans on the use of asbestos.
As this unfolds, the global asbestos industry is transferring its commercial activities to the third world. "Multinational asbestos corporations present a deplorable history of international exploitation. These firms have opened large and profitable internal and export markets in Brazil and elsewhere in South America, and in India, Thailand, Nigeria, Angola, Mexico, Uruguay, and Argentina."
Current Status in India: Dealing with “Impact of Hazardous Waste on Worker’s Health”, Hon’ble Supreme Court directed the government “to examine the matter and enumerate medical benefits which may be provided to the workers having regard to the occupational hazard as also keeping in view the question of health of the workers and the compensation which may have to be paid to them. The Committee while examining the recommendations, shall also keep in view the judgment of this Court in Consumer Education and Research Centre vs. Union of India (1995 (3) SCC 42).”
In the Consumer Education and Research Centre vs. Union of India matter the Hon’ble Court directed Union and the State Governments are directed to review asbestos standards must be reviewed “every 10 years and also as and when the ILO gives directions in this behalf consistent with its recommendations or any convention; (5) the Union and all the State Governments are directed to consider inclusion of such of those small-scale factory or factories or industries to protect health hazards of all workers engaged in the manufacture of asbestos or its ancillary products; appropriate Inspector of Factories in particular of the State of Gujarat, is directed to send all the workers, examined by the ESI hospital concerned, for re-examination by the National Institute of Occupational Health to detect whether all or any of them is suffering from asbestosis. In case of the positive finding that all or any of them are suffering from occupational health hazards, each such worker shall be entitled to compensation in a sum of rupees one lakh payable by the factory or industry or establishment concerned within a period of three months from the date of certification by the National Institute of Occupational Health.” (pg 73, 74. 1995 (3) SCC 42)
Although the Hon’ble Court had directed Union and State Governments to take action consistent with ILO resolutions and Convention on Asbestos, the concerned Ministries have not even initiated any action in pursuance of ILO’s Resolution on Asbestos dated 14th June, 2006 stating “the elimination of the future use of asbestos and the identification and proper management of asbestos currently in place are the most effective means to protect workers from asbestos exposures and to prevent future asbestos-related disease and deaths” has not been acted upon. That even if the use of asbestos products is discontinued there are and there will be a massive number victims from past asbestos exposure as is being experienced globally in US, Europe, Australia, Japan and other countries, therefore, the compensation amount may be increased from the current Rs 1 lakh to at least Rs 10 lakh. There is an urgent necessity for the creation of NIOH like facility in each state to deal with the imminent unprecedented environmental and occupational health crisis from asbestos exposure.
The Final Report of the Committee of Technical Experts has admitted that the vessel is laden with different kinds of asbestos such as Chrysotile, Amosite, and Crocidolite. (pg 4917, vol. xiv). Acknowledging the hazards from asbestos, the same Report NIOH’s admission “We do not have any information with regard to concentration of asbestos in the work environment” in its Report for TEC is noteworthy. (pg. 4824, vol. xiii)
In pursuance of the directions from the Chairman, TEC, the Director, NIOH was asked for medical examination of Asbestos Handlers. The NIOH in its recommendation said, “The directives of Hon Supreme Court (1995) for asbestos exposed workers …should be strictly followed.” The same has not been done else 16 % of the workers would not been found exposed to asbestos.
At page 4923, the Final Report of TEC has a copy of a letter dated March 14, 2006 (three months prior to SS Norway’s entry in the Indian territory) by one Jean Michel Chiapell wherein it is stated that “In Europe the exposure limit for workers is 0.100 fiber (average concentration over 1 hour). That means the air on the Norway was very clean, probably because of marine environment, and because most of the asbestos is covered or painted.”
It is noteworthy that the letter dated March 14, 2006 submitted by the TEC refers to the European occupational exposure limit. It is incomprehensible as to how the occupational exposure limit in Europe has any significance for a ship that carries tons of asbestos still on it, to India. The whole idea was for the European or American owners to have asbestos and other hazardous materials removed prior to sending the ship to India for shipbreaking. What difference does it make what the European asbestos workplace exposure limit is, if the asbestos is not removed in Europe?
In this connection it is relevant to submit that asbestos has been banned throughout the European Union since 1 January 2005. Asbestos is now a banned substance throughout all twenty-five member countries of the European Union. A five year phase-out period which was permitted under Commission Directive 1999/77/EC ended on January 1, 2005.
The countries that have banned asbestos are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom (including England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland), Uruguay and others.
On June 21, 2004, South Africa announced a 3-5 year phase-out of asbestos use and a ban on asbestos. Vietnam has banned the usage of chrysotile as a building material and is making more serious attempts than most Asian countries to remove asbestos from workplaces and replace it with safer alternatives. Vietnam announced its plan to ban in 2004. South Korea and Peru have also announced that they will soon ban asbestos.
ASBESTOS CRISIS
An urgent intervention is needed in the matter of a serious unprecedented environmental, physical and occupational health and moral crisis with regard to unnoticed asbestos (killer fibre) epidemic in our country. It is high time concerned authorities took note of exposures of workers and citizen consumers. “The Asbestos War” an editorial in the International Journal of Environmental Health, Special Issue, 2003 is a revealing document. It says, after one hundred years, asbestos industry’s battle for Europe as its market had been lost. Following the collapse in Western demand for asbestos, producers have mounted a global campaign to protect remaining markets and develop new ones. A well-oiled propaganda machine reassures civil servants and consumers that asbestos can be used “safely under controlled conditions,” despite a vast amount of scientific and medical evidence, which proves otherwise.
The word 'asbestos' in Greek means 'indestructible'. All types of asbestos tend to break into very tiny fibre, almost microscopic. In fact, some of them may be up to 700 times smaller than human hair. Because of their small size, once released into the air or water they may stay suspended for hours or even days. Because of its high durability and with tensile strength asbestos has been widely used in construction and insulation materials - it has been used in over 3,000 different products. After mining and milling (crushed/grinding), Asbestos is processed through various methods and used for making cement products, gasket sheet material, friction material, heat resistant textiles, some special applications like in paints, thermoplastics etc. In addition it is used for textiles, laminated products, tape, gland packing, packing ropes, brake lining and jointing used in core sector industries such as automobile, heavy equipment, petro-chemicals, nuclear power plants, fertilizers, thermal power plants, transportation, defense. Asbestos fibre is used in manufacture of asbestos cement roofs, pressure and non pressure pipes, sewage, irrigation and drainage system in urban and rural areas etc.
ASBESTOS HAZARDS
Asbestos is world's most notorious industrial health hazard. The primary routes of potential human exposure to asbestos are inhalation. Asbestos is used so widely that the entire population is potentially exposed to some degree. According World Health Organisation "Damage to asbestos-containing material can result in the release of small asbestos fibres that become airborne and are readily inhaled. These fibres can remain in the lungs for long periods and can cause serious lung disease." Therefore, it is harmful to not only the workers who make the asbestos products and handle them but also to the consumers who use them. In such a scenario, all studies concerning health hazards of asbestos are relevant.

In a journal article "The Asbestos Cancer Epidemic", Joseph Ladou, editor, International Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health wrote, “The asbestos cancer epidemic may take as many as 10 million lives before asbestos is banned worldwide and exposures are brought to an end. In many developed countries, in the most affected age groups, mesothelioma may account for 1% of all deaths. In addition to mesotheliomas, 5-7% of all lung cancers can be attributed to occupational exposures to asbestos. The asbestos cancer epidemic would have been largely preventable if the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Labor Organization (ILO) had responded early and responsibly. The WHO was late in recognizing the epidemic and failed to act decisively after it was well under way. The WHO and the ILO continue to fail to address the problem of asbestos mining, manufacturing, and use and world trade of a known human carcinogen. Part of the problem is that the WHO and the ILO have allowed organizations such as the International Commission on Occupational Health (ICOH) and other asbestos industry advocates to manipulate them and to distort scientific evidence. The global asbestos cancer epidemic is a story of monumental failure to protect the public health…All forms of asbestos can result in asbestosis (a progressive fibrotic disease of the lungs), lung cancer, and mesothelioma, a cancer arising in the membranes lining the pleural and peritoneal cavities.”(Environmental Health Perspectives, Vol. 112, 2004)

In an editorial “Chrysotile in India: Truth Held Hostage” (Indian Journal of Community Medicine, January – March 2006) Sanjay Chaturvedi, Professor, University College of Medical Sciences and GTB Hospital, Delhi wrote, “Information showing asbestos-cancer relationship was available as early as the 1940s. During next 2 decades, enough epidemiological as well as experimental evidence was generated to prove this relationship. For half a century the asbestos industry, in collaboration with some of the leaders of occupational and respiratory medicine, was able to suppress most of the data1. Meanwhile, millions of people were exposed to the carcinogen and hundreds of thousand died. The knowledge that asbestos causes cancer became public in the 80s, not because of scientific community but as a result of prolonged struggle and legal actions by ordinary people. For decades, certain privileged sections of the world order, including some scientists, were instrumental in the enormous release of a known carcinogen, just to keep their .profits. intact. Now we have a job on our hands - for a century - to combat the insult. Isn’t it a profound statement on our times, our polity and to an extent our science? This is just a punctuation in the whole story that ceases to conclude.”
Even World Bank has a policy against asbestos since 1991. “The Bank increasingly prefers to avoid financing asbestos use...Thus, at any mention of asbestos in Bank-assisted projects, the Task Manager needs to exercise special care.” The International Finance Corporation, the arm of the World Bank Group that lends to the private sector, urges that materials be avoided whose hazards to workers and the community cannot easily be prevented, such as “the use of asbestos in building materials.”
AVAILABLE RESEARCH/DATA AGAINST KILLER MATERIAL
USA: The unanimous and successful passage of Ban Asbestos America Act of 2007 by the U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works is a result of past exposure due to asbestos related deaths
CANADA: Canadian MP Pat Martin spoke out about Canada's duplicitous behavior in supporting the global asbestos lobby; his remarks were quoted in an article published in Canada on July 25, 2006 entitled: Canada tarnished by asbestos trade: "Canada is acting like an 'international pariah' by exporting asbestos to Third World countries despite the well-known health hazards, says a Manitoba MP (Martin)…".The Canadian asbestos industry was, Martin said, a "corporate serial killer" which exports "human misery." The Canadian Government should, Martin urged, ban all forms of asbestos, shut down the remaining mines, provide early retirement for asbestos workers and financial assistance to affected industries and communities. Martin has urged the government to launch a comprehensive testing and removal program.
· ASIA: The Asian debate on asbestos began in 2004 at the Global Asbestos Congress (GAC 2004) in Tokyo; the Bangkok conference progressed the discussion and allowed new voices to be heard. There was considerable interest amongst delegates in the availability of alternatives to replace asbestos-cement, a substance still being widely used throughout Asia. Following which Japan banned asbestos. The Asian Asbestos Conference which was held in Bangkok, Thailand in July 2006. The Bangkok Declaration on the Elimination of Asbestos and Asbestos-related Disease, called for a total ban on the use of asbestos and asbestos-containing products. Judging by the opinions expressed in Bangkok, there is little doubt that the momentum for a regional asbestos ban has been boosted by the conference.
· INDIA: On August 18, 2003, the Union Minister of Health and Family Welfare told the Indian Parliament that: “Studies by the National Institute of Occupational Health (NIOH), Ahmedabad, have shown that long-term exposure to any type of asbestos can lead to development of asbestosis, lung cancer and mesothelioma.” This was not the first official acknowledgment of the asbestos hazard. Government of India’s Office Memorandum NO.6 (6)/94 - Cement, (Sept 1, 1994) of the Ministry of Industry states: “The Department has generally not been recommending any case of Industrial License to any new unit for the creation of fresh capacity of asbestos products in the recent past due to the apprehension that prolonged exposure to asbestos leads to serious health hazards”.
In Uttar Pradesh a survey of U.P. Asbestos Limited, Mohanlalganj, Lucknow and Allied Nippn Pvt Ltd, Gaziabad, (U.P), the lung function impairment was found to be higher in subjects exposed for more than 11 years. This was the result of a Central Pollution Control Board sponsored project entitled "Human risk assessment studies in asbestos industries in India". This has been reported in the (2001-2002) Annual Report of Industrial Toxicological Research Centre, Lucknow. It has also been published in the 139th Report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Environment, Forests, Science and Technology and presented to the parliament on 17th March, 2005.
Dr S R Kamat, a renowned lung specialist was bitter at the "utter callousness of employers", the total lack of medical expertise and government inaction; all of which continued to put workers at risk of contracting asbestos-related diseases. In the 5 surveys done in the country, large number of the subjects showed asbestos lung diseases. All of them showed breathing problem, many had cough, some had sputum, chest pain finger clubbing and chest pain. Disability in such cases are permanent, progressive; means of compensation are meager. Dr Kamath, has observed number of asbestosis cases where patients who have not directly worked with asbestos had contracted the disease. "….patient was an industrialist's son, owner of an asbestos boxing plant...was exposed to the dust and diagnosed with asbestosis. In another case, the patient had an office in the first floor of a building which had asbestos boxing shed in the ground floor. The patient got exposed to asbestos fibres and dust through the AC ducts into the office...he was diagnosed with asbestosis too. A railway master was diagnosed with asbestosis due to the constant loading of asbestos in the rail wagons."
Dr Qamar Rahman one of the most renowned toxicologists of India formerly with Industrial Toxicology Research Centre (ITRC), Lucknow has revealed very shocking data on cellular and genetic mutations and about the plight of the asbestos mine workers especially women. She informed the scientific and medical community present here about the occurrences of asbestos related diseases that include cases where women have died after 6-7 years of the first exposure as was reported by the government doctors.
CONCLUSION: The present pathetic situation demands the criminal prosecution of those responsible for asbestos exposures such as factory owners and company directors and also the planners and users of the product. Asbestos is a public health issue, which the Government has ignored for far too long. Although non-asbestos technology certainly exists in India, in fact in some factories the two technologies exist side-by-side, consumers will inevitably opt for the cheaper product: more demand will translate into higher sales which will generate more Asbestos Money that is being used to obtain political support.

Wednesday, August 29, 2007

Blue Lady violates Environmental Laws & National Policy on Hazardous Wastes

Toxic chemicals laden 10 Dollar ship poses threat to workers and villagers

Terror elements suspected in the hazardous waste trade

The Parliamentary Committee dealing with Blue Lady (SS Norway) has taken note of huge amounts of Polychlorinated Biphenyl (PCBs) besides all the Supreme Court Committees but so far no “Inventory of PCB-Containing Equipment” has been made available either to the court or to the Parliamentary panel. The 315-metre long and 46,000-tonne, 11-storey Blue Lady left the port of Malaysia for Dubai for 'repairs' in May 2006 and later sailed towards Alang and anchored off Alang on humanitarian grounds due to monsoons in June 2006.

PCB is one of the Persistent Organic Pollutant (POPs) that remain intact in the environment for long periods, become widely distributed geographically, accumulate in the fatty tissue of living organisms and are toxic to humans and wildlife. POPs circulates globally and can cause damage wherever they travel. The case of toxic chemicals laden Blue Lady was listed for hearing today in the Supreme Court. The Court directed that the issue with regard to ship breaking, Blue Lady and Waste Oil will be heard on 30 August. The Gujarat Pollution Control Board was supposed to file an affidavit in the court with regard to the illegal sale of PCB containing oil.

The entry of Blue Lady in Indian territorial waters and continued presence since June 2006 is in violation of Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade and Stockholm Convention on POPs. India is signatory to these international environmental laws wherein disposal and movement of PCBs have been dealt with.

Even as it is becoming clearer that the Blue Lady (SS Norway, SS France) can be sent back, the Ministry is worked hand in glove the ship-breakers to let the ship contaminate the Indian shores and destroy the livelihood of the villagers.

In November, 2006 Sanjay Mehta, Priya Blue Industries Private Ltd based in Sosiya Ship-breaking yard, Bhavnagar, Gujarat filed an application in the court seeking permission for dismantling of vessel Blue Lady ship in the aftermath of the anchoring permission granted to Rajeev Reniwal, Hariyana Ship Demolitions Pvt Ltd, Sosiya Ship-breaking yard, Bhavnagar, Gujarat on humanitarian grounds in June 2006. Hariyana Ship Demolitions Pvt Ltd had bought the ship Bridgend Shipping Ltd, Monorovia, Liberia. Bridgend Shipping Ltd had bought SS Norway from Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd, a wholly owned subsidiary of Star Cruise Lines Ltd in January 2006 at the price of 10 Dollars. It was at this stage that the ship was once again renamed SS Blue Lady.

The ship in question is in illegal traffic. There is documentary proof that such ships are required to clearance from the Ministry of Defence, which has not been done in the case besides certification for prior decontamination of the ship in the country of export. It is a case of collusion of government agencies and connivance of enforcement authorities.

Some 30, 000 villagers and 12 village councils (local governments called panchayats) of Bhavnagar district of Gujarat have filed the case through their heads of village councils (Sarpanch) in the Supreme Court. These villages are in the vicinity of Alang ship-breaking yard. They have sought directions asking the court to "direct that the ship named "Blue Lady" (SS Norway) be not allowed to be dismantled at the Alang Ship-breaking yard." The villagers have argued that "The dismantling of the ship would have hazardous effect on the residents of the villages near the Alang ship breaking yard as the ship contains large amount of asbestos which, when exposed is hazardous to the health of the residents living in the twelve villages."

They have submitted that Rule 12 (i) of the Hazardous Wastes (Management and Handling) Rules under the Environment Protection Act, 1986 bans import of asbestos. As per Schedule 8 Serial No. 15 describes waste asbestos (dust and fibres) as hazardous wastes prohibited for import and export. Bhagvatsinh Haluba Gohil, head, village council (Sarpanch), Village Sosiya, Tehsil Talaja, and District Bhanvnagar whom we have met in the first week of April in his village opined that besides the danger of asbestos exposure the villagers face threat of loss of livelihood because of the contamination of the aquatic life in the sea.

Stockholm Convention, a global treaty to protect human health and the environment from POPs. In implementing the Convention, Governments are supposed to take measures to eliminate or reduce the release of POPs into the environment. The Convention in its Annex A and Article 6, requires Parties like India to identify, label and remove from use equipment containing polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and to dispose of the waste PCB-containing materials in an environmentally sound manner. This inventory form assists in identification of owners and locations of potentially PCB-containing equipment and wastes; identification and quantification of potentially PCB-containing equipment such as transformers, capacitors, vacuum pumps, lamp ballast, and electrical cables; and Identification and quantification of waste PCBs or PCB-contaminated sites.

As per the UNEP guide to the management of PCB, “Transportation of PCBs is one of the highest risk areas for potential spills or leaks. Most problems occur during loading or unloading of the vehicle. Loading areas should have adequate spill response materials and spill prevention measures should be taken and spill control and clean-up materials should be available, should they be needed. Any subsequent movement of the contaminated wastes shall be made in strict accordance with the provisions of the Basel Convention on hazardous waste movements.”

“It should be remembered that all transportation of hazardous wastes containing PCBs are covered by the Basel Convention, to which reference should be made for further guidance on the shipping of such wastes.”

Hazardous Wastes pertaining to ship breaking is highly toxic in nature. The hazardous wastes are thus required to be dealt with only with adequate and proper control and handling and only traded in accordance with international law. In developing countries, these matters are of particular importance from an environmental and policy standpoint to avoid global dumping on developing countries to avoid the high costs of proper careful hazardous waste management in developed countries. These and other allied problems gave birth to Basel. Both the Basel Convention and the Basel Ban Amendment applies to End-of-Life ships that contain hazardous materials. As per consensus decisions passed by the Parties to the Convention, a ship can be a ship and a waste at the same time and it could be a hazardous waste.

The key objectives of the Basel Convention are: to minimize the generation of hazardous wastes in terms of quantity and hazardousness; to dispose of them in the country in which they were generated, and to reduce the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes. (Article 4, para 2) The key objective of the Basel Ban Amendment is to: Prohibit the export of hazardous waste from member countries of the European Union (EU), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Liechtenstein to any other countries for any reason.

The Rotterdam Convention creates legally binding obligations for the implementation of the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) procedure. It covers pesticides and industrial chemicals that have been banned or severely restricted for health or environmental reasons by Parties and which have been notified by Parties for inclusion in the PIC procedure. There are 39 chemicals including PCBs listed in Annex III of the Convention and subject to the PIC procedure, including 24 pesticides, 4 severely hazardous pesticide formulations and 11 industrial chemicals. The import decisions are circulated and exporting country Parties are obligated under the Convention to take appropriate measure to ensure that exporters within its jurisdiction comply with the decisions.

National Policy on Hazardous Wastes admits, “Lack of laboratory facilities for analysis of trace organics such as PCBs could either result in holding up of supplies for long periods of time merely on grounds of suspicion or lead to illegal imports of waste oil under the garb of used oil.” Safe Ship-breaking activity is the responsibility of all the parties involved ranging from ship owner, ship exporter to ship importer and the concerned countries as per Basel Convention. Ship owners who own the ship for decades have benefited from the ship and they cannot and should not be allowed to escape from their responsibility of assuming decontamination cost. There are some efforts underway to eliminate the manifest responsibility of ship owners. This cannot be allowed without jeopardizing globally accepted principles of producer responsibility and the protection of environmental and occupational health workers and concerned communities. In the case of Blue Lady the exporting country has failed to comply with the Basel Convention but it has turned a blind to the act of illegal traffic committed by Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd. It did not inform the Indian authorities that there is radioactive material on the ship.

Note: Basel Convention defines Waste as “….substances or objects which are disposed of or are intended to be disposed of or are required to be disposed* of by the provisions of national law.” Disposal is defined both as as “recycling” or “final disposal” destinations listed in Annex IV. The Convention defines hazardous waste as those, which are present in Annex I and exhibit a hazardous characteristic found in Annex III, or which are listed in Annex VIII. Some Basel Hazardous Wastes (Annex VIII) Found on Ships & type of Basel Waste and how they are found in Ships Waste mineral oils, Oil sludge, Hydraulic systems, heavy fuel oil, lube oil, Waste oils/water mixtures and emulsions Ballast water, Waste containing PCBs, PCTs, PCNs, PBBs, Light fitting capacitors, in paints, etc, Waste from production, formulation and use of inks, paints, lacquers, varnish etc, All over as coatings Wastes containing mercury or mercury compounds, Fluorescent light fittings, Lead Acid Batteries, Batteries, Waste Asbestos, Heat insulation, fire retardant in structural material

Tuesday, August 28, 2007

Environment Ministry misleads Parliamentary Committee

Information about radioactive material not divulged

New Delhi: Even as the Supreme Court is all set to hear the case of Blue Lady on 29 August, Parliamentary Petitions Committee’s Report on Blue Lady has been tabled in the Lok Sabha. What is noteworthy is the fact that Environment Ministry has neither informed the apex court nor the Parliamentary Committee that the ships have radioactive material, handling of the same is fraught with hazardous consequences. The officials of both at the Ministry and the Gujarat Maritime Board has been guilty of dereliction of duty of not letting the workers and the concerned authorities know of the radioactive materials of the ships which come for dismantling.

In its recommendations the Committee has noted “The very fact that the Hon’ble Supreme Court had to intervene in the matter, underlines the failure of the Government to formulate till now any policy to regulate environmentally safe ship breaking activity in the country.” The Committee are extremely concerned that the ship contain an estimated 1240 MT of Asbestos Containing Material and about 10 MT of Polychlorinated Biphenyl (PCBs) as in-built material and as part of structure. In case the asbestos fibres are inhaled or human being consumes the PCBs, the same may cause cancer unless the workers take proper precautions for safe handling of these materials.

“The Committee strongly deprecates the repeated stand taken by the Ministry that since no hazardous wastes has been allowed on board as cargo, there is no violation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court directions.” The Ministry has misled the Committee by not informing it about there being admittedly containers full of toxic incineration ash and non-examination of Ballast water, which are likely to have alien microorganisms.

Taking note of the fact that hazardous material meant for disposal even when it is part of structure must be deemed hazardous wastes, it said, “The Committee need not emphasize that the hazardous wastes whether as cargo or in-built material are equally detrimental to the environment and human health.” It further recommended, “a National Policy should be framed by the Government to regulate ship breaking activities and dumping all toxic waste in the country. The policy should also cover establishment of facilities of international level for managing and disposal of hazardous materials such as asbestos, PCBs and other residues…The Committee also desire the Ministry to strongly campaign to create awareness amongst the people about the ill effects of asbestos and possible carcinogenic affects…”

The Committee unambiguously recommended, “…in no case, the ship breaking activities should be permitted at the cost of environment or safe and healthy life of workers.” The Parliamentary Petitions Committee report came in response to the petition raised in Lok Sabha by Basudev Acharya, MP, CPI (M) in August 2006. The petition had argued that the sovereignty of the country is being infringed due to dumping of hazardous wastes from developed countries and sought examination of the role of the authorities in allowing entry to the ship Blue Lady in Indian territorial waters.

Monday, August 27, 2007

CRIMES OF SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

SHOW-CAUSE NOTICE TO HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE OF INDIA

Q1. How many cases of allegations against judges were made in the
media about misuse of office , criminal acts by judges from munsiff
court to supreme court of India ? since 1947 till date ?

Q2. are the inquiry report findings, action taken reports of such
cases accessible to public ? if not why ?

Q3. what action has been taken against guilty judges ?

Q4. are the guilty judges legally prosecuted in all such cases ? or
has it just ended with their resignation from services or his superior
judge not allotting him any judicial work ?

Q5. why some high ranking judges are not legally prosecuted for their
wrong doings ?

Q6. are judges above law ? are not everybody equal before law ?

Q7. do the judiciary subject , all the cases handled by accused /
tainted , guilty judges to review , to undo past unjust judgments ?

Q8. how ? if not why ?

Q9. how do the judiciary monitor the net wealth growth of some
judges including the wealth in the name of judge's family members ?

Q10. do all the judges file their annual income , wealth statements on
sworn affidavits to the higher judiciary ? defaulters how many ?

Q11. how does the judiciary verifies those statements ?

Q12. is such statements made public , on web ?

Q13. when the judgment of a lower court is turned down by the higher
court , what action is initiated against lower court judge for making
unjust judgment & meting out injustice ?

Q14. when allegations of corruption , misuse of office , etc against
judges are made , why the accused - judges are not subjected to
tests like "poly graph , lie detector , brain mapping , etc" , in the
interest of justice & truth ?

Q15. judges are not employees of government , so they are ineligible
to be the members of "Karnataka state government judicial department
house building co-operative society". Then how come , many judges
including supreme court judges are admitted as members of this society
& allotted prime residential site worth crores of rupees for a few
thousands by the said society at said society's - judicial layout ,
yelahanka , Bangalore ? while the ordinary members like peons , clerks
in judicial department are waiting for a site since years , is not the
whole thing grossly illegal ?

Q16. in more than 70% of cases before all courts in India , central
government or state government or government agency is one of the
parties. How many judges or their family members , have received out
of turn , favourable allotments of sites , gas agency , petrol pumps ,
etc by the government ? is not such allotments illegal ? what action ?

Q17. when a person under police custody or judicial custody suffer 3rd
degree torture by police , is not the judge of the respective court
which is handling that tortured person's case responsible for it ?

Q18. has the higher judiciary legally prosecuted respective judges &
the police officers for committing 3rd degree torture , on charges of
attempt to murder & murder ? if not why ?

Q19. registrar , Mysore district & sessions court , has called for the
candidatures to various vacancies in that court from the public vide
notification no : ADMN/A/10825/2003 dated 19/11/2003 & collected
application fees from the candidates. Till date , they have not even
conducted the interview ? is it not public cheating by judiciary ?
what action to undo the injustices to unemployed ?

Q20. registrar , Bangalore city civil court , has called for the
candidatures to various vacancies in that court from the public vide
notification no : ADM-I(A)422/03 dated 19/05/2003 & collected
application fees from the candidates. Till date , they have not even
conducted the interview ? is it not public cheating by the judiciary ?
what action to undo injustices to unemployed ?

Q21. when a person doesn't get adequate food , medical care while
under police custody or judicial custody , is not the respective judge
dealing that person's case responsible for it ? what action ?

Q22. how judiciary is monitoring food & medical care to prisoners ?

Q23. numerous accused persons are suffering in jail under judicial
custody , for periods far exceeding the legally stipulated sentence
periods. For example : a pick-pocketer is in jail for one year , the
judge finds him guilty of offense & gives him 3 months sentence. What
about the excess punishment of 9 months. Is not the judge responsible
for the illegal , excess punishment of the convict ? what action
against the judge in such cases ?

Q24. numerous innocents suffer in jail for years & finally the judge
finds them as innocents & acquits them of the charges. What about the
prison sentence , the innocent has already served ? is not the judge
responsible for this illegal , unjust punishment to an innocent ?
remedy ? what action against the judge ?

Q25. does the privileges of judges cover both their official actions &
the actions arising out of misuse of office ?

Q26. does the privileges of judges cover both their official actions
as judges & their personal actions as individuals ?

Q27. are the fundamental rights of citizens supreme or the privileges
of judges , constitutional functionaries supreme ?

Q28. what is the criteria adopted for promotion of judges ?

Q29. what is the criteria adopted for appointment of advocates from
bar , as the judges ?

Q30. what is the criteria adopted for appointment of retired judges ,
as governors of states , members or as chairman of commissions ,
etc ?

Q31. how many judges belonging to oppressed classes - scheduled
caste , scheduled tribe , other backward classes , minorities & women
are their in supreme court , state high courts & subordinate courts ?
kindly provide specific figures .

Q32. what are the legal measures enforced by judiciary , to enforce
the accountability of judges & to check corruption in judiciary ?

Q33. are not these measures a failure , looking at present state of
affairs of judiciary ?

Q34. does the judges arrange for distribution of alcoholic drinks at
the official meetings , parties , at the tax payer's expense ?

Q35. does any judges have included their consumption of alcoholic
drinks , in their hotel bill & claimed traveling allowance ?

Q36. what action has been taken against - selectors ie Karnataka high
court judges & newly selected women judges involved in roost resort
scandal in Mysore , Karnataka ?

Q37. when common people / tax payers & even government employees are
not getting proper health care from government at government
hospitals. Is it right & just to provide premium health care to
judges , constitutional functionaries at 5-star private hospitals in
India , abroad , all at tax payer's expense ?

Q38. are the judges subjected to periodical health check-ups to
ascertain their health , mental faculties & mental balance in the
midst of all work pressures , emotional tensions ?

Q39. what is the criteria adopted by judiciary for accepting
applications seeking public interest litigations ?

Q40. why numerous appeals for PIL by me , were not considered ?

Q41. what is the criteria adopted by judiciary , for appointing
"amicus curie" in a case ?

Q42. why my appeal to honourable supreme court , to make me as an
"amicus curie" in late P.M Rajiv Gandhi's assassination case , was not
considered by the court ?

Q43. what is the criteria adopted by judiciary , for initiating suo-
motto action ?

Q44. numerous cases of injustices are reported in the media daily ,
with supporting evidences . why not the judiciary take suo-motto
action in all such cases ?

Q45. legal aid boards pre-judge the cases in the name of taking legal
opinion , before providing legal aid to the needy ? is it not needy
person's rights violation ?

Q46. is not the safety of witnesses , parties in cases responsibility
of the court , both during hearing of the case & afterwards ?

Q47. is the use of 3rd degree torture by police on prisoners , during
the police custody / judicial custody / prison sentence right ? what
action ?

Q48. when the corrupt police officer & government prosecution advocate
together cover-up evidences , conducts improper investigation
intentionally to fail the case - to cover-up rich crooks , high &
mighty people , what action judge takes in such cases ?

Q49. how does the judiciary monitor the wealth growth of police ,
government advocates , tax officials , officials of licensing
authorities , to ensure proper & fair prosecution of cases against
rich & mighty ?

Q50. what are the status of appeals made by human rights activist
NAGARAJ.M.R. to the honourable supreme court of India ?

Q51. corruption is rampant for selection of officers to quasi-judicial
positions like district / taluk magistrates , tax officers , revenue
officers , land acquisition officers , etc. how the judiciary monitors
over their quasi-judicial actions ?

Q52. subject to conditions , I , NAGARAJ.M.R. , editor , e-voice of
human rights watch , do offer my free services to honourable supreme
court of India , to apprehend corrupt judges , are you - the
honourable court ready to utilize it ?

Q53. what are the status of my appeals , sent to the honourable
supreme court of India , through government of india's on-line
grievance system ( DPG & DARPG ) :

DPG/M/2006/80008 , DARPG/E/2006/00057, DARPG/E/2006/00225 , DPG/M/
2006/80021 , DARPG/E/2006/00253 , DPG/M/2006/80032 , DARPG/E/
2006/01149 , DPG/M/2006/80047 , DARPG/E/2006/01164 , DPG/M/
2006/80043 , DPG/M/2006/80085 , DARPG/E/2006/06704 , DARPG/E/
2006/07017 , DARPG/E/2006/07018 , DPG/M/2006/80159 , DPG/M/
2006/80162 , DARPG/E/2006/07864 , DPG/M/2006/80165 , DARPG/E/
2006/07877 , DPG/M/2006/80167 , DARPG/E/2006/08028 , DARPG/E/
2006/08029 , DARPG/E/2006/08032 , DARPG/E/2006/08043 , DARPG/E/
2006/08044 , DPG/M/2006/80174 , DPG/M/2006/80193 , DARPG/E/
2007/00044 , DPG/M/2007/80003 , DPG/M/2007/80010 , DARPG/E/
2007/00164 , DARPG/E/2007/00165 , DPG/M/2007/80014 , DPG/M/
2007/80025 , DPG/M/2007/80049 , DPG/M/2007/80055 , DPG/M/2007/80056 ,
DPG/M/2007/80078 , DPG/M/2007/80082 , DARPG/E/2007/02618

Q54. the appeals made to the honourable supreme court of India ,
copies of which are available at following web pages :

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/naghrw/message/182 ,

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/naghrw/message/206 ,

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/naghrw/message/208 ,

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/naghrw/message/212 ,

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/naghrw/message/209 ,

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/naghrw

what are the status of those appeals ?

Q55. in the media , we have seen reports about judges committing
crimes - rape , attempt to murder , swindling government money ,
untouchability practice , the disrespect to national flag , sale of
judicial orders , bail , etc. by this way , judges themselves are
making contempt of court , constitution of India & citizens of India.
How you are protecting the honour of the judiciary , constitution of
India & citizens of India ? please answer.

Source: http://groups.google.com/group/BloggersCollective/browse_thread/thread/c2cf256337fcd5b0/3f14779e7ac819fd?hl=en#3f14779e7ac819fd

Friday, August 24, 2007

Global Warming and Hydro-electric Projects

The misleading Press Release of the Ministry of Water Resources, Govt of India, on August 21 and diverse responses to it must be responded to set the issue in proper context. Jai Prakash Narayan Yadav, Minister of State in the Ministry of Water Resources belongs to Rashtriya Janata Dal of Laloo Prasad Yadav. One can be almost confident that none of the political parties including Rashtriya Janata Dal have any position on climate change. Therefore, there is no point in singling him out.

Yadav is simply quoting what Geological Survey of India (GSI) position is with regard to climate change and not articulating the position of Ministry of Water Resources but by doing so it has cleverly indulged in selective reporting of facts to suit its ongoing and proposed hydro-electric projects. There is hardly any credible scientist who has not underlined that global warming is no more a debatable issue, it is a reality staring mankind in the face.


India is a signatory to Kyoto Protocol. Will Gauri Chatterjee, Secretary, Water Resources, Government of India explain as to whether India ratified the Protocol even as it continued to believe that global warming is "debatable"?. Did she brief Yadav properly about climate change? It is her responsibility to brief the Minister about global warming and how land use changes such as through hydro-electric projects contributes to climate change?


At a recent Panel Discussion on Lok Sabha TV, when the Rayapati Sambasiva Rao, chairman, parliamentary standing committee on water resources was asked as to how can Water Resources Ministry and the committee feign ignorance about government's own wisdom about climate change. He responded by saying that u intend to terrify me by citing global warming.Yadav is not alone in committing mistakes.


Did the Water Resources Ministry forgot that there is Prime Minister's Council on Climate Change which is coordinating National action plans for assessment, adaptation and mitigation of climate and facilitate inter-ministerial coordination and guide policy in relevant areas?. This mistake seems to have emerged also from the failure of the Council to do its job properly.


According to Namo Narayana Meena, Minister of State in the Ministry of Environment and Forests, "The Government has set up the “Expert Committee on Impacts of Climate Change” on 7th May 2007 under the chairmanship of Dr. R. Chidambaram, Principal Scientific Advisor to the Government of India".

Here is what the Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh himself said in a written reply on 22 August, 2007 in the parliament:

A coordination committee chaired by Prime Minister called Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change has been recently constituted to coordinate national action for assessment, adaptation and mitigation of climate change. The focus of the Committee is to:

i. Evolve a coordinated response to issues relating to climate change at the national level;

ii. Provide oversight for formulation of action plans in the area of assessment, adaptation and mitigation of climate change;

iii. Periodically monitor key policy decisions.

The Government has also set up an “Expert Committee on Impacts of Climate Change”. The Terms of Reference of the Committee are as under:

i. To study the impacts of anthropogenic climate change on India.

ii. To identify the measures that we may have to take in the future in relation to addressing vulnerability to anthropogenic climate change impacts.

iii. Any other matter relevant to (i) and (ii) above.

This information was given by the Prime Minister in a written reply to question by J.M.Aaron Rashid and Dr. Arun Kumar Sarma in the Lok Sabha.

Does the Water Resources Ministry still feel that climate change is "debatable"?

--
Gopal Krishna


---------------------Original Message---------------------------------------------

From: Himanshu Thakkar <ht.sandrp@gmail.com>
Date: Aug 22, 2007 11:38 AM
Subject: Ministry of Water Resources misleading everyone on global warming?
To: waterwatch@yahoogroups.com

Dear All,
The following Press Release from the Press Information Bureau, on behalf of the Ministry of Water Resources, Govt of India, on Aug 21, 2007 raises many questions.
1. It says at the end of first para, "it may also be due to global warming a topic which is still debatable." Does this mean the Ministry of Water Resources and hence govt of India still considers global warming is a debatable topic? This is very shocking, when there is so much scientific evidence from all over the world about the impact of global warming on climate and contribution of human activities there of. [If the MWR claims that it is quoting GSI opinion, even then the ministry's stand is questionable as to why did it found fit to quote an unscientific assertion?]
2. The first para says, "the recession of glaciers of the glaciers may result due to subnormal snowfall...", this means that the agencies concerned, including MWR has no idea if there has been reduction in snowfall or not and if there is, how much of that may impact recession of glaciers. Moreover, in the next para the PR says, "...snow fall and precipitation which is likely to go up with global warming..." Now if the global warming will lead to increase in snowfall, than where is the question of the subnormal snowfall leading to recession of glaciers? Theoratically, it can be said that the statement is correct, but practically, there are obvious contradictions.
3. The next statement is, "More melting of glaciers will generate more water initially. Hence there is no likelihood of northern rivers drying up in the near future." Does the ministry have the data to substantiate if the rivers have more water in summer (when glaciers melt)? What does "new future" mean? What will happen after that?
There are some people from the water resources establishement on this forum and I would like them to clarify these issues and get further information from the ministry.
Himanshu
--------------------------------

PIB 210807

Ministry of Water Resources

GLOBAL WARMING AND HYDRO-ELECTRIC PROJECTS

RAJYA SABHA

Various reports indicate that the average temperature values of the earth has in last decade shown increasing trend. As reported by Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the seasonal snow cover has been melting in the last few years, the same way it was in the past and it seems that effect is more pronounced on Glaciers. Geological Survey of India (GSI) have reported that most of the glaciers of Himalayas as well as in the other parts of the world are receding and the recession of the glaciers may result due to subnormal snowfall, higher temperature during summer, less severe winter or a combination of all of them. The GSI has further reported that it may also be due to global warming a topic which is still debatable.

As per GSI, if the present scenario of receding glaciers is accelerated, there may be some reduction in the river discharge. However, it may be noted that the major part of the river discharge is contributed by snow fall and precipitation which is likely to go up with global warming. More melting of glaciers will generate more water initially. Hence there is no likelihood of northern rivers drying up in the near future.

This information was given by the Minister of State in the Ministry of Water Resources Shri Jai Prakash Narayan Yadav in a written reply to question by Smt. Maya Singh :in the Rajya Sabha today.

SKS:PM

--
Himanshu Thakkar

South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers & People
Delhi, India

himanshuthakkar@iitbombay.org
ht.sandrp@gmail.com

www.sandrp.in


Global Warming and Hydro-electric Projects

Global Warming and Hydro-electric Projects

Jai Prakash Narayan Yadav, Minister of State in the Ministry of Water Resources belongs to Rashtriya Janata Dal of Laloo Prasad Yadav. One can be almost confident that none of the political parties including Rashtriya Janata Dal have any position on climate change. Therefore, there is no point in singling him out.

Yadav is simply quoting what Geological Survey of India (GSI) position is with regard to climate change and not articulating the position of Ministry of Water Resources but by doing so it has cleverly indulged in selective reporting of facts to suit its ongoing and proposed hydro-electric projects. There is hardly any credible scientist who has not underlined that global warming is no more a debatable issue, it is a reality staring mankind in the face.


India is a signatory to Kyoto Protocol. Will Gauri Chatterjee, Secretary, Water Resources, Government of India explain as to whether India ratified the Protocol even as it continued to believe that global warming is "debatable"?. Did she brief Yadav properly about climate change? It is her responsibility to brief the Minister about global warming and how land use changes such as through hydro-electric projects contributes to climate change?


At a recent Panel Discussion on Lok Sabha TV, when the Rayapati Sambasiva Rao, chairman, parliamentary standing committee on water resources was informed of how can Water Resources Ministry and the committee feign ignorance about government's own wisdom about climate change. He responded by saying that u intend to terrify me by citing global warming.Yadav is not alone in committing mistakes.


Did the Water Resources Ministry forgot that there is Prime Minister's Council on Climate Change which is coordinating National action plans for assessment, adaptation and mitigation of climate and facilitate inter-ministerial coordination and guide policy in relevant areas?. This mistake seems to have emerged also from the failure of the Council to do its job properly.


According to Namo Narayana Meena, Minister of State in the Ministry of Environment and Forests, "The Government has set up the “Expert Committee on Impacts of Climate Change” on 7th May 2007 under the chairmanship of Dr. R. Chidambaram, Principal Scientific Advisor to the Government of India".

Here is what the Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh himself said in a written reply on 22 August, 2007 in the parliament:

A coordination committee chaired by Prime Minister called Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change has been recently constituted to coordinate national action for assessment, adaptation and mitigation of climate change. The focus of the Committee is to:

i. Evolve a coordinated response to issues relating to climate change at the national level;

ii. Provide oversight for formulation of action plans in the area of assessment, adaptation and mitigation of climate change;

iii. Periodically monitor key policy decisions.

The Government has also set up an “Expert Committee on Impacts of Climate Change”. The Terms of Reference of the Committee are as under:

i. To study the impacts of anthropogenic climate change on India.

ii. To identify the measures that we may have to take in the future in relation to addressing vulnerability to anthropogenic climate change impacts.

iii. Any other matter relevant to (i) and (ii) above.

This information was given by the Prime Minister in a written reply to question by J.M.Aaron Rashid and Dr. Arun Kumar Sarma in the Lok Sabha.

Does the Water Resources Ministry still feel that climate change is "debatable"?

--
Gopal Krishna


---------------------Original Message---------------------------------------------

From: Himanshu Thakkar <ht.sandrp@gmail.com>
Date: Aug 22, 2007 11:38 AM
Subject: Ministry of Water Resources misleading everyone on global warming?
To: waterwatch@yahoogroups.com

Dear All,
The following Press Release from the Press Information Bureau, on behal of the Ministry of Water Resources, Govt of India, on Aug 21, 2007 raises many questions.
1. It says at the end of first para, "it may also be due to global warming a topic which is still debatable." Does this mean the Ministry of Water Resources and hence govt of India still considers global warming is a debatable topic? This is very shocking, when there is so much scientific evidence from all over the world about the impact of global warming on climate and contribution of human activities there of. [If the MWR claims that it is quoting GSI opinion, even then the ministry's stand is questionable as to why did it found fit to quote an unscientific assertion?]
2. The first para says, "the recession of glaciers of the glaciers may result due to subnormal snowfall...", this means that the agencies concerned, including MWR has no idea if there has been reduction in snowfall or not and if there is, how much of that may impact recession of glaciers. Moreover, in the next para the PR says, "...snow fall and precipitation which is likely to go up with global warming..." Now if the global warming will lead to increase in snowfall, than where is the question of the subnormal snowfall leading to recession of glaciers? Theoratically, it can be said that the statement is correct, but practically, there are obvious contradictions.
3. The next statement is, "More melting of glaciers will generate more water initially. Hence there is no likelihood of northern rivers drying up in the near future." Does the ministry have the data to substantiate if the rivers have more water in summer (when glaciers melt)? What does "new future" mean? What will happen after that?
There are some people from the water resources establishement on this forum and I would like them to clarify these issues and get further information from the ministry.
Himanshu
--------------------------------

PIB 210807

Ministry of Water Resources

GLOBAL WARMING AND HYDRO-ELECTRIC PROJECTS

RAJYA SABHA

Various reports indicate that the average temperature values of the earth has in last decade shown increasing trend. As reported by Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the seasonal snow cover has been melting in the last few years, the same way it was in the past and it seems that effect is more pronounced on Glaciers. Geological Survey of India (GSI) have reported that most of the glaciers of Himalayas as well as in the other parts of the world are receding and the recession of the glaciers may result due to subnormal snowfall, higher temperature during summer, less severe winter or a combination of all of them. The GSI has further reported that it may also be due to global warming a topic which is still debatable.

As per GSI, if the present scenario of receding glaciers is accelerated, there may be some reduction in the river discharge. However, it may be noted that the major part of the river discharge is contributed by snow fall and precipitation which is likely to go up with global warming. More melting of glaciers will generate more water initially. Hence there is no likelihood of northern rivers drying up in the near future.

This information was given by the Minister of State in the Ministry of Water Resources Shri Jai Prakash Narayan Yadav in a written reply to question by Smt. Maya Singh :in the Rajya Sabha today.

SKS:PM

--
Himanshu Thakkar

South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers & People
Delhi, India

himanshuthakkar@iitbombay.org
ht.sandrp@gmail.com

www.sandrp.in


Wednesday, August 22, 2007

Blue Lady Report in Parliament

Amid massive uproar due to Indo-US nuclear deal, the Parliamentary Petitions Committee headed by Prabhunath Singh has tabled a report in the Lok Sabha (Lower House of Parliament) on 22 August that has gone into details regarding ship-breaking activities and dumping of toxic waste in the sea in general and the Blue Lady ship in particular.

The Parliamentary Petitions Committee has admonished the Ministry of Environment and Forests for "failing to address" the issue of dumping of toxic waste and ship-breaking activities in the country and asked it to frame a national policy in the matter at the earliest.

The committee has looked into the petition from the Platform with regard to government’s permission for dismantling of Blue Lady ship carrying hazardous waste in violation of a Supreme Court order.

It has taken a position that even the hazardous material, which is inbuilt in the ship, is hazardous waste and sought a national policy that can regulate all such activities including dumping of waste and establish world-class facilities for management and disposal of hazardous material such as asbestos and PCBs.

The matter is likely to be raised again in the parliament with specific reference to radioactive material on the ship at 5500 places that has not been disclosed by the Technical Committee of the Supreme Court.

Tuesday, August 21, 2007

Ronen Sen's interview

Ambassador Sen: 'We will have zero credibility'


Aziz Haniffa in Washington, DC

August 20, 2007 12:07 IST


last Updated:
August 20, 2007 16:03 IST

India's Ambassador to the United States, Ronen Sen -- a key protagonist of the US-India civilian nuclear agreement, and the architect behind scripting the resurrection of the 123 Agreement as it lay virtually dormant for several months -- is quite aghast at the opposition to the deal from the Left parties, not to mention the Bharatiya Janata Party's attempts to torpedo it.

Warning that if the deal begins to unravel because of this opposition it would impact heavily on India's credibility and have grave implications for US-India relations in the future, Sen told Rediff India Abroad that the Hyde Amendment -- which has already been signed into law -- cannot be renegotiated. He declared that it would be a pity if the agreement is not operationalised before the end of the Bush Administration's tenure, because as in the prime minister's words there has not been, and unlikely to be in the near future, a President as friendly and supportive of India as President George W Bush [Images].

Sen said, "If you really look at it (the 123 Agreement), every single (concern) has been met," particularly with regard to reprocessing and assurances of fuel supplies to India's reactors even in the hypothetical case of India conducting a nuclear test, even though there has been no mention of 'testing' in the text।

"What is in the agreement which they are not satisfied with?" he asked। "Not one," and noted that such an agreement was unprecedented in the annals of India's history since its independence 60 years ago.

"All that is in the agreement," he said, "There is no precedence in the United States" either where such an agreement has been so transparent. "Even before it is signed, we made it public -- and that is the most authoritative."

"It has been approved here (in Washington, DC) by the President, and there (in New Delhi) it's been approved by the Indian cabinet. So why do you have all this running around like headless chicken, looking for a comment here or comment there, and these little storms in a tea-cup?"

Sen said he couldn't understand "why we don't have a little bit of confidence," and said he was "really amazed" over the current drama and debate being played out in New Delhi.

"I can understand (such a debate) immediately after independence," he said. "But 60 years after independence! I am really bothered that 60 years after independence, they are so insecure -- that we have not grown up, this lack of confidence and lack of self-respect."

Sen continued to reiterate that this was not a secret document but "a public document," and the fact that it was made available in the public domain "is unprecedented."

He argued that there seems "to be this gap between perception and reality," and said what the critics of the deal don't apparently comprehend is "the enormity of this change. That a country (the United States), which had taken the lead in setting up a regime (the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) where India was targeted, is taking the lead again to exempt India.'

"There has been no parallel of a single country exemption to any of the international regimes," he recalled, "not in the 21st century, the 20th, 19th, 18th, 17th, 16th, in any century. All what we are doing is absolutely unprecedented."

Sen said he simply couldn't understand the argument that India was "getting too close" to the United States, and said, "We are talking of the leading technological country in the world" which everybody else seems to have cottoned on to, "but our people have not or maybe they don't want to believe it."

He asserted that there can be no talk at all vis-�-vis the re-negotiation of the Hyde Amendment. "That's an issue that cannot even be considered."

Sen pointed out that "it is the law of the land," since President Bush has already signed it. "The law is very, very clear. It's on the books."

He said if India tries to re-negotiate this legislation, it would "have zero credibility."

"Can you imagine anybody telling us that this act of your Parliament has not been accepted by the United States and so you have to introduce new legislation and tell your Parliament that the legislation that has been adopted is not acceptable? You won't have any credibility."

According to the envoy, if this deal is not operationalised because the clock runs out in the wake of all the opposition in India and calls for special committees to review it and everything else, even after it has been made public and endorsed by both the US president and the Indian cabinet, "it would be a pity because what the prime minister said is very true -- that we will not, and there has not been and I don't think in the near future we will see such a friend and supporter as this President. Absolutely. There is none."

Sen said if the deal falls through, the implications would indeed be grave for US-India relations, and the entire broad-based agenda envisaged between both countries would be adversely impacted.

He argued that it was because of the excitement over this deal and what it could envisage for the strategic partnership between the US and India that had resulted in the proliferation of visits to India by leading CEOs of American companies. In the past few years, he pointed out, "There has been a quadrupling of visits to India by Senators and Congressmen, there has been a quadrupling of visits by presidents of universities, chancellors leading teams to India. Airlines like Delta, Continental deciding to have direct flights to India."

"So nothing happens by accident. It's not just symbolic. It's much, much more. But will we be able to get benefits out of all that, without this (nuclear agreement)?"

Sen asserted that "all of this is inter-linked. We cannot insulate this. People don't seem to realise that."

Meanwhile, senior diplomatic observers in Washington, DC, slammed the critics of the deal, particularly the BJP, saying that they obviously had made up their minds to oppose the agreement even before they saw the veritable iron-clad 123 Agreement, which was very much in favour of India in terms of addressing all of its concerns with regard to issues like reprocessing and assurances of continued fuel supplies to its civilian nuclear reactors.

"If you remember, people like (former minister) Yashwant Sinha reacted even before they saw the text. So obviously, they had made up their minds in advance, irrespective of even what we got."

The observers said, "The cat was out of the bag because they made their opposition clear even without seeing the text, even though they knew it's going to be made public and were informed of it."

One diplomatic observer, pointing to the BJP's assertions that it would abrogate the agreement if it came into power, recalled that none of the BJP's initiatives and reforms while in government could have been implemented "without Congress's support. They never would have been able to get it through."

Thus, according to this observer, it was beyond his comprehension that the BJP could be "so irresponsible," with statements such as abrogating the agreement if it assumed the reins of power.

"The opposition is supposed to be responsible, and here they are talking of, 'If we come to power, we'll abrogate the agreement'!"

The observer asked, "Has that ever been done? If you look at India in its 60 years, one thing that distinguishes India from any other country in any continent, is that we have always honoured our commitments."

"We have faced every challenge conceivable -- assassinations of political leaders, starting with Mahatma Gandhi [Images], border conflicts, natural disasters of unprecedented magnitude, oil shocks, economic crises, and we've had revolving door governments -- Chandra Shekhar, H D Deve Gowda, Inder Kumar Gujral -- but no government, no successor government, had changed (any agreement). We have always honoured our commitment. This is what distinguishes India -- not just that it is a democracy."

The observer argued that statements such as those warning of the abrogation of agreements "is absolutely going against -- flying against -- your own national interest and the way you are perceived."

"There was only one instance, when after an election a state government changed one contract, and that is Enron. (But) That was a state government. At the central level, none, not one, and that is the one thing that distinguishes us."

Thus, he argued that such statements, "are haphazard, like a childish tantrum saying, we are going to abrogate it, they don't even seem to be aware of what they are saying, the import of what they are saying।".

http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/aug/20inter.htm

Indian Activists' Rising Clout

Indian Activists' Rising Clout

Vedanta case mirrors the challenges investors face

Activists allege the firm did not disclose that it had to clear forest area for the project, which is against Indian law

Jackie Range

The Supreme Court is poised to decide whether a British company has the right to mine in a sacred tribal forest, a case that underlines the complexity of undertaking large-scale industrial projects here.

The case’s hearing by the court reflects the growing clout of activist groups and the bigger role the judiciary is taking in enforcing the country’s environmental rules. Experts say legal challenges could become a greater hurdle for foreign and local investors as India’s environmental lobbyists work together and gather influence.

Vedanta Alumina Ltd, majority-owned by London-listed metals-and-mining company Vedanta Resources Plc., wants the right to mine bauxite in the Niyamgiri hills, in the mineral-rich state of Orissa. Bauxite is refined to produce alumina, which is then smelted to produce aluminium.

Vedanta already operates an alumina refinery it built adjacent to the area it wants to mine, part of an $800 million (Rs3,288 crore) project that also includes a power plant. The company opened the refinery in March, using bauxite from elsewhere.

The environmental and social activists who brought the dispute to the court allege Vedanta didn’t disclose that forest land was needed for the project and, therefore, didn’t get prior clearance from the ministry of environment and forests—a violation of the law.

A spokesman for Vedanta Resources denies this but declined to comment further on the case because it is before the court.

The activists also argue that the project will do serious harm to the flora and fauna of the area, which include rare orchids, elephants, barking deer and sloth bears. Vedanta declined to comment.

At a hearing in May, Vedanta argued that bringing mining to the area would create jobs, said a person who attended the hearing. The company also promised to forest other areas in compensation for the trees lost. The court is scheduled to hear the Vedanta case on Friday. Its ruling could stop the mine project, require Vedanta to find another area to mine or allow the project to proceed, legal observers say.

The legal battle comes against a backdrop of growing social discontent as India’s economic growth of more than 9% leaves many behind.

“India’s much-feted economic miracle is not only bypassing many of the most vulnerable communities suchas Dalits, urban poor and indigenous groups, but is pushing them off their land, out of their homes and destroying their livelihoods,” says Bratindi Jena of the international non-governmental organization ActionAid, which opposes the mine.

As a result, foreign companies flocking here to tap into the booming economy, as well as India’s own fast-growing corporate giants, face increasing grass-roots resistance: Across the country, conflicts have erupted over projects ranging from mines to supermarkets.
In May, villagers opposed to South Korean company Posco’s construction of a huge steel complex in Orissa seized three employees, assaulted two and held them briefly. Canada’s Alcan Inc. had said in April that it would withdraw from a mining-and-refinery venture that had faced years of protests, though a spokeswoman denies that is the reason it pulled out.

Reliance Retail Ltd, a subsidiary of India’s biggest company, Reliance Industries Ltd., which is investing more than $5 billion in a national supermarket chain, has had stores attacked as small traders fear for their livelihoods in the face of major retail competition.
Amid such opposition, “investors need to be aware of the potential for litigators to file public interest litigation in the courts,” says Seema Desai, a London-based India analyst with Eurasia Group, a consultancy firm.

Projects have seen opposition from a range of sources, from farmers to social activists to larger non-governmental organizations. Desai predicts that “over time, some of the protesters or litigators will join hands in more organized ways, in which case it could become a big hurdle for investors.”

Public interest litigation, similar to class-action lawsuits in the US, is filed directly in the Supreme Court because it is considered to be in the general public interest.
In court, environmentalists are already getting a sympathetic ear, says Gurdip Singh, a professor specializing in international and environmental law at the Delhi University. Judicial activism has led to India adopting stringent environmental regulations, he says.

The judiciary tends to see the environment as the property of future generations to be protected, and it treats the right to a healthy environment as a fundamental human right, Singh says.

The Supreme Court is “taking a big interest in things like urban planning, land issues, environmental issues,” says Desai. In taking on such cases, the Supreme Court is filling a gap left by the Union government, which has been reluctant to strictly enforce environmental laws, says Anand Prasad, a New Delhi-based partner with Indian law firm Trilegal.

The Vedanta case centres on a report produced by an expert panel assembled by the ministry of environment and forests on the direction of the apex court.

The report said use of forest land in an ecologically sensitive area like the Niyamgiri hills shouldn’t be permitted. It suggested environmental clearance for the refinery should be revoked until an alternative mine site has been identified, and said that if the plans had been properly reviewed at the outset, the project would have likely been abandoned.

The refinery was completed and began operating after the report was issued. Vedanta Resources declined to comment on the report.

Aug 17 2007

The Wall Street Journal

Mint

Russia vs U.S. – The Cold War Returns

August 19th, 2007

by Paul Burns

Who says Stalin’s doctrines are dead or that Lenin’s teachings are forgotten in Russia? This land of many intrigues and desolate landscapes and beautiful city centers is always a potential world power. The far reaches of the old USSR are now separate and distinct, but the mother country still has the natural resources to compete in the modern world. Now that the upheaval of the instigation of democracy has run its early course, the country is tuning to a more conservative, socialistic bent that resembles the old order. If you don’t believe it, take a look at three separate occurrences of the last six months which verify the trend.

Vladimir Putin is deifying himself in the grade schools. Putin is a Stalin-like personality who no doubt wishes to continue as President For Life. Right or wrong, he thinks propaganda for the young will bring a loyal, subservient populace under his control. Think back to almost every move of Joe Stalin in this matter for a historical pespective.

Russia has begun a new round of long distance bomber over-flights in the Pacific and Atlantic to rattle the saber once again. The equipment used, the cold war long range bomber, is of B-52 vintage and easily intercepted. The real purpose here cannot be strategic any longer but just a reminder that Russia is in the contender mix and not to be ignored. No doubt the aggressive attitude once again signals the old combative attitude. And if there are bomber over flights, the Russians have probably warmed up the remains of the submarine fleet too.

The press is full of the travails of Russian expat multi-billionaires and ex KGB operatives who are meeting with unexplained and catastrophic illnesses and sometimes death. This parallels the aggressive actions of the government in essentially voiding the contracts entered into regarding oil and other minerals and the old factory/hard assets of the USSR. The illustration here is of KGB-like actions on a covert basis which indicates a cross me at your peril program ala Leon Trotsky.

All of this reflects the background of Vladimir Putin। The tactics are Stalinesque and KGB’ish and lawyer like. The odds are high that the coming months will see announcements of more of the same from this Russian administration.

Source: http://www.bloggernews.net/



Monday, August 13, 2007

Rule 184 & rule 193

The Left parties have said that they want a discussion under Rule 193, which does not entail voting, while the NDA and the UNPA have demanded a debate under Rule 184, which requires voting.

PM’s statement in Lok Sabha on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation with US

PM’s statement in the Lok Sabha on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation with the United States


August 13, 2007
New Delhi

Excerpts of the Prime Minister's statement - this is a preliminary transcript that is yet to be corrected and matched with the official transcription from the Lok Sabha.

I rise to inform this august House that the Government of India has reached agreement with the Government of the United States of America on the text of the bilateral Agreement on Cooperation for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.

2. This Government has kept Parliament fully in the picture at various stages of our negotiations with the United States. We have never shied away from a full discussion in Parliament on this important issue. I have myself made statements on several previous occasions – on July 29, 2005 soon after my return from Washington; on February 27, 2006 during which I took Parliament into confidence regarding our ongoing discussions with the United States on the Separation Plan; and on March 7, 2006 following the visit of President Bush to India. I also made a detailed statement in the Rajya Sabha on August 17, 2006 conveying certain solemn commitments to which I shall return shortly.

Our Government has adhered scrupulously to Parliamentary traditions and practices. We have in fact gone far beyond any previous Government.

3. After the conclusion of the Agreement we have also briefed many of the parties represented in Parliament on the details of the Agreement.

4. The Agreement is about civil nuclear energy cooperation. It is an Agreement between two States possessing advanced nuclear technologies, both parties having the same benefits and advantages. The significance of the Agreement lies in the fact that when brought into effect, it will open the way for full civil nuclear energy cooperation between India and the United States. We have negotiated this Agreement as an equal partner, precisely because of the achievements of our scientists and technologists in overcoming the barriers placed around us in the past. This is an Agreement based on the principle of mutual benefit.

5. There has been considerable public debate and discussion on various aspects of the Agreement. On August 17, 2006, I had given a solemn commitment to Parliament and to the country regarding what we can agree and cannot agree with the United States to enable civil nuclear energy cooperation with India. I had stressed that it must be within specific parameters, which I had shared with Parliament. This was an unprecedented measure of transparency on our part even in the midst of complex negotiations.

6. I had given Parliament my assurance that the Government will make every effort so that the vision of the Joint Statements of July, 2005 and March, 2006 becomes a living reality. I believe that we have redeemed that pledge. In concluding this Agreement, we have ensured that the autonomy of our strategic programme is fully maintained, and that Dr. Homi Bhabha’s long-term vision remains our guiding principle.

7. With your permission, I wish to draw the attention of this august House to the main features of the Agreement in some detail. It would become evident that the commitments I had made to Parliament, including those on August 17, 2006, have been fully adhered to.

(i) Full Civil Nuclear Cooperation

Ø The concept of full civil nuclear cooperation has been clearly enshrined in this Agreement. The Agreement stipulates that uch cooperation will include nuclear reactors and aspects of the associated nuclear fuel cycle, including technology transfer on industrial or commercial scale. It would also include development of a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of our reactors.

Ø A significant aspect of the Agreement is our right to reprocess US origin spent fuel. This has been secured upfront. We view our right to reprocess as a key element of a closed fuel cycle, which will enable us to make full use in our national facilities of the energy potential of the nuclear fuel used in our reactors. This important yardstick has been met by the permanent consent for India to reprocess.

Ø India will establish a new national reprocessing facility dedicated to reprocessing foreign nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. India and the US will mutually agree on arrangements and procedures under which such reprocessing will take place in the new facility. Consultations on arrangements and procedures will begin within six months of a request by either party and will be concluded within one year. There is no ambiguity with regard to the commitments of both countries.

Ø Any special fissionable material that may be separated may be utilized in national facilities under IAEA safeguards. Thus the interests of our three stage nuclear programme have been protected.

Ø The United States has a longstanding policy of not supplying to any country enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water production facilities. This Agreement provides for such transfers to India only through an amendment. Forward- looking language has been included for dual use transfers of enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water production facilities. We hope transfers will become possible as cooperation develops and expands in the future. It is important to note that no prohibition that is specifically directed against India has been included in the Agreement.

(ii) The Principle of Reciprocity:

Ø The principle of reciprocity, which was integral to the July 2005 Statement, has been fully safeguarded in this Agreement. There is no change in our position that we would accept only IAEA safeguards on our civilian nuclear facilities. This would also be in a phased manner and as identified for that purpose in the Separation Plan, and only when all international restrictions on nuclear trade with India have been lifted. India will not take any irreversible steps with the IAEA prior to this.

(iii) Certification:

Ø This Agreement emphasizes the desire of both countries to cooperate extensively in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as a means of achieving energy security on a stable, reliable and predictable basis. This Agreement further confirms that US cooperation with India is a permanent one.

There is no provision that states that US cooperation with India will be subject to an annual certification process.

Ø Hon’ble Members may recall that the 18th July 2005 Joint Statement had acknowledged that India be regarded as a state with advanced nuclear technology enjoying the same advantages and benefits as other States with advanced nuclear technology, such as the US. This Agreement makes specific references to India and the United States as States possessing advanced nuclear technology, both parties having the same benefits and advantages, both committed to preventing WMD proliferation.

(iv) Safeguards:

Ø As agreed in the March Separation Plan, India has accepted only IAEA safeguards that will be reflected in an India-specific Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA.

We have not consented to any provision that mandates scrutiny of our nuclear weapons programme or any unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. There are explicit provisions in the Agreement that make it clear that this Agreement does not affect our unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and that it will not affect our right to use materials, equipment, information or technology acquired or developed independently. India and the United States have agreed that the implementation of the Agreement will not hinder or otherwise interfere with India’s nuclear activities including our military nuclear facilities. Nothing in the Agreement would impinge on our strategic programme, our three-stage nuclear power programme or our ability to conduct advanced R&D.

(v) Fuel Supply Assurances:

Ø I would like to reiterate that the March 2006 Separation Plan provided for an India-specific Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, with assurances of uninterrupted supply of fuel to reactors that would be placed under IAEA safeguards together with India’s right to take corrective measures in the event fuel supplies are interrupted. An important assurance given is the commitment of support for India’s right to build up strategic reserves of nuclear fuel to meet the lifetime requirements of India’s reactors.

Ø This Agreement envisages, in consonance with the Separation Plan, US support for an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply for the lifetime of India’s reactors. The Agreement reiterates in toto the corresponding portions of the Separation Plan.

It has endorsed the right of India to take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supply.

Hon’ble Members will agree that these provisions will ensure that there is no repeat of our unfortunate experience with Tarapur.

(vi) Integrity and reliability of our strategic programme, autonomy of decision making and future scientific research and development:

Ø In my statements of March 7 and August 17, 2006, I had assured Parliament that the Separation Plan would not adversely affect our strategic programme, the integrity of the three-stage nuclear programme and the autonomy of our Research and Development activity.

Ø This Agreement does not in any way impact on India’s ability to produce and utilize fissile material for its current and future strategic needs.

Our right to use for our own purposes our independent and indigenously developed nuclear facilities has been fully preserved. The Agreement also provides for non-hindrance and non-interference in our activities involving use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology and military nuclear facilities produced, acquired or developed independently for our own purposes.

(vii) Cessation of cooperation:

Ø An elaborate multi-layered consultation process has been included with regard to any future events that may be cited as a reason by either Party to seek cessation of cooperation or termination of the Agreement. Both Parties have agreed to take a number of factors into account in their consultations so that the scope for precipitate or unilateral action is reduced.

Cessation of cooperation can be sought by the US only if it is prepared to take the extreme step of termination of the Agreement. India’s right to take “corrective measures” will be maintained even after the termination of the Agreement.

Ø In the case of termination of this Agreement and cessation of cooperation by either Party, each has the right to seek return of nuclear material and equipment supplied by it to the other. However, before the right of return is exercised, the Agreement commits the parties to consult and to take into account specific factors such as national security, ongoing contracts and projects, compensation at market value, physical protection and environmental issues. India and the United States have agreed to consider carefully the circumstances that may lead to termination, including a party’s concerns about a change in the security environment or a response to similar actions by other states that could impact on national security.

The Agreement stipulates that the two parties recognise that exercising the right of return would have profound implications and consequences for their relations.

Ø From India’s point of view our primary objective is to ensure the uninterrupted operation of our nuclear reactors, in the context of the detailed fuel supply assurances provided in the Separation Plan and these are now reflected in full in the Agreement. The Agreement specifically states in regard to fuel supply assurances and India’s right to take “corrective measures” that there will be no derogation of India’s rights in this regard, including the right to take “corrective measures” to ensure the uninterrupted operation of its reactors. This reflects the balance of obligations consistent with the understandings of the July Statement and the March Separation Plan.

8. Among the significant and innovative features of this Agreement are specific mention of the right to run foreign supplied reactors ‘without interruption’ and to take ‘corrective measures’ in the event of fuel supply disruption. This has been made possible by crafting the provisions in a manner that provide for explicit linkages and interlocking of rights and commitments contained in the Agreement.

9. The Agreement does not in any way affect India’s right to undertake future nuclear tests, if it is necessary in India’s national interest. Let me hence reiterate once again that a decision to undertake a future nuclear test would be our sovereign decision, one that rests solely with the Government. There is nothing in the Agreement that would tie the hands of a future Government or legally constrain its options to protect India’s security and defence needs.

10. If I might sum-up, this Agreement does not in any way inhibit, restrict or curtail our strategic autonomy or capabilities. Our rights to pursue our three-stage nuclear power programme remain undiluted.

In the unlikely event of cessation of cooperation there is no derogation of our rights with regard to corrective measures. Our reprocessing rights are upfront and are permanent in nature. Advanced R&D programmes and IPR Protection are fully safeguarded.

11. As I have said, this is an Agreement for cooperation between India and the US on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Its genesis is the shared perception between India and the US that both our countries need to address their energy challenges, and address them in a manner that is sensitive to concerns about the environment. For India, it is critically important to maintain our current GDP growth rate of 8 to 10% per annum if our goal of eradicating poverty is to be achieved. The energy implications of this growth rate over the next couple of decades are enormous. Even if we were to exploit all our known resources of coal, oil, gas and hydropower, we would still be confronted with a yawning demand and supply gap.

12. India’s three-stage nuclear power programme holds immense promise for the future. The unique thorium-based technology would become an economically viable alternative over a period of time following sequential implementation of the three stages. We must, in the meantime, explore and exploit every possible source of energy. Nuclear energy is a logical choice for India. Indigenous supplies of uranium are highly inadequate and hence we need to source uranium supply from elsewhere. In a globalised world, technology is always a premium item and we look forward to expanding our horizons in this regard as well. We intend to carry forward our cooperation with other countries in civil nuclear energy, in particular with major nuclear suppliers such as Russia and France.

13. We already have a comprehensive nuclear infrastructure. We have a corps of skilled and technically qualified manpower in this sector. It makes sense for us to leverage this valuable asset. As Hon’ble Members are aware, our target for the year 2020 is 20,000 MW of nuclear power generation. It is quite modest.

However, if international cooperation once again became available, we could hope to double this target.

14. On the basis of the Indo-US bilateral Agreement and the finalisation of an India-specific Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, which is being taken up shortly, the Nuclear Suppliers Group is expected to adapt its guidelines to enable international commerce with India in civil nuclear energy and all dual use technologies associated with it. This would be the beginning of the end of the technology-denial regimes against India that have been in existence for over three decades.

15. Apart from its direct impact on our nuclear energy programme, this Agreement will have major spin-offs for the development of our industries, both public and private. High technology trade with the US and other technologically advanced countries will expand rapidly.

16. I wish to draw attention to another major gain for India from this initiative.

We will be creating opportunities for our scientists to participate in the international exchange of scientific ideas and technical know-how and to contribute to the global effort to deal with the world-wide challenges of energy security and climate change. This includes the International Thermonuclear Research Reactor or ITER project, in which India has already joined as a full and equal member along with a handful of technologically advanced countries.

17. In discussions on this subject, questions have been raised about Government’s commitment to an independent foreign policy. I have clearly spelt out the Government’s position in this regard in my statements to Parliament in March and August 2006. I had specially underlined that the pursuit of a foreign policy that is independent in its judgement is a legacy of our founding fathers and an abiding commitment of my Government. India is too large and too important a country to have the independence of its foreign policy taken away by any power.

Today, India stands on the world stage as an influential and respected member of the international community. There is independence in our thought and independence in our actions.

18. I would like to reiterate that our engagement today with all global powers like US, Russia, China, EU, UK, France, Germany and Japan is unprecedented. Engagement with West, East, South East and Central Asia has been significantly stepped up with visible results. We are building new frontiers in our ties with Africa and Latin America. In South Asia we seek to develop a peaceful environment, one that is conducive to ambitious developmental targets. I urge those who question our commitment to an independent foreign policy to display the same degree of confidence in India, as others from outside do.

19. Thus, there is no question that we will ever compromise, in any manner, our independent foreign policy. We shall retain our strategic autonomy.

At the same time, we must not forget India’s long-standing commitment to the noble ideas of nuclear disarmament and our refusal to participate in any arms race, including a nuclear arms race. Our commitment to universal, non-discriminatory and total elimination of nuclear weapons remains undiminished. It was this vision of a world free of nuclear weapons which Shri Rajiv Gandhi put before the UN in 1988 and this still has universal resonance.

20. We remain committed to a voluntary, unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. We are also committed to negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty or FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament. India is willing to join only a non-discriminatory, multilaterally negotiated, and internationally verifiable FMCT, as and when it is concluded in the Conference on Disarmament, subject to it meeting our national security interests.

21. Despite changes in government and changes in political leadership we have always tempered the exercise of our strategic autonomy with a sense of global responsibility and with a commitment to the ideals of general and complete disarmament, including global nuclear disarmament. This Government believes that our commitment to these ideals and our efforts to realize them must continue, and continue with even greater vigour, now that we are a nuclear weapon state. The possession of nuclear weapons only increases our sense of responsibility and does not diminish it.

22. Pending global nuclear disarmament, India has maintained an impeccable non-proliferation record. As a responsible nuclear power, India will not be the source of proliferation of sensitive technologies. We stand for the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime as the infirmities in this regime have affected our security interests. We will work together with the international community to advance our common objective of non-proliferation.

23. There are now other landmarks to cross before the goal of India joining the international mainstream as a full and equal partner becomes a reality. We have to finalise an India-specific Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. Thereafter, the Nuclear Suppliers Group has to agree, by consensus, to adapt its guidelines, we expect without conditions, to enable nuclear commerce with India and to dismantle the restrictions on the transfer of dual use technologies and items to our country. The US Administration is to secure requisite approval from the US Congress. The completion of these next steps will mark the practical realization of this initiative.

24. Our negotiators deserve credit for delivering to the nation an Agreement, which can potentially transform the economic prospects of our country. It is an Agreement that will enable us to meet the twin challenges of energy security and environmental sustainability, and remove the technology denial regimes that have, for decades, been a major constraint on our development.

At the same time, it will bring India the recognition it deserves thanks to the outstanding achievements of our scientists in nuclear and space sciences as well as other high technology areas.

25. This historic initiative has received the steadfast support of President Bush and senior members of his Administration. The strengthening and enhancement of our bilateral relations is an objective that has received his unstinting personal support and commitment. This Agreement is a shining example of how far we have progressed.

26. Finally, Sir, let me end by saying that we have achieved an Agreement that is good for India, and good for the world. I am neither given to exaggeration nor am I known to be self-congratulatory. I will let history judge; I will let posterity judge the value of what we have done through this Agreement. In days to come it will be seen that it is not just the United States but nations across the world that wish to arrive at a new equilibrium in their relations with India. This agreement with the United States will open new doors in capitals across the world. It is another step in our journey to regain our due place in global councils. When future generations look back, they will come to acknowledge the significance of this historic deal.

Thank you, Sir.


Agreement for Cooperation Between The Government of India and The Government of The United States of America Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy -03/08/2007
here it is

123 Agreement

Full text of the Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy (123 Agreement).

The Government of India and the Government of the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

RECOGNIZING the significance of civilian nuclear energy for meeting growing global energy demands in a cleaner and more efficient manner;

DESIRING to cooperate extensively in the full development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as a means of achieving energy security, on a stable, reliable and predictable basis;

WISHING to develop such cooperation on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit, reciprocity and with due respect for each other's nuclear programmes;

DESIRING to establish the necessary legal framework and basis for cooperation concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

AFFIRMING that cooperation under this Agreement is between two States possessing advanced nuclear technology, both Parties having the same benefits and advantages, both committed to preventing WMD proliferation;

NOTING the understandings expressed in the India - U.S. Joint Statement of July 18, 2005 to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India covering aspects of the associated nuclear fuel cycle;

AFFIRMING their support for the objectives of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system, as applicable to India and the United States of America, and its importance in ensuring that international cooperation in development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is carried out under arrangements that will not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

NOTING their respective commitments to safety and security of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to adequate physical protection of nuclear material and effective national export controls;

MINDFUL that peaceful nuclear activities must be undertaken with a view to protecting the environment;

MINDFUL of their shared commitment to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and

DESIROUS of strengthening the strategic partnership between them;

Have agreed on the following:

ARTICLE 1 - DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this Agreement:

(A) "By-product material" means any radioactive material (except special fissionable material) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing special fissionable material. By-product material shall not be subject to safeguards or any other form of verification under this Agreement, unless it has been decided otherwise by prior mutual agreement in writing between the two Parties.

(B) "Component" means a component part of equipment, or other item so designated by agreement of the Parties.

(C) "Conversion" means any of the normal operations in the nuclear fuel cycle, preceding fuel fabrication and excluding enrichment, by which uranium is transformed from one chemical form to another - for example, from uranium hexafluoride (UF6) to uranium dioxide (UO2) or from uranium oxide to metal.

(D) "Decommissioning" means the actions taken at the end of a facility's useful life to retire the facility from service in the manner that provides adequate protection for the health and safety of the decommissioning workers and the general public, and for the environment.These actions can range from closing down the facility and a minimal removal of nuclear material coupled with continuing maintenance and surveillance, to a complete removal of residual radioactivity in excess of levels acceptable for unrestricted use of the facility and its site.

(E) "Dual-Use Item" means a nuclear related item which has a technical use in both nuclear and non-nuclear applications.

(F) "Equipment" means any equipment in nuclear operation including reactor, reactor pressure vessel, reactor fuel charging and discharging equipment, reactor control rods, reactor pressure tubes, reactor primary coolant pumps, zirconium tubing, equipment for fuel fabrication and any other item so designated by the Parties.

(G) "High enriched uranium" means uranium enriched to twenty percent or greater in the isotope 235.

(H) "Information" means any information that is not in the public domain and is transferred in any form pursuant to this Agreement and so designated and documented in hard copy or digital form by mutual agreement by the Parties that it shall be subject to this Agreement, but will cease to be information whenever the Party transferring the information or any third party legitimately releases it into the public domain.

(I) "Low enriched uranium" means uranium enriched to less than twenty percent in the isotope 235.

(J) "Major critical component" means any part or group of parts essential to the operation of a sensitive nuclear facility or heavy water production facility.

(K) "Non-nuclear material" means heavy water, or any other material suitable for use in a reactor to slow down high velocity neutrons and increase the likelihood of further fission, as may be jointly designated by the appropriate authorities of the Parties.

(L) "Nuclear material" means (1) source material and (2) special fissionable material. "Source material" means uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the isotope 235; thorium; any of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical compound, or concentrate; any other material containing one or more of the foregoing in such concentration as the Board of Governors of the IAEA shall from time to time determine; and such other materials as the Board of Governors of the IAEA may determine or as may be agreed by the appropriate authorities of both Parties. "Special fissionable material" means plutonium, uranium-233, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or 235, any substance containing one or more of the foregoing, and such other substances as the Board of Governors of the IAEA may determine or as may be agreed by the appropriate authorities of both Parties. "Special fissionable material" does not include "source material". Any determination by the Board of Governors of the IAEA under Article XX of that Agency's Statute or otherwise that amends the list of materials considered to be "source material" or "special fissionable material" shall only have effect under this Agreement when both Parties to this Agreement have informed each other in writing that they accept such amendment.

(M) "Peaceful purposes" include the use of information, nuclear material, equipment or components in such fields as research, power generation, medicine, agriculture and industry, but do not include use in, research on, or development of any nuclear explosive device or any other military purpose.Provision of power for a military base drawn from any power network, production of radioisotopes to be used for medical purposes in military environment for diagnostics, therapy and sterility assurance, and other similar purposes as may be mutually agreed by the Parties shall not be regarded as military purpose.

(N) "Person" means any individual or any entity subject to the territorial jurisdiction of either Party but does not include the Parties.

(O) "Reactor" means any apparatus, other than a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device, in which a self-sustaining fission chain reaction is maintained by utilizing uranium, plutonium, or thorium or any combination thereof.

(P) "Sensitive nuclear facility" means any facility designed or used primarily for uranium enrichment, reprocessing of nuclear fuel, or fabrication of nuclear fuel containing plutonium.

(Q) "Sensitive nuclear technology" means any information that is not in the public domain and that is important to the design, construction, fabrication, operation, or maintenance of any sensitive nuclear facility, or other such information that may be so designated by agreement of the Parties.

ARTICLE 2 - SCOPE OF COOPERATION

1. The Parties shall cooperate in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. Each Party shall implement this Agreement in accordance with its respective applicable treaties, national laws, regulations, and license requirements concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

2. The purpose of the Agreement being to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation between the Parties, the Parties may pursue cooperation in all relevant areas to include, but not limited to, the following:

a. Advanced nuclear energy research and development in such areas as may be agreed between the Parties;
b. Nuclear safety matters of mutual interest and competence, as set out in Article 3;
c. Facilitation of exchange of scientists for visits, meetings, symposia and collaborative research;
d. Full civil nuclear cooperation activities covering nuclear reactors and aspects of the associated nuclear fuel cycleincluding technology transfer on an industrial or commercial scale between the Parties or authorized persons;
e. Development of a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors;
f. Advanced research and development in nuclear sciences including but not limited to biological research, medicine, agriculture and industry, environment and climate change;
g. Supply between the Parties, whether for use by or for the benefit of the Parties or third countries, of nuclear material;
h. Alteration in form or content of nuclear material as provided for in Article 6;
i. Supply between the Parties of equipment, whether for use by or for the benefit of the Parties or third countries;
j. Controlled thermonuclear fusion including in multilateral projects; and
k. Other areas of mutual interest as may be agreed by the Parties.

3. Transfer of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components and information under this Agreement may be undertaken directly between the Parties or through authorized persons. Such transfers shall be subject to this Agreement and to such additional terms and conditions as may be agreed by the Parties.Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components and information transferred from the territory of one Party to the territory of the other Party, whether directly or through a third country, will be regarded as having been transferred pursuant to this Agreement only upon confirmation, by the appropriate authority of the recipient Party to the appropriate authority of the supplier Party that such items both will be subject to the Agreement and have been received by the recipient Party.

4. The Parties affirm that the purpose of this Agreement is to provide for peaceful nuclear cooperation and not to affect the unsafeguarded nuclear activities of either Party. Accordingly, nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted as affecting the rights of the Parties to use for their own purposes nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology produced, acquired or developed by them independent of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology transferred to them pursuant to this Agreement. This Agreement shall be implemented in a manner so as not to hinder or otherwise interfere with any other activities involving the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology and military nuclear facilities produced, acquired or developed by them independent of this Agreement for their own purposes.

ARTICLE 3 - TRANSFER OF INFORMATION

1. Information concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes may be transferred between the Parties. Transfers of information may be accomplished through reports, data banks and computer programs and any other means mutually agreed to by the Parties. Fields that may be covered include, but shall not be limited to, the following:

a. Research, development, design, construction, operation, maintenance and use of reactors, reactor experiments, and decommissioning;
b. The use of nuclear material in physical, chemical, radiological and biological research, medicine, agriculture and industry;
c. Fuel cycle activities to meet future world-wide civil nuclear energy needs, including multilateral approaches to which they are parties for ensuring nuclear fuel supply and appropriate techniques for management of nuclear wastes;
d. Advanced research and development in nuclear science and technology;
e. Health, safety, and environmental considerations related to the foregoing;
f. Assessments of the role nuclear power may play in national energy plans;
g. Codes, regulations and standards for the nuclear industry;
h. Research on controlled thermonuclear fusion including bilateral activities and contributions toward multilateral projects such as the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER); and
i. Any other field mutually agreed to by the Parties.

2. Cooperation pursuant to this Article may include, but is not limited to, training, exchange of personnel, meetings, exchange of samples, materials and instruments for experimental purposes and a balanced participation in joint studies and projects.

3. This Agreement does not require the transfer of any information regarding matters outside the scope of this Agreement, or information that the Parties are not permitted under their respective treaties, national laws, or regulations to transfer.


4. Restricted Data, as defined by each Party, shall not be transferred under this Agreement.

ARTICLE 4 - NUCLEAR TRADE

1.The Parties shall facilitate nuclear trade between themselves in the mutual interests of their respective industry, utilities and consumers and also, where appropriate, trade between third countries and either Party of items obligated to the other Party. The Parties recognize that reliability of supplies is essential to ensure smooth and uninterrupted operation of nuclear facilities and that industry in both the Parties needs continuing reassurance that deliveries can be made on time in order to plan for the efficient operation of nuclear installations.

2. Authorizations, including export and import licenses as well as authorizations or consents to third parties, relating to trade, industrial operations or nuclear material movement should be consistent with the sound and efficient administration of this Agreement and should not be used to restrict trade. It is further agreed that if the relevant authority of the concerned Party considers that an application cannot be processed within a twomonth period it shall immediately, upon request, provide reasoned information to the submitting Party. In the event of a refusal to authorize an application or a delay exceeding four months from the date of the first application the Party of the submitting persons or undertakings may call for urgent consultations under Article 13 of this Agreement, which shall take place at the earliest opportunity and in any case not later than 30 days after such a request.

ARTICLE 5 - TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL, NON-NUCLEAR MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT, COMPONENTS AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY

1. Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components may be transferred for applications consistent with this Agreement. Any special fissionable material transferred under this Agreement shall be low enriched uranium, except as provided in paragraph 5.

2. Sensitive nuclear technology, heavy water production technology, sensitive nuclear facilities, heavy water production facilities and major critical components of such facilities may be transferred under this Agreement pursuant to an amendment to this Agreement. Transfers of dual-use items that could be used in enrichment, reprocessing or heavy water production facilities will be subject to the Parties' respective applicable laws, regulations and license policies.

3. Natural or low enriched uranium may be transferred for use as fuel in reactor experiments and in reactors, for conversion or fabrication, or for such other purposes as may be agreed to by the Parties.

4. The quantity of nuclear material transferred under this Agreement shall be consistent with any of the following purposes: use in reactor experiments or the loading of reactors, the efficient and continuous conduct of such reactor experiments or operation of reactors for their lifetime, use as samples, standards, detectors, and targets, and the accomplishment of other purposes as may be agreed by the Parties.

5. Small quantities of special fissionable material may be transferred for use as samples, standards, detectors, and targets, and for such other purposes as the Parties may agree.

6.

(a) The United States has conveyed its commitment to the reliable supply of fuel to India. Consistent with the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement, the United States has also reaffirmed its assurance to create the necessary conditions for India to have assured and full access to fuel for its reactors. As part of its implementation of the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement the United States is committed to seeking agreement from the U.S.Congress to amend its domestic laws and to work with friends and allies to adjust the practices of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to create the necessary conditions for India to obtain full access to the international fuel market, including reliable, uninterrupted and continual access to fuel supplies from firms in several nations.

(b) To further guard against any disruption of fuel supplies, the United States is prepared to take the following additional steps:

i) The United States is willing to incorporate assurances regarding fuel supply in the bilateral U.S.-India agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy under Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which would be submitted to the U.S. Congress.

ii) The United States will join India in seeking to negotiate with the IAEA an India-specific fuel supply agreement.

iii) The United States will support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors.

iv) If despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs, the United States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries to include countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India.

(c) In light of the above understandings with the United States, an India-specific safeguards agreement will be negotiated between India and the IAEA providing for safeguards to guard against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time as well as providing for corrective measures that India may take to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies. Taking this into account, India will place its civilian nuclear facilities under India-specific safeguards in perpetuity and negotiate an appropriate safeguards agreement to this end with the IAEA.


ARTICLE 6 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE ACTIVITIES

In keeping with their commitment to full civil nuclear cooperation, both Parties, as they do with other states with advanced nuclear technology, may carry out the following nuclear fuel cycle activities:

i) Within the territorial jurisdiction of either Party, enrichment up to twenty percent in the isotope 235 of uranium transferred pursuant to this Agreement, as well as of uranium used in or produced through the use of equipment so transferred, may be carried out.

ii) Irradiation within the territorial jurisdiction of either Party of plutonium, uranium-233, high enriched uranium and irradiated nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement or used in or produced through the use of non-nuclear material, nuclear material or equipment so transferred may be carried out.

iii) With a view to implementing full civil nuclear cooperation as envisioned in the Joint Statement of the Parties of July 18, 2005, the Parties grant each other consent to reprocess or otherwise alter in form or content nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material and by-product material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, or equipment so transferred. To bring these rights into effect, India will establish a new national reprocessing facility dedicated to reprocessing safeguarded nuclear material under IAEA safeguards and the Parties will agree on arrangements and procedures under which such reprocessing or other alteration in form or content will take place in this new facility.Consultations on arrangements and procedures will begin within six months of a request by either Party and will be concluded within one year. The Parties agree on the application of IAEA safeguards to all facilities concerned with the above activities. These arrangements and procedures shall include provisions with respect to physical protection standards set out in Article 8, storage standards set out in Article 7, and environmental protections set forth in Article 11 of this Agreement, and such other provisions as may be agreed by the Parties. Any special fissionable material that may be separated may only be utilized in national facilities under IAEA safeguards.

iv) Post-irradiation examination involving chemical dissolution or separation of irradiated nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement or irradiated nuclear material used in or produced through the use of non-nuclear material, nuclear material or equipment so transferred may be carried out.

ARTICLE 7 - STORAGE AND RETRANSFERS

1. Plutonium and uranium 233 (except as either may be contained in irradiated fuel elements), and high enriched uranium, transferred pursuant to this Agreement or used in or produced through the use of material or equipment so transferred, may be stored in facilities that are at all times subject, as a minimum, to the levels of physical protection that are set out in IAEA document INFCIRC 225/REV 4 as it may be revised and accepted by the Parties. Each Party shall record such facilities on a list, made available to the other Party. A Party's list shall be held confidential if that Party so requests. Either Party may make changes to its list by notifying the other Party in writing and receiving a written acknowledgement. Such acknowledgement shall be given no later than thirty days after the receipt of the notification and shall be limited to a statement that the notification has been received. If there are grounds to believe that the provisions of this sub-Article are not being fully complied with, immediate consultations may be called for. Following upon such consultations, each Party shall ensure by means of such consultations that necessary remedial measures are taken immediately. Such measures shall be sufficient to restore the levels of physical protection referred to above at the facility in question. However, if the Party on whose territory the nuclear material in question is stored determines that such measures are not feasible, it will shift the nuclear material to another appropriate, listed facility it identifies.

2. Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, and information transferred pursuant to this Agreement and any special fissionable material produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material or equipment so transferred shall not be transferred or re-transferred to unauthorized persons or, unless the Parties agree, beyond the recipient Party's territorial jurisdiction.

ARTICLE 8 - PHYSICAL PROTECTION

1. Adequate physical protection shall be maintained with respect to nuclear material and equipment transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material or equipment so transferred.

2. To fulfill the requirement in paragraph 1, each Party shall apply measures in accordance with (i) levels of physical protection at least equivalent to the recommendations published in IAEA document INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 entitled "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities," and in any subsequent revisions of that document agreed to by the Parties, and (ii) the provisions of the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and any amendments to the Convention that enter into force for both Parties.

3.The Parties will keep each other informed through diplomatic channels of those agencies or authorities having responsibility for ensuring that levels of physical protection for nuclear material in their territory or under their jurisdiction or control are adequately met and having responsibility for coordinating response and recovery operations in the event of unauthorized use or handling of material subject to this Article. The Parties will also keep each other informed through diplomatic channels of the designated points of contact within their national authorities to cooperate on matters of out-of-country transportation and other matters of mutual concern.

4. The provisions of this Article shall be implemented in such a manner as to avoid undue interference in the Parties' peaceful nuclear activities and so as to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the safe and economic conduct of their peaceful nuclear programs.

ARTICLE 9 - PEACEFUL USE

Nuclear material, equipment and components transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material and by-product materialused in or produced through the use of any nuclear material, equipment, and components so transferred shall not be used by the recipient Party for any nuclear explosive device, for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device or for any military purpose.

ARTICLE 10 - IAEA SAFEGUARDS

1. Safeguards will be maintained with respect to all nuclear materials and equipment transferred pursuant to this Agreement, and with respect to all special fissionable material used in or produced through the use of such nuclear materials and equipment, so long as the material or equipment remains under the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating Party.

2. Taking into account Article 5.6 of this Agreement, India agrees that nuclear material and equipment transferred to India by the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement and any nuclear material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or components so transferred shall be subject to safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with the India-specific Safeguards Agreement between India and the IAEA [identifying data] and an Additional Protocol, when in force.

3. Nuclear material and equipment transferred to the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement and any nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, or components so transferred shall be subject to the Agreement between the United States of America and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in the United States of America, done at Vienna November 18, 1977, which entered into force on December 9, 1980, and an Additional Protocol, when in force.

4. If the IAEA decides that the application of IAEA safeguards is no longer possible, the supplier and recipient should consult and agree on appropriate verification measures.

5. Each Party shall take such measures as are necessary to maintain and facilitate the application of IAEA safeguards in its respective territory provided for under this Article.

6. Each Party shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any material, equipment, or components so transferred. The procedures applicable to India shall be those set forth in the India-specific Safeguards Agreement referred to in Paragraph 2 of this Article.

7. Upon the request of either Party, the other Party shall report or permit the IAEA to report to the requesting Party on the status of all inventories of material subject to this Agreement.

8.The provisions of this Article shall be implemented in such a manner as to avoid hampering, delay, or undue interference in the Parties' peaceful nuclear activities and so as to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the safe and economic conduct of their peaceful nuclear programs.

ARTICLE 11 - ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

The Parties shall cooperate in following the best practices for minimizing the impact on the environment from any radioactive, chemical or thermal contamination arising from peaceful nuclear activities under this Agreement and in related matters of health and safety.

ARTICLE 12 - IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT

1. This Agreement shall be implemented in a manner designed:

a) to avoid hampering or delaying the nuclear activities in the territory of either Party;
b) to avoid interference in such activities;
c) to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the safe conduct of such activities; and
d) to take full account of the long term requirements of the nuclear energy programs of the Parties.

2. The provisions of this Agreement shall not be used to:

a) secure unfair commercial or industrial advantages or to restrict trade to the disadvantage of persons and undertakings of either Party or hamper their commercial or industrial interests, whether international or domestic;
b) interfere with the nuclear policy or programs for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy including research and development; or
c) impede the free movement of nuclear material, non nuclear material and equipment supplied under this Agreement within the territory of the Parties.

3. When execution of an agreement or contract pursuant to this Agreement between Indian and United States organizations requires exchanges of experts, the Parties shall facilitate entry of the experts to their territories and their stay therein consistent with national laws, regulations and practices. When other cooperation pursuant to this Agreement requires visits of experts, the Parties shall facilitate entry of the experts to their territory and their stay therein consistent with national laws, regulations and practices.

ARTICLE 13 - CONSULTATIONS

1. The Parties undertake to consult at the request of either Party regarding the implementation of this Agreement and the development of further cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy on a stable, reliable and predictable basis. The Parties recognize that such consultations are between two States with advanced nuclear technology, which have agreed to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology.

2. Each Party shall endeavor to avoid taking any action that adversely affects cooperation envisaged under Article 2 of this Agreement. If either Party at any time following the entry into force of this Agreement does not comply with the provisions of this Agreement, the Parties shall promptly hold consultations with a view to resolving the matter in a way that protects the legitimate interests of both Parties, it being understood that rights of either Party under Article 16.2 remain unaffected.

3. Consultations under this Article may be carried out by a Joint Committee specifically established for this purpose. A Joint Technical Working Group reporting to the Joint Committee will be set up to ensure the fulfillment of the requirements of the Administrative Arrangements referred to in Article 17.


ARTICLE 14 - TERMINATION AND CESSATION OF COOPERATION

1.Either Party shall have the right to terminate this Agreement prior to its expiration on one year's written notice to the other Party. A Party giving notice of termination shall provide the reasons for seeking such termination. The Agreement shall terminate one year from the date of the written notice, unless the notice has been withdrawn by the providing Party in writing prior to the date of termination.

2. Before this Agreement is terminated pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the Parties shall consider the relevant circumstances and promptly hold consultations, as provided in Article 13, to address the reasons cited by the Party seeking termination. The Party seeking termination has the right to cease further cooperation under this Agreement if it determines that a mutually acceptable resolution of outstanding issues has not been possible or cannot be achieved through consultations. The Parties agree to consider carefully the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation of cooperation. They further agree to take into account whether the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation resulted from a Party's serious concern about a changed security environment or as a response to similar actions by other States which could impact national security.

3. If a Party seeking termination cites a violation of this Agreement as the reason for notice for seeking termination, the Parties shall consider whether the action was caused inadvertently or otherwise and whether the violation could be considered as material. No violation may be considered as being material unless corresponding to the definition of material violation or breach in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. If a Party seeking termination cites a violation of an IAEA safeguards agreement as the reason for notice for seeking termination, a crucial factor will be whether the IAEA Board of Governors has made a finding of non-compliance.

4. Following the cessation of cooperation under this Agreement, either Party shall have the right to require the return by the other Party of any nuclear material, equipment, non-nuclear material or components transferred under this Agreement and any special fissionable material produced through their use. A notice by a Party that is invoking the right of return shall be delivered to the other Party on or before the date of termination of this Agreement. The notice shall contain a statement of the items subject to this Agreement as to which the Party is requesting return. Except as provided in provisions of Article 16.3, all other legal obligations pertaining to this Agreement shall cease to apply with respect to the nuclear items remaining on the territory of the Party concerned upon termination of this Agreement.

5. The two Parties recognize that exercising the right of return would have profound implications for their relations. If either Party seeks to exercise its right pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, it shall, prior to the removal from the territory or from the control of the other Party of any nuclear items mentioned in paragraph 4, undertake consultations with the other Party. Such consultations shall give special consideration to the importance of uninterrupted operation of nuclear reactors of the Party concerned with respect to the availability of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as a means of achieving energy security. Both Parties shall take into account the potential negative consequences of such termination on the on-going contracts and projects initiated under this Agreement of significance for the respective nuclear programmes of either Party.

6.If either Party exercises its right of return pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, it shall, prior to the removal from the territory or from the control of the other Party, compensate promptly that Party for the fair market value thereof and for the costs incurred as a consequence of such removal. If the return of nuclear items is required, the Parties shall agree on methods and arrangements for the return of the items, the relevant quantity of the items to be returned, and the amount of compensation that would have to be paid by the Party exercising the right to the other Party.

7. Prior to return of nuclear items, the Parties shall satisfy themselves that full safety, radiological and physical protection measures have been ensured in accordance with their existing national regulations and that the transfers pose no unreasonable risk to either Party, countries through which the nuclear items may transit and to the global environment and are in accordance with existing international regulations.

8. The Party seeking the return of nuclear items shall ensure that the timing, methods and arrangements for return of nuclear items are in accordance with paragraphs 5, 6 and 7. Accordingly, the consultations between the Parties shall address mutual commitments as contained in Article 5.6. It is not the purpose of the provisions of this Article regarding cessation of cooperation and right of return to derogate from the rights of the Parties under Article 5.6.

9. The arrangements and procedures concluded pursuant to Article 6(iii) shall be subject to suspension by either Party in exceptional circumstances, as defined by the Parties, after consultations have been held between the Parties aimed at reaching mutually acceptable resolution of outstanding issues, while taking into account the effects of such suspension on other aspects of cooperation under this Agreement.

ARTICLE 15 - SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Any dispute concerning the interpretation or implementation of the provisions of this Agreement shall be promptly negotiated by the Parties with a view to resolving that dispute.

ARTICLE 16 - ENTRY INTO FORCE AND DURATION

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the Parties exchange diplomatic notes informing each other that they have completed all applicable requirements for its entry into force.

2. This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of40 years. It shall continue in force thereafter for additional periods of 10 years each. Each Party may, by giving 6 months written notice to the other Party, terminate this Agreement at the end of the initial 40 year period or at the end of any subsequent 10 year period.

3. Notwithstanding the termination or expiration of this Agreement or withdrawal of a Party from this Agreement, Articles 5.6(c), 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 15 shall continue in effect so long as any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, by-product material, equipment or components subject to these articles remains in the territory of the Party concerned or under its jurisdiction or control anywhere, or until such time as the Parties agree that such nuclear material is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards.

4. This Agreement shall be implemented in good faith and in accordance with the principles of international law.

5. The Parties may consult, at the request of either Party, on possible amendments to this Agreement. This Agreement may be amended if the Parties so agree.Any amendment shall enter into force on the date on which the Parties exchange diplomatic notes informing each other that their respective internal legal procedures necessary for the entry into force have been completed.

ARTICLE 17 - ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENT

1. The appropriate authorities of the Parties shall establish an Administrative Arrangement in order to provide for the effective implementation of the provisions of this Agreement.

2. The principles of fungibility and equivalence shall apply to nuclear material and non-nuclear material subject to this Agreement. Detailed provisions for applying these principles shall be set forth in the Administrative Arrangement.

3. The Administrative Arrangement established pursuant to this Article may be amended by agreement of the appropriate authorities of the Parties.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at , this day of , 200 , in duplicate.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF INDIA:

AGREED MINUTE

During the negotiation of the Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy ("the Agreement") signed today, the following understandings, which shall be an integral part of the Agreement, were reached.

Proportionality

For the purposes of implementing the rights specified in Articles 6 and 7 of the Agreement with respect to special fissionable material and by-product material produced through the use of nuclear material and non-nuclear material, respectively, transferred pursuant to the Agreement and not used in or produced through the use of equipment transferred pursuant to the Agreement, such rights shall in practice be applied to that proportion of special fissionable material and by-product material produced that represents the ratio of transferred nuclear material and non-nuclear material, respectively, used in the production of the special fissionable material and by-product material to the total amount of nuclear material and non-nuclear material so used, and similarly for subsequent generations.

By-product material

The Parties agree that reporting and exchanges of information on by-product material subject to the Agreement will be limited to the following:

(1) Both Parties would comply with the provisions as contained in the IAEA document GOV/1999/19/Rev.2, with regard to by-product material subject to the Agreement.

(2) With regard to tritium subject to the Agreement, the Parties will exchange annually information pertaining to its disposition for peaceful purposes consistent with Article 9 of this Agreement.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF INDIA:



PM’s statement in Lok Sabha on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation with US

PM’s statement in the Lok Sabha on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation with the United States


August 13, 2007
New Delhi

Excerpts of the Prime Minister's statement - this is a preliminary transcript that is yet to be corrected and matched with the official transcription from the Lok Sabha.

I rise to inform this august House that the Government of India has reached agreement with the Government of the United States of America on the text of the bilateral Agreement on Cooperation for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.

2. This Government has kept Parliament fully in the picture at various stages of our negotiations with the United States. We have never shied away from a full discussion in Parliament on this important issue. I have myself made statements on several previous occasions – on July 29, 2005 soon after my return from Washington; on February 27, 2006 during which I took Parliament into confidence regarding our ongoing discussions with the United States on the Separation Plan; and on March 7, 2006 following the visit of President Bush to India. I also made a detailed statement in the Rajya Sabha on August 17, 2006 conveying certain solemn commitments to which I shall return shortly.

Our Government has adhered scrupulously to Parliamentary traditions and practices. We have in fact gone far beyond any previous Government.

3. After the conclusion of the Agreement we have also briefed many of the parties represented in Parliament on the details of the Agreement.

4. The Agreement is about civil nuclear energy cooperation. It is an Agreement between two States possessing advanced nuclear technologies, both parties having the same benefits and advantages. The significance of the Agreement lies in the fact that when brought into effect, it will open the way for full civil nuclear energy cooperation between India and the United States. We have negotiated this Agreement as an equal partner, precisely because of the achievements of our scientists and technologists in overcoming the barriers placed around us in the past. This is an Agreement based on the principle of mutual benefit.

5. There has been considerable public debate and discussion on various aspects of the Agreement. On August 17, 2006, I had given a solemn commitment to Parliament and to the country regarding what we can agree and cannot agree with the United States to enable civil nuclear energy cooperation with India. I had stressed that it must be within specific parameters, which I had shared with Parliament. This was an unprecedented measure of transparency on our part even in the midst of complex negotiations.

6. I had given Parliament my assurance that the Government will make every effort so that the vision of the Joint Statements of July, 2005 and March, 2006 becomes a living reality. I believe that we have redeemed that pledge. In concluding this Agreement, we have ensured that the autonomy of our strategic programme is fully maintained, and that Dr. Homi Bhabha’s long-term vision remains our guiding principle.

7. With your permission, I wish to draw the attention of this august House to the main features of the Agreement in some detail. It would become evident that the commitments I had made to Parliament, including those on August 17, 2006, have been fully adhered to.

(i) Full Civil Nuclear Cooperation

Ø The concept of full civil nuclear cooperation has been clearly enshrined in this Agreement. The Agreement stipulates that uch cooperation will include nuclear reactors and aspects of the associated nuclear fuel cycle, including technology transfer on industrial or commercial scale. It would also include development of a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of our reactors.

Ø A significant aspect of the Agreement is our right to reprocess US origin spent fuel. This has been secured upfront. We view our right to reprocess as a key element of a closed fuel cycle, which will enable us to make full use in our national facilities of the energy potential of the nuclear fuel used in our reactors. This important yardstick has been met by the permanent consent for India to reprocess.

Ø India will establish a new national reprocessing facility dedicated to reprocessing foreign nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. India and the US will mutually agree on arrangements and procedures under which such reprocessing will take place in the new facility. Consultations on arrangements and procedures will begin within six months of a request by either party and will be concluded within one year. There is no ambiguity with regard to the commitments of both countries.

Ø Any special fissionable material that may be separated may be utilized in national facilities under IAEA safeguards. Thus the interests of our three stage nuclear programme have been protected.

Ø The United States has a longstanding policy of not supplying to any country enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water production facilities. This Agreement provides for such transfers to India only through an amendment. Forward- looking language has been included for dual use transfers of enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water production facilities. We hope transfers will become possible as cooperation develops and expands in the future. It is important to note that no prohibition that is specifically directed against India has been included in the Agreement.

(ii) The Principle of Reciprocity:

Ø The principle of reciprocity, which was integral to the July 2005 Statement, has been fully safeguarded in this Agreement. There is no change in our position that we would accept only IAEA safeguards on our civilian nuclear facilities. This would also be in a phased manner and as identified for that purpose in the Separation Plan, and only when all international restrictions on nuclear trade with India have been lifted. India will not take any irreversible steps with the IAEA prior to this.

(iii) Certification:

Ø This Agreement emphasizes the desire of both countries to cooperate extensively in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as a means of achieving energy security on a stable, reliable and predictable basis. This Agreement further confirms that US cooperation with India is a permanent one.

There is no provision that states that US cooperation with India will be subject to an annual certification process.

Ø Hon’ble Members may recall that the 18th July 2005 Joint Statement had acknowledged that India be regarded as a state with advanced nuclear technology enjoying the same advantages and benefits as other States with advanced nuclear technology, such as the US. This Agreement makes specific references to India and the United States as States possessing advanced nuclear technology, both parties having the same benefits and advantages, both committed to preventing WMD proliferation.

(iv) Safeguards:

Ø As agreed in the March Separation Plan, India has accepted only IAEA safeguards that will be reflected in an India-specific Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA.

We have not consented to any provision that mandates scrutiny of our nuclear weapons programme or any unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. There are explicit provisions in the Agreement that make it clear that this Agreement does not affect our unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and that it will not affect our right to use materials, equipment, information or technology acquired or developed independently. India and the United States have agreed that the implementation of the Agreement will not hinder or otherwise interfere with India’s nuclear activities including our military nuclear facilities. Nothing in the Agreement would impinge on our strategic programme, our three-stage nuclear power programme or our ability to conduct advanced R&D.

(v) Fuel Supply Assurances:

Ø I would like to reiterate that the March 2006 Separation Plan provided for an India-specific Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, with assurances of uninterrupted supply of fuel to reactors that would be placed under IAEA safeguards together with India’s right to take corrective measures in the event fuel supplies are interrupted. An important assurance given is the commitment of support for India’s right to build up strategic reserves of nuclear fuel to meet the lifetime requirements of India’s reactors.

Ø This Agreement envisages, in consonance with the Separation Plan, US support for an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply for the lifetime of India’s reactors. The Agreement reiterates in toto the corresponding portions of the Separation Plan.

It has endorsed the right of India to take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supply.

Hon’ble Members will agree that these provisions will ensure that there is no repeat of our unfortunate experience with Tarapur.

(vi) Integrity and reliability of our strategic programme, autonomy of decision making and future scientific research and development:

Ø In my statements of March 7 and August 17, 2006, I had assured Parliament that the Separation Plan would not adversely affect our strategic programme, the integrity of the three-stage nuclear programme and the autonomy of our Research and Development activity.

Ø This Agreement does not in any way impact on India’s ability to produce and utilize fissile material for its current and future strategic needs.

Our right to use for our own purposes our independent and indigenously developed nuclear facilities has been fully preserved. The Agreement also provides for non-hindrance and non-interference in our activities involving use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology and military nuclear facilities produced, acquired or developed independently for our own purposes.

(vii) Cessation of cooperation:

Ø An elaborate multi-layered consultation process has been included with regard to any future events that may be cited as a reason by either Party to seek cessation of cooperation or termination of the Agreement. Both Parties have agreed to take a number of factors into account in their consultations so that the scope for precipitate or unilateral action is reduced.

Cessation of cooperation can be sought by the US only if it is prepared to take the extreme step of termination of the Agreement. India’s right to take “corrective measures” will be maintained even after the termination of the Agreement.

Ø In the case of termination of this Agreement and cessation of cooperation by either Party, each has the right to seek return of nuclear material and equipment supplied by it to the other. However, before the right of return is exercised, the Agreement commits the parties to consult and to take into account specific factors such as national security, ongoing contracts and projects, compensation at market value, physical protection and environmental issues. India and the United States have agreed to consider carefully the circumstances that may lead to termination, including a party’s concerns about a change in the security environment or a response to similar actions by other states that could impact on national security.

The Agreement stipulates that the two parties recognise that exercising the right of return would have profound implications and consequences for their relations.

Ø From India’s point of view our primary objective is to ensure the uninterrupted operation of our nuclear reactors, in the context of the detailed fuel supply assurances provided in the Separation Plan and these are now reflected in full in the Agreement. The Agreement specifically states in regard to fuel supply assurances and India’s right to take “corrective measures” that there will be no derogation of India’s rights in this regard, including the right to take “corrective measures” to ensure the uninterrupted operation of its reactors. This reflects the balance of obligations consistent with the understandings of the July Statement and the March Separation Plan.

8. Among the significant and innovative features of this Agreement are specific mention of the right to run foreign supplied reactors ‘without interruption’ and to take ‘corrective measures’ in the event of fuel supply disruption. This has been made possible by crafting the provisions in a manner that provide for explicit linkages and interlocking of rights and commitments contained in the Agreement.

9. The Agreement does not in any way affect India’s right to undertake future nuclear tests, if it is necessary in India’s national interest. Let me hence reiterate once again that a decision to undertake a future nuclear test would be our sovereign decision, one that rests solely with the Government. There is nothing in the Agreement that would tie the hands of a future Government or legally constrain its options to protect India’s security and defence needs.

10. If I might sum-up, this Agreement does not in any way inhibit, restrict or curtail our strategic autonomy or capabilities. Our rights to pursue our three-stage nuclear power programme remain undiluted.

In the unlikely event of cessation of cooperation there is no derogation of our rights with regard to corrective measures. Our reprocessing rights are upfront and are permanent in nature. Advanced R&D programmes and IPR Protection are fully safeguarded.

11. As I have said, this is an Agreement for cooperation between India and the US on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Its genesis is the shared perception between India and the US that both our countries need to address their energy challenges, and address them in a manner that is sensitive to concerns about the environment. For India, it is critically important to maintain our current GDP growth rate of 8 to 10% per annum if our goal of eradicating poverty is to be achieved. The energy implications of this growth rate over the next couple of decades are enormous. Even if we were to exploit all our known resources of coal, oil, gas and hydropower, we would still be confronted with a yawning demand and supply gap.

12. India’s three-stage nuclear power programme holds immense promise for the future. The unique thorium-based technology would become an economically viable alternative over a period of time following sequential implementation of the three stages. We must, in the meantime, explore and exploit every possible source of energy. Nuclear energy is a logical choice for India. Indigenous supplies of uranium are highly inadequate and hence we need to source uranium supply from elsewhere. In a globalised world, technology is always a premium item and we look forward to expanding our horizons in this regard as well. We intend to carry forward our cooperation with other countries in civil nuclear energy, in particular with major nuclear suppliers such as Russia and France.

13. We already have a comprehensive nuclear infrastructure. We have a corps of skilled and technically qualified manpower in this sector. It makes sense for us to leverage this valuable asset. As Hon’ble Members are aware, our target for the year 2020 is 20,000 MW of nuclear power generation. It is quite modest.

However, if international cooperation once again became available, we could hope to double this target.

14. On the basis of the Indo-US bilateral Agreement and the finalisation of an India-specific Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, which is being taken up shortly, the Nuclear Suppliers Group is expected to adapt its guidelines to enable international commerce with India in civil nuclear energy and all dual use technologies associated with it. This would be the beginning of the end of the technology-denial regimes against India that have been in existence for over three decades.

15. Apart from its direct impact on our nuclear energy programme, this Agreement will have major spin-offs for the development of our industries, both public and private. High technology trade with the US and other technologically advanced countries will expand rapidly.

16. I wish to draw attention to another major gain for India from this initiative.

We will be creating opportunities for our scientists to participate in the international exchange of scientific ideas and technical know-how and to contribute to the global effort to deal with the world-wide challenges of energy security and climate change. This includes the International Thermonuclear Research Reactor or ITER project, in which India has already joined as a full and equal member along with a handful of technologically advanced countries.

17. In discussions on this subject, questions have been raised about Government’s commitment to an independent foreign policy. I have clearly spelt out the Government’s position in this regard in my statements to Parliament in March and August 2006. I had specially underlined that the pursuit of a foreign policy that is independent in its judgement is a legacy of our founding fathers and an abiding commitment of my Government. India is too large and too important a country to have the independence of its foreign policy taken away by any power.

Today, India stands on the world stage as an influential and respected member of the international community. There is independence in our thought and independence in our actions.

18. I would like to reiterate that our engagement today with all global powers like US, Russia, China, EU, UK, France, Germany and Japan is unprecedented. Engagement with West, East, South East and Central Asia has been significantly stepped up with visible results. We are building new frontiers in our ties with Africa and Latin America. In South Asia we seek to develop a peaceful environment, one that is conducive to ambitious developmental targets. I urge those who question our commitment to an independent foreign policy to display the same degree of confidence in India, as others from outside do.

19. Thus, there is no question that we will ever compromise, in any manner, our independent foreign policy. We shall retain our strategic autonomy.

At the same time, we must not forget India’s long-standing commitment to the noble ideas of nuclear disarmament and our refusal to participate in any arms race, including a nuclear arms race. Our commitment to universal, non-discriminatory and total elimination of nuclear weapons remains undiminished. It was this vision of a world free of nuclear weapons which Shri Rajiv Gandhi put before the UN in 1988 and this still has universal resonance.

20. We remain committed to a voluntary, unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. We are also committed to negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty or FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament. India is willing to join only a non-discriminatory, multilaterally negotiated, and internationally verifiable FMCT, as and when it is concluded in the Conference on Disarmament, subject to it meeting our national security interests.

21. Despite changes in government and changes in political leadership we have always tempered the exercise of our strategic autonomy with a sense of global responsibility and with a commitment to the ideals of general and complete disarmament, including global nuclear disarmament. This Government believes that our commitment to these ideals and our efforts to realize them must continue, and continue with even greater vigour, now that we are a nuclear weapon state. The possession of nuclear weapons only increases our sense of responsibility and does not diminish it.

22. Pending global nuclear disarmament, India has maintained an impeccable non-proliferation record. As a responsible nuclear power, India will not be the source of proliferation of sensitive technologies. We stand for the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime as the infirmities in this regime have affected our security interests. We will work together with the international community to advance our common objective of non-proliferation.

23. There are now other landmarks to cross before the goal of India joining the international mainstream as a full and equal partner becomes a reality. We have to finalise an India-specific Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. Thereafter, the Nuclear Suppliers Group has to agree, by consensus, to adapt its guidelines, we expect without conditions, to enable nuclear commerce with India and to dismantle the restrictions on the transfer of dual use technologies and items to our country. The US Administration is to secure requisite approval from the US Congress. The completion of these next steps will mark the practical realization of this initiative.

24. Our negotiators deserve credit for delivering to the nation an Agreement, which can potentially transform the economic prospects of our country. It is an Agreement that will enable us to meet the twin challenges of energy security and environmental sustainability, and remove the technology denial regimes that have, for decades, been a major constraint on our development.

At the same time, it will bring India the recognition it deserves thanks to the outstanding achievements of our scientists in nuclear and space sciences as well as other high technology areas.

25. This historic initiative has received the steadfast support of President Bush and senior members of his Administration. The strengthening and enhancement of our bilateral relations is an objective that has received his unstinting personal support and commitment. This Agreement is a shining example of how far we have progressed.

26. Finally, Sir, let me end by saying that we have achieved an Agreement that is good for India, and good for the world. I am neither given to exaggeration nor am I known to be self-congratulatory. I will let history judge; I will let posterity judge the value of what we have done through this Agreement. In days to come it will be seen that it is not just the United States but nations across the world that wish to arrive at a new equilibrium in their relations with India. This agreement with the United States will open new doors in capitals across the world. It is another step in our journey to regain our due place in global councils. When future generations look back, they will come to acknowledge the significance of this historic deal.

Thank you, Sir.


Agreement for Cooperation Between The Government of India and The Government of The United States of America Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy -03/08/2007
here it is

123 Agreement

Full text of the Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy (123 Agreement).

The Government of India and the Government of the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

RECOGNIZING the significance of civilian nuclear energy for meeting growing global energy demands in a cleaner and more efficient manner;

DESIRING to cooperate extensively in the full development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as a means of achieving energy security, on a stable, reliable and predictable basis;

WISHING to develop such cooperation on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit, reciprocity and with due respect for each other's nuclear programmes;

DESIRING to establish the necessary legal framework and basis for cooperation concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

AFFIRMING that cooperation under this Agreement is between two States possessing advanced nuclear technology, both Parties having the same benefits and advantages, both committed to preventing WMD proliferation;

NOTING the understandings expressed in the India - U.S. Joint Statement of July 18, 2005 to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India covering aspects of the associated nuclear fuel cycle;

AFFIRMING their support for the objectives of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system, as applicable to India and the United States of America, and its importance in ensuring that international cooperation in development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is carried out under arrangements that will not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

NOTING their respective commitments to safety and security of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to adequate physical protection of nuclear material and effective national export controls;

MINDFUL that peaceful nuclear activities must be undertaken with a view to protecting the environment;

MINDFUL of their shared commitment to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and

DESIROUS of strengthening the strategic partnership between them;

Have agreed on the following:

ARTICLE 1 - DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this Agreement:

(A) "By-product material" means any radioactive material (except special fissionable material) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing special fissionable material. By-product material shall not be subject to safeguards or any other form of verification under this Agreement, unless it has been decided otherwise by prior mutual agreement in writing between the two Parties.

(B) "Component" means a component part of equipment, or other item so designated by agreement of the Parties.

(C) "Conversion" means any of the normal operations in the nuclear fuel cycle, preceding fuel fabrication and excluding enrichment, by which uranium is transformed from one chemical form to another - for example, from uranium hexafluoride (UF6) to uranium dioxide (UO2) or from uranium oxide to metal.

(D) "Decommissioning" means the actions taken at the end of a facility's useful life to retire the facility from service in the manner that provides adequate protection for the health and safety of the decommissioning workers and the general public, and for the environment.These actions can range from closing down the facility and a minimal removal of nuclear material coupled with continuing maintenance and surveillance, to a complete removal of residual radioactivity in excess of levels acceptable for unrestricted use of the facility and its site.

(E) "Dual-Use Item" means a nuclear related item which has a technical use in both nuclear and non-nuclear applications.

(F) "Equipment" means any equipment in nuclear operation including reactor, reactor pressure vessel, reactor fuel charging and discharging equipment, reactor control rods, reactor pressure tubes, reactor primary coolant pumps, zirconium tubing, equipment for fuel fabrication and any other item so designated by the Parties.

(G) "High enriched uranium" means uranium enriched to twenty percent or greater in the isotope 235.

(H) "Information" means any information that is not in the public domain and is transferred in any form pursuant to this Agreement and so designated and documented in hard copy or digital form by mutual agreement by the Parties that it shall be subject to this Agreement, but will cease to be information whenever the Party transferring the information or any third party legitimately releases it into the public domain.

(I) "Low enriched uranium" means uranium enriched to less than twenty percent in the isotope 235.

(J) "Major critical component" means any part or group of parts essential to the operation of a sensitive nuclear facility or heavy water production facility.

(K) "Non-nuclear material" means heavy water, or any other material suitable for use in a reactor to slow down high velocity neutrons and increase the likelihood of further fission, as may be jointly designated by the appropriate authorities of the Parties.

(L) "Nuclear material" means (1) source material and (2) special fissionable material. "Source material" means uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the isotope 235; thorium; any of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical compound, or concentrate; any other material containing one or more of the foregoing in such concentration as the Board of Governors of the IAEA shall from time to time determine; and such other materials as the Board of Governors of the IAEA may determine or as may be agreed by the appropriate authorities of both Parties. "Special fissionable material" means plutonium, uranium-233, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or 235, any substance containing one or more of the foregoing, and such other substances as the Board of Governors of the IAEA may determine or as may be agreed by the appropriate authorities of both Parties. "Special fissionable material" does not include "source material". Any determination by the Board of Governors of the IAEA under Article XX of that Agency's Statute or otherwise that amends the list of materials considered to be "source material" or "special fissionable material" shall only have effect under this Agreement when both Parties to this Agreement have informed each other in writing that they accept such amendment.

(M) "Peaceful purposes" include the use of information, nuclear material, equipment or components in such fields as research, power generation, medicine, agriculture and industry, but do not include use in, research on, or development of any nuclear explosive device or any other military purpose.Provision of power for a military base drawn from any power network, production of radioisotopes to be used for medical purposes in military environment for diagnostics, therapy and sterility assurance, and other similar purposes as may be mutually agreed by the Parties shall not be regarded as military purpose.

(N) "Person" means any individual or any entity subject to the territorial jurisdiction of either Party but does not include the Parties.

(O) "Reactor" means any apparatus, other than a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device, in which a self-sustaining fission chain reaction is maintained by utilizing uranium, plutonium, or thorium or any combination thereof.

(P) "Sensitive nuclear facility" means any facility designed or used primarily for uranium enrichment, reprocessing of nuclear fuel, or fabrication of nuclear fuel containing plutonium.

(Q) "Sensitive nuclear technology" means any information that is not in the public domain and that is important to the design, construction, fabrication, operation, or maintenance of any sensitive nuclear facility, or other such information that may be so designated by agreement of the Parties.

ARTICLE 2 - SCOPE OF COOPERATION

1. The Parties shall cooperate in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. Each Party shall implement this Agreement in accordance with its respective applicable treaties, national laws, regulations, and license requirements concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

2. The purpose of the Agreement being to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation between the Parties, the Parties may pursue cooperation in all relevant areas to include, but not limited to, the following:

a. Advanced nuclear energy research and development in such areas as may be agreed between the Parties;
b. Nuclear safety matters of mutual interest and competence, as set out in Article 3;
c. Facilitation of exchange of scientists for visits, meetings, symposia and collaborative research;
d. Full civil nuclear cooperation activities covering nuclear reactors and aspects of the associated nuclear fuel cycleincluding technology transfer on an industrial or commercial scale between the Parties or authorized persons;
e. Development of a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors;
f. Advanced research and development in nuclear sciences including but not limited to biological research, medicine, agriculture and industry, environment and climate change;
g. Supply between the Parties, whether for use by or for the benefit of the Parties or third countries, of nuclear material;
h. Alteration in form or content of nuclear material as provided for in Article 6;
i. Supply between the Parties of equipment, whether for use by or for the benefit of the Parties or third countries;
j. Controlled thermonuclear fusion including in multilateral projects; and
k. Other areas of mutual interest as may be agreed by the Parties.

3. Transfer of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components and information under this Agreement may be undertaken directly between the Parties or through authorized persons. Such transfers shall be subject to this Agreement and to such additional terms and conditions as may be agreed by the Parties.Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components and information transferred from the territory of one Party to the territory of the other Party, whether directly or through a third country, will be regarded as having been transferred pursuant to this Agreement only upon confirmation, by the appropriate authority of the recipient Party to the appropriate authority of the supplier Party that such items both will be subject to the Agreement and have been received by the recipient Party.

4. The Parties affirm that the purpose of this Agreement is to provide for peaceful nuclear cooperation and not to affect the unsafeguarded nuclear activities of either Party. Accordingly, nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted as affecting the rights of the Parties to use for their own purposes nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology produced, acquired or developed by them independent of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology transferred to them pursuant to this Agreement. This Agreement shall be implemented in a manner so as not to hinder or otherwise interfere with any other activities involving the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology and military nuclear facilities produced, acquired or developed by them independent of this Agreement for their own purposes.

ARTICLE 3 - TRANSFER OF INFORMATION

1. Information concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes may be transferred between the Parties. Transfers of information may be accomplished through reports, data banks and computer programs and any other means mutually agreed to by the Parties. Fields that may be covered include, but shall not be limited to, the following:

a. Research, development, design, construction, operation, maintenance and use of reactors, reactor experiments, and decommissioning;
b. The use of nuclear material in physical, chemical, radiological and biological research, medicine, agriculture and industry;
c. Fuel cycle activities to meet future world-wide civil nuclear energy needs, including multilateral approaches to which they are parties for ensuring nuclear fuel supply and appropriate techniques for management of nuclear wastes;
d. Advanced research and development in nuclear science and technology;
e. Health, safety, and environmental considerations related to the foregoing;
f. Assessments of the role nuclear power may play in national energy plans;
g. Codes, regulations and standards for the nuclear industry;
h. Research on controlled thermonuclear fusion including bilateral activities and contributions toward multilateral projects such as the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER); and
i. Any other field mutually agreed to by the Parties.

2. Cooperation pursuant to this Article may include, but is not limited to, training, exchange of personnel, meetings, exchange of samples, materials and instruments for experimental purposes and a balanced participation in joint studies and projects.

3. This Agreement does not require the transfer of any information regarding matters outside the scope of this Agreement, or information that the Parties are not permitted under their respective treaties, national laws, or regulations to transfer.


4. Restricted Data, as defined by each Party, shall not be transferred under this Agreement.

ARTICLE 4 - NUCLEAR TRADE

1.The Parties shall facilitate nuclear trade between themselves in the mutual interests of their respective industry, utilities and consumers and also, where appropriate, trade between third countries and either Party of items obligated to the other Party. The Parties recognize that reliability of supplies is essential to ensure smooth and uninterrupted operation of nuclear facilities and that industry in both the Parties needs continuing reassurance that deliveries can be made on time in order to plan for the efficient operation of nuclear installations.

2. Authorizations, including export and import licenses as well as authorizations or consents to third parties, relating to trade, industrial operations or nuclear material movement should be consistent with the sound and efficient administration of this Agreement and should not be used to restrict trade. It is further agreed that if the relevant authority of the concerned Party considers that an application cannot be processed within a twomonth period it shall immediately, upon request, provide reasoned information to the submitting Party. In the event of a refusal to authorize an application or a delay exceeding four months from the date of the first application the Party of the submitting persons or undertakings may call for urgent consultations under Article 13 of this Agreement, which shall take place at the earliest opportunity and in any case not later than 30 days after such a request.

ARTICLE 5 - TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL, NON-NUCLEAR MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT, COMPONENTS AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY

1. Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components may be transferred for applications consistent with this Agreement. Any special fissionable material transferred under this Agreement shall be low enriched uranium, except as provided in paragraph 5.

2. Sensitive nuclear technology, heavy water production technology, sensitive nuclear facilities, heavy water production facilities and major critical components of such facilities may be transferred under this Agreement pursuant to an amendment to this Agreement. Transfers of dual-use items that could be used in enrichment, reprocessing or heavy water production facilities will be subject to the Parties' respective applicable laws, regulations and license policies.

3. Natural or low enriched uranium may be transferred for use as fuel in reactor experiments and in reactors, for conversion or fabrication, or for such other purposes as may be agreed to by the Parties.

4. The quantity of nuclear material transferred under this Agreement shall be consistent with any of the following purposes: use in reactor experiments or the loading of reactors, the efficient and continuous conduct of such reactor experiments or operation of reactors for their lifetime, use as samples, standards, detectors, and targets, and the accomplishment of other purposes as may be agreed by the Parties.

5. Small quantities of special fissionable material may be transferred for use as samples, standards, detectors, and targets, and for such other purposes as the Parties may agree.

6.

(a) The United States has conveyed its commitment to the reliable supply of fuel to India. Consistent with the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement, the United States has also reaffirmed its assurance to create the necessary conditions for India to have assured and full access to fuel for its reactors. As part of its implementation of the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement the United States is committed to seeking agreement from the U.S.Congress to amend its domestic laws and to work with friends and allies to adjust the practices of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to create the necessary conditions for India to obtain full access to the international fuel market, including reliable, uninterrupted and continual access to fuel supplies from firms in several nations.

(b) To further guard against any disruption of fuel supplies, the United States is prepared to take the following additional steps:

i) The United States is willing to incorporate assurances regarding fuel supply in the bilateral U.S.-India agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy under Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which would be submitted to the U.S. Congress.

ii) The United States will join India in seeking to negotiate with the IAEA an India-specific fuel supply agreement.

iii) The United States will support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors.

iv) If despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs, the United States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries to include countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India.

(c) In light of the above understandings with the United States, an India-specific safeguards agreement will be negotiated between India and the IAEA providing for safeguards to guard against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time as well as providing for corrective measures that India may take to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies. Taking this into account, India will place its civilian nuclear facilities under India-specific safeguards in perpetuity and negotiate an appropriate safeguards agreement to this end with the IAEA.


ARTICLE 6 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE ACTIVITIES

In keeping with their commitment to full civil nuclear cooperation, both Parties, as they do with other states with advanced nuclear technology, may carry out the following nuclear fuel cycle activities:

i) Within the territorial jurisdiction of either Party, enrichment up to twenty percent in the isotope 235 of uranium transferred pursuant to this Agreement, as well as of uranium used in or produced through the use of equipment so transferred, may be carried out.

ii) Irradiation within the territorial jurisdiction of either Party of plutonium, uranium-233, high enriched uranium and irradiated nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement or used in or produced through the use of non-nuclear material, nuclear material or equipment so transferred may be carried out.

iii) With a view to implementing full civil nuclear cooperation as envisioned in the Joint Statement of the Parties of July 18, 2005, the Parties grant each other consent to reprocess or otherwise alter in form or content nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material and by-product material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, or equipment so transferred. To bring these rights into effect, India will establish a new national reprocessing facility dedicated to reprocessing safeguarded nuclear material under IAEA safeguards and the Parties will agree on arrangements and procedures under which such reprocessing or other alteration in form or content will take place in this new facility.Consultations on arrangements and procedures will begin within six months of a request by either Party and will be concluded within one year. The Parties agree on the application of IAEA safeguards to all facilities concerned with the above activities. These arrangements and procedures shall include provisions with respect to physical protection standards set out in Article 8, storage standards set out in Article 7, and environmental protections set forth in Article 11 of this Agreement, and such other provisions as may be agreed by the Parties. Any special fissionable material that may be separated may only be utilized in national facilities under IAEA safeguards.

iv) Post-irradiation examination involving chemical dissolution or separation of irradiated nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement or irradiated nuclear material used in or produced through the use of non-nuclear material, nuclear material or equipment so transferred may be carried out.

ARTICLE 7 - STORAGE AND RETRANSFERS

1. Plutonium and uranium 233 (except as either may be contained in irradiated fuel elements), and high enriched uranium, transferred pursuant to this Agreement or used in or produced through the use of material or equipment so transferred, may be stored in facilities that are at all times subject, as a minimum, to the levels of physical protection that are set out in IAEA document INFCIRC 225/REV 4 as it may be revised and accepted by the Parties. Each Party shall record such facilities on a list, made available to the other Party. A Party's list shall be held confidential if that Party so requests. Either Party may make changes to its list by notifying the other Party in writing and receiving a written acknowledgement. Such acknowledgement shall be given no later than thirty days after the receipt of the notification and shall be limited to a statement that the notification has been received. If there are grounds to believe that the provisions of this sub-Article are not being fully complied with, immediate consultations may be called for. Following upon such consultations, each Party shall ensure by means of such consultations that necessary remedial measures are taken immediately. Such measures shall be sufficient to restore the levels of physical protection referred to above at the facility in question. However, if the Party on whose territory the nuclear material in question is stored determines that such measures are not feasible, it will shift the nuclear material to another appropriate, listed facility it identifies.

2. Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, and information transferred pursuant to this Agreement and any special fissionable material produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material or equipment so transferred shall not be transferred or re-transferred to unauthorized persons or, unless the Parties agree, beyond the recipient Party's territorial jurisdiction.

ARTICLE 8 - PHYSICAL PROTECTION

1. Adequate physical protection shall be maintained with respect to nuclear material and equipment transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material or equipment so transferred.

2. To fulfill the requirement in paragraph 1, each Party shall apply measures in accordance with (i) levels of physical protection at least equivalent to the recommendations published in IAEA document INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 entitled "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities," and in any subsequent revisions of that document agreed to by the Parties, and (ii) the provisions of the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and any amendments to the Convention that enter into force for both Parties.

3.The Parties will keep each other informed through diplomatic channels of those agencies or authorities having responsibility for ensuring that levels of physical protection for nuclear material in their territory or under their jurisdiction or control are adequately met and having responsibility for coordinating response and recovery operations in the event of unauthorized use or handling of material subject to this Article. The Parties will also keep each other informed through diplomatic channels of the designated points of contact within their national authorities to cooperate on matters of out-of-country transportation and other matters of mutual concern.

4. The provisions of this Article shall be implemented in such a manner as to avoid undue interference in the Parties' peaceful nuclear activities and so as to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the safe and economic conduct of their peaceful nuclear programs.

ARTICLE 9 - PEACEFUL USE

Nuclear material, equipment and components transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material and by-product materialused in or produced through the use of any nuclear material, equipment, and components so transferred shall not be used by the recipient Party for any nuclear explosive device, for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device or for any military purpose.

ARTICLE 10 - IAEA SAFEGUARDS

1. Safeguards will be maintained with respect to all nuclear materials and equipment transferred pursuant to this Agreement, and with respect to all special fissionable material used in or produced through the use of such nuclear materials and equipment, so long as the material or equipment remains under the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating Party.

2. Taking into account Article 5.6 of this Agreement, India agrees that nuclear material and equipment transferred to India by the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement and any nuclear material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or components so transferred shall be subject to safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with the India-specific Safeguards Agreement between India and the IAEA [identifying data] and an Additional Protocol, when in force.

3. Nuclear material and equipment transferred to the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement and any nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, or components so transferred shall be subject to the Agreement between the United States of America and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in the United States of America, done at Vienna November 18, 1977, which entered into force on December 9, 1980, and an Additional Protocol, when in force.

4. If the IAEA decides that the application of IAEA safeguards is no longer possible, the supplier and recipient should consult and agree on appropriate verification measures.

5. Each Party shall take such measures as are necessary to maintain and facilitate the application of IAEA safeguards in its respective territory provided for under this Article.

6. Each Party shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any material, equipment, or components so transferred. The procedures applicable to India shall be those set forth in the India-specific Safeguards Agreement referred to in Paragraph 2 of this Article.

7. Upon the request of either Party, the other Party shall report or permit the IAEA to report to the requesting Party on the status of all inventories of material subject to this Agreement.

8.The provisions of this Article shall be implemented in such a manner as to avoid hampering, delay, or undue interference in the Parties' peaceful nuclear activities and so as to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the safe and economic conduct of their peaceful nuclear programs.

ARTICLE 11 - ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

The Parties shall cooperate in following the best practices for minimizing the impact on the environment from any radioactive, chemical or thermal contamination arising from peaceful nuclear activities under this Agreement and in related matters of health and safety.

ARTICLE 12 - IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT

1. This Agreement shall be implemented in a manner designed:

a) to avoid hampering or delaying the nuclear activities in the territory of either Party;
b) to avoid interference in such activities;
c) to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the safe conduct of such activities; and
d) to take full account of the long term requirements of the nuclear energy programs of the Parties.

2. The provisions of this Agreement shall not be used to:

a) secure unfair commercial or industrial advantages or to restrict trade to the disadvantage of persons and undertakings of either Party or hamper their commercial or industrial interests, whether international or domestic;
b) interfere with the nuclear policy or programs for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy including research and development; or
c) impede the free movement of nuclear material, non nuclear material and equipment supplied under this Agreement within the territory of the Parties.

3. When execution of an agreement or contract pursuant to this Agreement between Indian and United States organizations requires exchanges of experts, the Parties shall facilitate entry of the experts to their territories and their stay therein consistent with national laws, regulations and practices. When other cooperation pursuant to this Agreement requires visits of experts, the Parties shall facilitate entry of the experts to their territory and their stay therein consistent with national laws, regulations and practices.

ARTICLE 13 - CONSULTATIONS

1. The Parties undertake to consult at the request of either Party regarding the implementation of this Agreement and the development of further cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy on a stable, reliable and predictable basis. The Parties recognize that such consultations are between two States with advanced nuclear technology, which have agreed to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology.

2. Each Party shall endeavor to avoid taking any action that adversely affects cooperation envisaged under Article 2 of this Agreement. If either Party at any time following the entry into force of this Agreement does not comply with the provisions of this Agreement, the Parties shall promptly hold consultations with a view to resolving the matter in a way that protects the legitimate interests of both Parties, it being understood that rights of either Party under Article 16.2 remain unaffected.

3. Consultations under this Article may be carried out by a Joint Committee specifically established for this purpose. A Joint Technical Working Group reporting to the Joint Committee will be set up to ensure the fulfillment of the requirements of the Administrative Arrangements referred to in Article 17.


ARTICLE 14 - TERMINATION AND CESSATION OF COOPERATION

1.Either Party shall have the right to terminate this Agreement prior to its expiration on one year's written notice to the other Party. A Party giving notice of termination shall provide the reasons for seeking such termination. The Agreement shall terminate one year from the date of the written notice, unless the notice has been withdrawn by the providing Party in writing prior to the date of termination.

2. Before this Agreement is terminated pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the Parties shall consider the relevant circumstances and promptly hold consultations, as provided in Article 13, to address the reasons cited by the Party seeking termination. The Party seeking termination has the right to cease further cooperation under this Agreement if it determines that a mutually acceptable resolution of outstanding issues has not been possible or cannot be achieved through consultations. The Parties agree to consider carefully the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation of cooperation. They further agree to take into account whether the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation resulted from a Party's serious concern about a changed security environment or as a response to similar actions by other States which could impact national security.

3. If a Party seeking termination cites a violation of this Agreement as the reason for notice for seeking termination, the Parties shall consider whether the action was caused inadvertently or otherwise and whether the violation could be considered as material. No violation may be considered as being material unless corresponding to the definition of material violation or breach in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. If a Party seeking termination cites a violation of an IAEA safeguards agreement as the reason for notice for seeking termination, a crucial factor will be whether the IAEA Board of Governors has made a finding of non-compliance.

4. Following the cessation of cooperation under this Agreement, either Party shall have the right to require the return by the other Party of any nuclear material, equipment, non-nuclear material or components transferred under this Agreement and any special fissionable material produced through their use. A notice by a Party that is invoking the right of return shall be delivered to the other Party on or before the date of termination of this Agreement. The notice shall contain a statement of the items subject to this Agreement as to which the Party is requesting return. Except as provided in provisions of Article 16.3, all other legal obligations pertaining to this Agreement shall cease to apply with respect to the nuclear items remaining on the territory of the Party concerned upon termination of this Agreement.

5. The two Parties recognize that exercising the right of return would have profound implications for their relations. If either Party seeks to exercise its right pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, it shall, prior to the removal from the territory or from the control of the other Party of any nuclear items mentioned in paragraph 4, undertake consultations with the other Party. Such consultations shall give special consideration to the importance of uninterrupted operation of nuclear reactors of the Party concerned with respect to the availability of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as a means of achieving energy security. Both Parties shall take into account the potential negative consequences of such termination on the on-going contracts and projects initiated under this Agreement of significance for the respective nuclear programmes of either Party.

6.If either Party exercises its right of return pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, it shall, prior to the removal from the territory or from the control of the other Party, compensate promptly that Party for the fair market value thereof and for the costs incurred as a consequence of such removal. If the return of nuclear items is required, the Parties shall agree on methods and arrangements for the return of the items, the relevant quantity of the items to be returned, and the amount of compensation that would have to be paid by the Party exercising the right to the other Party.

7. Prior to return of nuclear items, the Parties shall satisfy themselves that full safety, radiological and physical protection measures have been ensured in accordance with their existing national regulations and that the transfers pose no unreasonable risk to either Party, countries through which the nuclear items may transit and to the global environment and are in accordance with existing international regulations.

8. The Party seeking the return of nuclear items shall ensure that the timing, methods and arrangements for return of nuclear items are in accordance with paragraphs 5, 6 and 7. Accordingly, the consultations between the Parties shall address mutual commitments as contained in Article 5.6. It is not the purpose of the provisions of this Article regarding cessation of cooperation and right of return to derogate from the rights of the Parties under Article 5.6.

9. The arrangements and procedures concluded pursuant to Article 6(iii) shall be subject to suspension by either Party in exceptional circumstances, as defined by the Parties, after consultations have been held between the Parties aimed at reaching mutually acceptable resolution of outstanding issues, while taking into account the effects of such suspension on other aspects of cooperation under this Agreement.

ARTICLE 15 - SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Any dispute concerning the interpretation or implementation of the provisions of this Agreement shall be promptly negotiated by the Parties with a view to resolving that dispute.

ARTICLE 16 - ENTRY INTO FORCE AND DURATION

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the Parties exchange diplomatic notes informing each other that they have completed all applicable requirements for its entry into force.

2. This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of40 years. It shall continue in force thereafter for additional periods of 10 years each. Each Party may, by giving 6 months written notice to the other Party, terminate this Agreement at the end of the initial 40 year period or at the end of any subsequent 10 year period.

3. Notwithstanding the termination or expiration of this Agreement or withdrawal of a Party from this Agreement, Articles 5.6(c), 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 15 shall continue in effect so long as any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, by-product material, equipment or components subject to these articles remains in the territory of the Party concerned or under its jurisdiction or control anywhere, or until such time as the Parties agree that such nuclear material is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards.

4. This Agreement shall be implemented in good faith and in accordance with the principles of international law.

5. The Parties may consult, at the request of either Party, on possible amendments to this Agreement. This Agreement may be amended if the Parties so agree.Any amendment shall enter into force on the date on which the Parties exchange diplomatic notes informing each other that their respective internal legal procedures necessary for the entry into force have been completed.

ARTICLE 17 - ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENT

1. The appropriate authorities of the Parties shall establish an Administrative Arrangement in order to provide for the effective implementation of the provisions of this Agreement.

2. The principles of fungibility and equivalence shall apply to nuclear material and non-nuclear material subject to this Agreement. Detailed provisions for applying these principles shall be set forth in the Administrative Arrangement.

3. The Administrative Arrangement established pursuant to this Article may be amended by agreement of the appropriate authorities of the Parties.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at , this day of , 200 , in duplicate.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF INDIA:

AGREED MINUTE

During the negotiation of the Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy ("the Agreement") signed today, the following understandings, which shall be an integral part of the Agreement, were reached.

Proportionality

For the purposes of implementing the rights specified in Articles 6 and 7 of the Agreement with respect to special fissionable material and by-product material produced through the use of nuclear material and non-nuclear material, respectively, transferred pursuant to the Agreement and not used in or produced through the use of equipment transferred pursuant to the Agreement, such rights shall in practice be applied to that proportion of special fissionable material and by-product material produced that represents the ratio of transferred nuclear material and non-nuclear material, respectively, used in the production of the special fissionable material and by-product material to the total amount of nuclear material and non-nuclear material so used, and similarly for subsequent generations.

By-product material

The Parties agree that reporting and exchanges of information on by-product material subject to the Agreement will be limited to the following:

(1) Both Parties would comply with the provisions as contained in the IAEA document GOV/1999/19/Rev.2, with regard to by-product material subject to the Agreement.

(2) With regard to tritium subject to the Agreement, the Parties will exchange annually information pertaining to its disposition for peaceful purposes consistent with Article 9 of this Agreement.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF INDIA:



Mir ZAFAR Awardees

Mir ZAFAR awards for treachery were given to twelve deserving and eminent people in New Delhi on 11 August, 2007. These politicians, bureacrats and others were "awarded" for their efforts to bury Dow Chemical's liabilities in the Bhopal tragedy cases, and clear the way for Dow and Carbide to freely do business in India. Timed to mark the 250th anniversary of the Battle of Plassey, where Mir Zafar betrayed his troops and cut a deal with the British East India Company, organizers of the ceremony likened the present Government's kow-towing to US Corporations to Zafar's deal-making. Such Government's actions, they said, favoured the elite and exacted a heavy toll on the lives of common Indian citizens.

The list of award-winners include senior Ministers Kamalnath, P. Chidambaram and Manmohan
Singh, noted industrialists Ratan Tata, Mukesh Ambani and Ashok Punjwani, Congress spokesperson Abhishek Manu Singhvi, and senior bureaucrats such as PMO Principal Secretary T।K।A. Nair and former Cabinet Secretary B.K. Chaturvedi. Madhya Pradesh Gas Relief Minister Babu Lal Gaur came in for special mention for a lifetime spent in betraying Bhopal victims. Aside from these, Indian Ambassador to US Mr Ronen Sen, and Planning Commission Vice-chairman also were given the Mir Zafar Award.

The Battle of Plassey took place on June 23, 1757, at Palashi, India, on the banks of the Bhagirathi River, about 150 km north of Calcutta, near Murshidabad, then the capital of the Nawab of Bengal. The opponents were Siraj Ud Daulah, the last independent Nawab of Bengal,
and the British East India Company. The battle was waged during The Seven Years' War in Europe (1756�1763); the French East India Company sent a small contingent to fight against the British East India Company.

Siraj-ud-Daulah's army commander defected to the British, causing his army to collapse. As a result, the entire province of Bengal fell to the Company. The enormous wealth gained from the Bengal treasury allowed the Company to significantly strengthen its military might.
Today, Plassey is judged to be one of the pivotal battles leading to the formation of the British Empire in India.

Palash, an extravagant red flowering tree (Flame of the forest), gives its name to a small village near the battlefield. A phonetically accurate romanization of the Bengali name would be Battle of Palashi, but the spelling "Plassey" is now conventional.

The ostensible reason for the Battle of Plassey was Siraj-ud-Daulah's capture of Fort William, Calcutta (which he renamed Alinagar) during June, 1756, but the battle is today seen as part of the geopolitical ambition of the East India Company and the larger dynamics of colonial
conquest.

This conflict was precipitated by the illegal use of Mughal Imperial export trade permits (dastaks) granted to the British in 1717 for engaging in internal trade within India. The British cited this permit as their excuse for not paying taxes to the Bengal Nawab.

Company policy

The Company had long since decided that a change of regime would be conducive to their interests in Bengal. In 1752, Robert Orme, in a letter to Clive, noted that the company would have to remove Siraj's grandfather, Alivardi Khan, in order to prosper.

After the premature death of Alivardi Khan in April, 1756, his nominated successor was Siraj-ud-Daulah, a grandson whom Alivardi had adopted.

Instructions dated October 13, 1756 from Fort St. George instructed Robert Clive, "to effect a junction with any powers in the province of Bengal that might be dissatisfied with the violence of the Nawab's government or that might have pretensions to the Nawabship"।

Accordingly, Clive deputised William Watts, chief of the Kasimbazar factory of the Company, who was proficient in Bengali and Persian, to negotiate with two potential contenders, one of Siraj's generals, Yar Latif Khan, and Siraj's grand-uncle and army chief, Mir Jafar Ali Khan.

On April 23, 1757 the Select Committee of the Board of Directors of the British East India Company approved Coup d' tat as its policy in Bengal.

Mir Jafar was the Company's final choice. Finally, on June 5, 1757 a written agreement was signed between the Company, represented by Clive, and Mir Jafar. It ensured that Mir Jafar would be appointed Nawab of Bengal once Siraj Ud Daulah was deposed.

The British army was vastly outnumbered, consisting of 2,200 Europeans and 2,100 native Indians and a small number of guns. The Nawab had an army of about 50,000 with some heavy artillery operated by about 40 French soldiers sent by the French East India Company.

The battle opened on a very hot and humid morning at 7:00 a.m. on June 23, 1757 where the Nawab's army came out of its fortified camp and launched a massive cannonade against the British camp.

The 18th Century historian Ghulam Husain Salim describes what followed:

" Mīr Muhammad Jafar Khān, with his detachment, stood at a distance towards the left from the main army; and although Sirāju-d-daulah summoned him to his side, Mīr Jafar did not move from his position. in the thick of the fighting, and in the heat of the work of carnage,
whilst victory and triumph were visible on the side of the army of Sirāju-d-daulah, all of a sudden Mīr Madan, commander of the Artillery, fell on being hit with a cannon-ball। At the sight of this, the aspect of Sirāju-d-daulah's army changed, and the artillerymen with the corpse of Mīr Madan moved into tents. It was now midday, when the people of the tents fled. As yet Nawāb Sirāju-d-daulah was busy fighting and slaughtering, when the camp-followers decamping from Dāūdpūr went the other side, and gradually the soldiers also took to their heels. Two hours before sun-set, flight occurred in Sirāju-d-daulah's army, and Sirāju-d-daulah also being unable to stand his ground any longer fled. "

At around 11:00 a.m., Mir Madan, one of the Nawab's most loyal officers, launched an attack against the fortified grove where The East Indian Company was located, and was mortally wounded by a British cannonball. This cannonade was essentially futile in any case; the
British guns had greater range than those of the French.

At noon, a heavy rainstorm fell on the battlefield, wherein the tables were turned. The British covered their cannons and muskets for protection from the rain, whereas the French did not.

As a result, the cannonade ceased by 2:00 p.m. and the battle resumed where Clive's chief officer, Kilpatrick, launched an attack against the water ponds in between the armies. With their cannons and muskets completely useless, and with Mir Jafar's cavalry who were closest to the English refusing to attack Clive's camp, revealing his treachery, the Nawab was forced to order a retreat.

By 5:00 p.m., the Nawab's army was in full retreat and the British had command of the field.

The battle cost the British East India Company just 22 killed and ५० wounded (most of these were native sepoys), while the Nawab's army lost at least 500 men killed and wounded.

The Battle of Plassey is considered as a starting point to the events that established the era of British dominion and conquest in India.

Mir Jafar's and Robert Clive’s fate

Mir Jafar, for his betrayal of the Nawab Siraj Ud Daulah and alliance with the British, was installed as the new Nawab, while Siraj Ud Daulah was captured on July 2 in Murshidabad as he attempted to escape further north. He was later executed on the order of Mir Jafar's son.

Mir Jafar as Nawab chafed under the British supervision, and सो requested the Dutch East India Company to intervene. They sent seven ships and about 700 sailors up the Hoogley to their settlement, but the British led by Colonel Forde managed to defeat them at Chinsura on
November 25, 1759। Thereafter Mir Jafar was deposed as Nawab (1760) and they appointed Mir Kasim Ali Khan, (Mir Jafar's son-in-law) as Nawab. Mir Kasim showed signs of independence and was defeated in The Battle of Buxar (1764), after which full political control shifted to the Company. Mir Jafar was re-appointed and remained the titular Nawab until his
death in 1765, while all actual power was exercised by the Company.

Robert Clive was appointed Governor of Bengal in 1765 for his efforts. William Watts was appointed Governor of Fort William on June 22, 1758 । But he later resigned in favour of Robert Clive, who was also later appointed Baron of Plassey in 1762. Clive later committed suicide in
1774, after being addicted to opium.




Sunday, August 12, 2007

V P Singh demands Manmohan's resignation

V P Singh demands Manmohan's resignation

August 12

Accusing the UPA Government of subversion of democracy, Jan Morcha leader V P Singh today demanded resignation of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh for ignoring the concern of the "majority opinion" against Indo-US nuclear deal.

The former Prime Minister also asked the Left parties, who have raised serious objections over the issue, to consider a vote on the Indo-US pact in Parliament.

"I have highest regard for Manmohan Singh. He is a man of conscience. When it is clear that the majority of the MPs are against the deal on which he has staked his name, I am sure, his conscience will dictate him to resign," Singh, former Prime Minister.

Referring to Singh's statement yesterday that the deal was "signed and sealed" and was "honourable", the Jan Morcha leader said that if the deal could not be renegotiated, then it can be "terminated".

PTI


11 August 2007

Press Statement

Prakash Karat, General Secretary of Communist Party of India (Marxist), has issued the following statement:

The Left parties have been consistently expressing their opposition to the July 2005 joint statement with the United States, which includes the nuclear cooperation agreement. After the Hyde Act was adopted by the United States containing unacceptable conditions, the CPI(M) has been asking the government not to proceed with the negotiations for the bilateral (123) agreement. We do not share the optimism that India can become “a great power with the help of the United States”. India is a country endowed with sufficient resources and self-confidence to carve out its own path of development.

The Prime Minister and the government must realise that this agreement is not acceptable to the majority in Parliament.

As far as the approach to the government is concerned, we will take our own counsel.

http://www.cpim.org/

Anguished’ PM to Left: If you want to withdraw, so be it

TELEGRAPH EXCLUSIVE

New Delhi, Aug. 10: Tired of the Left parties’ constant bark, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh dared them to bite after their latest diatribe against the Indo-US nuclear deal on Tuesday.

In an exclusive interview to The Telegraph, the Prime Minister said: “I told them that it is not possible to renegotiate the deal. It is an honourable deal, the cabinet has approved it, we cannot go back on it. I told them to do whatever they want to do, if they want to withdraw support, so be it….”

He was referring to his conversation with the CPM’s Prakash Karat and the CPI’s A.B. Bardhan on Tuesday night, hours after the Left released a statement on the nuclear deal.

In a frank conversation, the Prime Minister said he was “not angry but anguished” at the harsh tone and tenor of the Left’s reaction and made it clear that the UPA-Left relationship could not be a one-sided affair.

Replying to a question, he said: “I don’t get angry, I don’t want to use harsh words. They are our colleagues and we have to work with them. But they also have to learn to work with us.”

Although he did not raise his voice, those last 10 words had a hint of steel which underlined the Prime Minister’s new resolve to take on the Left. There was no immediate response from the Left leaders, Singh said, adding: “They haven’t thought it through.”

In the course of the interview, the Prime Minister made it clear that the Left had a flawed understanding not just of the 123 Agreement but also of India’s intrinsic strength and its enhanced status in the world.

On the nuclear deal itself, he said: “It is an honourable deal which enlarges India’s development options, particularly in regard to energy security and environmental protection, and it doesn’t in any way affect our ability to pursue our nuclear weapons programme. We have not surrendered an iota of our freedom in this regard; not an iota of our sovereignty.”

In this context, he referred to the interview in The Hindu newspaper today with R. Chidambaram, the former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and currently the government’s principal scientific adviser.

“I cannot improve on what he (Chidambaram) has said. He has said that all three conditions (there will be no effect on the strategic programme, there will be no deceleration in our three-stage nuclear power programme, and there will be no effect on our advanced R&D programme) have been met.”Asked why then was the Left objecting to the deal, the Prime Minister said: “I don’t know… (but) they seem to have a problem with the United States.”

Elaborating on his own stand, Singh added: “I want India’s relations to improve with all powers and we have been doing that — with the US, with Russia, with the EU, with France, and particularly with China. We have had a breakthrough with China, a historic agreement where we have defined the principles that will outline the border agreement….” On the Left’s fears that the 123 Agreement would draw India further into a strategic alliance with the US, rendering it an American satellite, Singh said: “How can we ever become anyone’s satellite? Yes, we live in an increasingly interdependent world but the challenge before us is to forge new linkages, widen our strategic options and, at the same time, guard against the negative side of the process of globalisation.”

Although he did not directly attack the Left’s stand on the US as outdated or alarmist, he made his meaning clear by referring to the way communist countries were dealing with the superpower.

China, he pointed out, had a huge trade surplus with the US but was not worried about losing its independence. “Look at Vietnam, look at China (the way they are engaging with America) — out of fear of dealing with the US, we cannot become a frog in the well,” Singh said.

If the Prime Minister was “anguished” at the Left’s obvious lack of trust in him to do right by the country, he appeared equally dismayed at their low levels of confidence in the nation. “India, with a billion people and with such a diversity of languages and cultures and religions, with its functioning democracy and respect for rule of law is a unique country; we are a role model for the world.”

By railing against the nuclear deal, the Left was “underestimating the intrinsic strength of India, of India’s capacity to defend its national interests”, he felt.

http://www.telegraphindia.com/1070811/asp/frontpage/story_8179523
।asp#

PRESS RELEASES

August 04, 2007

Press Statement issued by Shri Yashwant Sinha &Shri Arun Shourie on Indo-US nuclear deal

Preliminary comments of the BJP on the Agreement between the Government of India and the Government of the USA concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

1. The BJP has been expressing its reservations regarding the Indo-US nuclear deal from the very beginning. When the Joint Statement was issued at the end of the visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Washington in July 2005, Shri Vajpayee issued a statement in which he expressed his reservations about the deal, specially with regard to its impact on our strategic nuclear programme.

He had expressed his apprehension at the proposed separation plan of our nuclear facilities between civilian and military. Later, when the separation plan was presented to Parliament, we expressed our opposition to it. We warned the Government of India when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee of the US Congress adopted the draft bills for enabling this cooperation between the two countries.

We protested strongly when the Hyde Act was passed by the US Congress. We have consistently opposed the deal in Parliament whenever discussions on this deal have taken place.

None of our fears and apprehensions was ever given serious consideration by the Government of India. No effort was ever made by it to evolve a national consensus on this vital issue of national concern before making commitments to the US.

The text of the bilateral 123 Agreement has been made public on Friday, August 3, 2007.

We have looked at the text and our preliminary comments are as follows:

(i) Each party is required to implement this Agreement in accordance with its national laws and regulations and its licence requirements. There is no doubt, therefore, that the implementation of this Agreement shall be governed by the provisions of the Hyde Act of 2006, the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which are its national laws on this subject, and its licensing requirements relating to the supply of nuclear materials to India {article 2(1)}. The confidence with which US officials have asserted that the Agreement is Hyde act bound flows from this provision. Which act will India enforce on the US?

(ii) The Agreement is supposed to lead to full civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries yet article 2(2)(d) talks of cooperation relating to “aspects of the associated nuclear fuel cycle”. Aspects mean parts and hence all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle are not covered under this Agreement.

(iii) According to article 5(2) of the Agreement sensitive nuclear technology, heavy water production technology, sensitive nuclear facilities and major critical components of such facilities can be transferred to India only after an amendment to this Agreement has been carried out. The provision for such transfer should have been included in this Agreement itself instead of leaving it to a future amendment. It is a peculiar arrangement. Under the same provision, the US will retain the right of end-use verification of all its supplies. This will ensure that American inspectors will “roam around our nuclear installations”, a fear which was completely discounted by the Prime Minister while replying to the Rajya Sabha debate on 17.8.2006.

(iv) As far as fuel supplies are concerned, the commitment of the US in the Agreement is vague and futuristic. “The US is committed to seeking agreement from the US Congress to amend its domestic laws”. This assurance in article 5(6)(a) of the Agreement and the assurances contained in article 5(6)(b) of the Agreement is not only bad drafting but deliberately repeats an old assurance given by the US at the time of the separation plan and remains as evasive as it was then. According to article 5(6)(c), the India specific Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA is to be negotiated on the basis of these evasive assurances and requires India to place its civilian nuclear facilities under safeguards in perpetuity.

(v) India is required under this Agreement to establish a new national reprocessing facility dedicated to reprocessing safeguarded nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. If it is an agreement between two equal parties with reciprocal commitments, is the US accepting a similar provision for its reprocessing facilities? Is any such facility being created in any country belonging to the Nuclear Five?

(vi) Following the cessation of cooperation under this Agreement either party shall have the right to require the return by the other party of any nuclear material, equipment, non-nuclear material or components transferred under this Agreement and any special fissionable material produced through their use. {article 14(4)} Thus, notwithstanding the sugar-coated language which has been used in the Agreement to soften the blow, the fact remains that the US retains the right to recall all the supplies that it has made to India under this Agreement.

What is worse is that under article 16(3) despite the termination of this Agreement, the safeguards in perpetuity will continue to apply so long as any material or equipment or any of the by products thereof remain on Indian soil. Clearly, therefore, with regard to fuel supplies, reprocessing rights and the right to recall the equipments supplied, the US has maintained its position as in the Hyde Act. India, on the other hand, has accepted legally enforceable commitments in perpetuity.

There is nothing in the Agreement regarding the reprocessing of the spent fuel of Tarapur which has accumulated over the last 33 years. Nuclear testing has not been mentioned in the Agreement. According to the Government of India this is a matter of great comfort for us. This view is entirely untenable. When national laws apply, which includes the NPT, the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Hyde Act of 2006 which specifically forbid nuclear tests, where is the question of India having the freedom to test once we enter into this agreement? In other words, we are being forced to accept a bilateral CTBT with more stringent provisions than the multilateral CTBT.

In his very first statement in 2005, Shri Vajpayee had raised the issue of the financial cost of separation of our facilities between civilian and military. The Government of India has kept mum on this. To this cost has now been added the cost of setting up a dedicated reprocessing facility, the cost of holding strategic fuel supplies for the life time of all our future reactors and the cost of mammoth and intrusive IAEA inspections.

In the separation plan prepared under the surveillance of the US, two thirds of our reactors will be put in the civilian category under safeguards. The recently refurbished CYRUS reactor will be shut down. In course of time, 90% of our reactors will be in the civilian category.

In the ongoing negotiations in the Committee of Disarmament in Geneva, we have agreed to work together with the US for the early conclusion of the FMCT. We appear to have given up our insistence on international verification and all countries complying.

All these, along with the intrusive provisions of the Hyde Act are bound to have a stultifying effect on our strategic nuclear programme.

The BJP is of the clear view that this Agreement is an assault on our nuclear sovereignty and our foreign policy options. We are, therefore, unable to accept this Agreement as finalised. We demand that a Joint Parliamentary Committee be set up to examine the text in detail; that, after it has submitted its report, parliamentary approval be secured before this deal is signed; and that all further action on it should be suspended until this sequence is completed.

The manner in which this agreement has been pushed through, leads us to further demand that appropriate amendments be made in the Constitution and laws to ensure that all agreements which affect the country’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and national security shall be ratified by Parliament.

http://www.bjp.org/

India’s ailing public health services

The Eleventh Plan approach paper correctly notes that rural health care in most states in India is marked by absenteeism of doctors/health providers, low levels of skills, shortage of medicines, inadequate supervision/monitoring and callous attitudes. There are neither rewa-rds for service providers, nor punishments to defaulters. As a result, health outcomes in India are worse than neighbouring countries like Sri Lanka and Southeast Asian countries like China and Vietnam.

The failure of the health system is leading to a visible decline in outcomes. Immunisation rates in India were already low by international comparisons, worse than even those for countries like Bangladesh and Cambodia. A recent report shows that immunisation of children in India declined sharply from an already low 52% in 1998-99 to 44.6% in 2002-03. The two rounds of household surveys on the state of maternal and child health care, conducted by the Reprod-uctive and Child Health Programme of the World Bank, show serious failures in public health services in India. Out of 274 districts, child immunisation declined in 197 districts. Routine polio, DPT and measles vaccination declined in 191, 199 and 153 districts, respectively.

The data on antenatal care and assisted deliveries is appalling. Though the proportion of deliveries assisted by health workers went up from 39.6% in 1998-99 to 47.5% in 2002-03, the percentage of women delivering in public health facilities declined from 24% to 18.5%. The increase took place in deliveries in the private sector, where they rose steeply from 9.4% to 21.5%.

Ironically, women in “better placed states”, which presumably have better access to public health facilities, are using these less. In Andhra Pradesh, the percentage of women delivering in public institutions declined by 9.8%, in Kerala by 28.9%, in Karnataka by 10.2%, in Maharashtra by 9.1% and in Tamil Nadu by 15.3%. Further, the number of women who received post-natal care by public health workers through home visits within two weeks of delivery also declined from 14.1% to 12.7%.


Approach paper to the 11th FYP says rural health care system unsatisfactory
It is marked by absentee doctors, shortage of medicines, low skill levels, etc
TIt suggests empowering panchayati raj institutions to manage health services

The maternal mortality rate in India—407 deaths per 100,000 live births— compared with 56 in China and 46 in Sri Lanka. There may be many factors that explain the evidence thrown up by the RCH report, such as literacy and empowerment of women. But, as recent studies on the health sector in India have shown, the biggest issue is job security of the health staff, which leads to a lack of interest in doing work for patients.

The Plan document notes that there is a shortage of health staff. But does hiring more public sector health workers contribute towards a more healthy population? A study in Udaipur titled, Wealth, health and health service in rural Rajasthan, by Banerjee, Deaton and Duflo, conducted between January 2002 and August 2003, shows high absenteeism by public health workers. Nearly 45% of medical personnel are absent in subcentres and aid posts. And 36% are absent in the (larger) primary health and community health centres.

An absent nurse meant that the subcentre had to be closed, because sub-centres are often staffed only by a nurse. Hence, sub-centres were closed 56% of the time during regular hours. Sub-centres were open not merely infrequently, but also unpredictably. Patients, thus, often choose not to walk the approximate half-an-hour from the average village to the closest public health centre.

The consequence is predictable. As the Planning Commission’s mid-term appraisal of the Tenth Plan observes, “when people first seek treatment, an estimated 70-85% visit a private sector provider for their health care needs.” However, as the appraisal says, “the poor avail of the costlier services provided by the private practitioner, even when they have access to subsidised or free public health care, due to reasons of distance, but most importantly, on account of the unpredictable availability and very low quality of health care services provided by the rural public primary health sector.”

The 11th Plan approach paper suggests that the way out may be to empower panchayati raj institutions to manage, administer and be accountable for health services in community levels. The success of this strategy may hinge on whether health workers continue to have permanent government jobs, or get paid by the health care they provide and patients they see.

Uncle Sam, your banker will see you now

Uncle Sam, your banker will see you now

Aug 9, 2007, 00:46



Early this morning China let the idiots in Washington, and on Wall Street, know that it has them by the short hairs. Two senior spokesmen for the Chinese government observed that China’s considerable holdings of US dollars and Treasury bonds "contributes a great deal to maintaining the position of the dollar as a reserve currency." [China threatens 'nuclear option' of dollar sales, by Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, London Telegraph, August 9, 2007]

Should the US proceed with sanctions intended to cause the Chinese currency to appreciate, "the Chinese central bank will be forced to sell dollars, which might lead to a mass depreciation of the dollar."

If Western financial markets are sufficiently intelligent to comprehend the message, US interest rates will rise regardless of any further action by China. At this point, China does not need to sell a single bond. In an instant, China has made it clear that US interest rates depend on China, not on the Federal Reserve.

The precarious position of the US dollar as reserve currency has been thoroughly ignored and denied. The delusion that the US is "the world’s sole superpower," whose currency is desirable regardless of its excess supply, reflects American hubris, not reality. This hubris is so extreme that only six weeks ago McKinsey Global Institute published a study that concluded that even a doubling of the US current account deficit to $1.6 trillion would pose no problem.

Strategic thinkers, if any remain who have not been purged by neocons, will quickly conclude that China’s power over the value of the dollar and US interest rates also gives China power over US foreign policy. The US was able to attack Afghanistan and Iraq only because China provided the largest part of the financing for Bush’s wars.

If China ceased to buy US Treasuries, Bush’s wars would end. The savings rate of US consumers is essentially zero, and several million are afflicted with mortgages that they cannot afford. With Bush’s budget in deficit and with no room in the US consumer’s budget for a tax increase, Bush’s wars can only be financed by foreigners.

No country on earth, except for Israel, supports the Bush regime's desire to attack Iran. It is China’s decision whether it calls in the US ambassador, and delivers the message that there will be no attack on Iran or further war unless the US is prepared to buy back $900 billion in US Treasury bonds and other dollar assets.

The US, of course, has no foreign reserves with which to make the purchase. The impact of such a large sale on US interest rates would wreck the US economy and effectively end Bush’s war-making capability. Moreover, other governments would likely follow the Chinese lead, as the main support for the US dollar has been China’s willingness to accumulate them. If the largest holder dumped the dollar, other countries would dump dollars, too.

The value and purchasing power of the US dollar would fall. When hard-pressed Americans went to Wal-Mart to make their purchases, the new prices would make them think they had wandered into Nieman Marcus. Americans would not be able to maintain their current living standard.

Simultaneously, Americans would be hit either with tax increases in order to close a budget deficit that foreigners will no longer finance or with large cuts in income security programs. The only other source of budgetary finance would be for the government to print money to pay its bills. In this event, Americans would experience inflation in addition to higher prices from dollar devaluation.

This is a grim outlook. We got in this position because our leaders are ignorant fools. So are our economists, many of whom are paid shills for some interest group. So are our corporate leaders whose greed gave China power over the US by offshoring the US production of goods and services to China. It was the corporate fat cats who turned US Gross Domestic Product into Chinese imports, and it was the "free trade, free market economists" who egged it on.

How did a people as stupid as Americans get so full of hubris?


By Paul Craig Roberts


Paul Craig Roberts [email him] was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in the Reagan Administration. He is the author of Supply-Side Revolution : An Insider's Account of Policymaking in Washington; Alienation and the Soviet Economy and Meltdown: Inside the Soviet Economy, and is the co-author with Lawrence M. Stratton of The Tyranny of Good Intentions : How Prosecutors and Bureaucrats Are Trampling the Constitution in the Name of Justice. Click here for Peter Brimelow’s Forbes Magazine interview with Roberts about the recent epidemic of prosecutorial misconduct.

Friday, August 10, 2007

Vanising Bees

Apropos the article "If bees die, so do we" (August 6, 2007, Pioneer, Sudhirendar Sharma). Inexplicable human and animal diseases that do not respect national boundaries are on the rise.

For instance, an alarming disease has wiped out 2.4 million beehives across 35 states of America and scientists are working flat out to discover the cause.

It is officially being called Colony Collapse Disorder, but it is actually Vanishing Bee Syndrome. It endangers the food systems that they sustain.

If "Out of 115 crops studied, 87 have been found to depend on pollination and account for one third of global crop production", it is high time Indian Government set up a multi-disciplinary task force (independent of Genetic Engineering Approval Committee) to examine the vulnerability of Indian agriculture from this syndrome. If it has happend in US and to the bees, it is a fact that we too are not immune from it. Or are we?

It merits immediate governmental and multi-disciplinary attention. Indeed it would be "foolhardy in the extreme" for the government to turn a blind eye towards the emergenece of this syndrome.

It is a fit case to adopt Precautionary Principle and the Genetic Engineering Approval Committee (GEAC) should be asked to submit a report as to whether or not it is aware of the possible dangers to bees from Genetically Modified (GM) crops.

In this regard it is in public interest to provide a comprehensive list of the 24 varieties and hybrids that were approved between May-September, 2006 under nine listed crops, namely Bt Cotton, transgenic okra, tomato cauliflower, brinjal, rice, castor, groundnut and potato along with their health impact assessment and environment impact assessment reports. It would be revealing to note as to how the reports have taken cognisance of the impact on bees that contribute so much to agriculture.

Tuesday, August 07, 2007

Cancer Society Calls for Ban on Asbestos

Cancer Society Seeks Ban on White Asbestos

US Senate Committee passes Ban Asbestos in America Act Unanimously

Canada is the biggest exporter of asbestos to India. Taking cognizance of the hazards from this killer fiber, the Canadian Cancer Society has called for a ban on the use and export of asbestos. In a statement “Canadian Cancer Society Pursues Elimination of Asbestos-Related Diseases”, it has appealed to the Canadian government to adopt a comprehensive asbestos strategy, including the eventual phasing out of both the use and export of this substance.

“The Society believes that exposure to asbestos must stop so that asbestos-related diseases can be eliminated,” says Dr. Barbara Whylie, CEO, Canadian Cancer Society.

In India, Canada promotes the sale of Chrysotile Asbestos through Asbestos Information Centre (AIC) and Asbestos Cement Products Manufacturers' Association (ACPMA). India has banned all forms of asbestos except Chrysotile Asbestos (also known as White Asbestos).

Mining of asbestos and export of asbestos waste is also banned in India. Even if one asbestos fibre reaches the right place in the body, it causes irreversible damage - leading to Asbestosis, Lung Cancer or Mesothelioma- Biggest Man Made Epidemic. Thirty deaths are caused per day from asbestos-related diseases as per estimates based on US and European studies.

Ban Asbestos Network of India (BANI) supports the call given by the Society and the Ban Asbestos in America Act and urges Indian Government to take cognizance of it and do the needful. The unanimous and successful passage of Ban Asbestos in America Act of 2007 by the U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works and the call by the Cancer Society in July 2007 provides a compelling reason for the Indian Government to act with urgency against the massive use of asbestos in the country. Some 40 countries including European Union besides World Trade Organisation and agencies like International Labour Organisation (ILO) have realized that “safe and controlled use” of asbestos is not possible and consequently have banned all forms of asbestos because of the incurable but preventable cancer caused by this killer fiber. Given the ubiquitous presence of the fiber, there is no alternative to getting it banned in right earnest.

BANI is an alliance of scientists, doctors, public health researchers, trade unions, activists and civil society groups is working to persuade the Governments to give up its consistent and continued pro-asbestos industry bias and lack of concern for the asbestos-injured who die one of the most painful deaths imaginable. In developing its asbestos position, the Society wanted to ensure elimination of this harmful substance going forward, without forgetting either the people who have already been affected from exposure or those whose livelihood depends on asbestos.

BANI endorses the Cancer Society’s position that “Countries importing asbestos from Canada must be made fully informed of the health and environmental risks, safer substitutes for asbestos, which have been identified, should be safely phased into use, including safeguards for workers, a national surveillance system to track asbestos-related diseases must be developed. This system would assess the extent of asbestos-related diseases and it would track health outcomes for those suffering with asbestos-related diseases, a public registry of buildings that contain asbestos should be maintained.” It calls on India Government to support inclusion of Chrysotile in the list of Rotterdam Convention.

Asbestos industry in Canada consists of two companies with 800 workers at three mines in the towns of Asbestos and Thetford Mines, which is exported to countries like India, where it's used in cement, pipes and sheeting etc.

Meanwhile, one of Canada's largest asbestos producers, LAB Chrysotile, a company based in Quebec has filed a notice of intention to submit a proposal to their creditors under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act on July 25, 2007. This Act grants LAB a period of 30 days to submit a proposal. In a related development a former roofer, Jim Kingshott, 57 who contracted mesothelioma has been awarded over £160000 in compensation as per news reports dated 5 August, 2007. He was exposed to asbestos over a 20-year period in his job at Doric Co Ltd, based in Shoreham, UK. It is compensations like these that has lead to the bankruptcy of asbestos companies world over. But in India deliberate misdiagnosis of asbestos related diseases by government agencies has provided an opportunity for the industry to operate with impunity.

Both Asbestos Information Centre (AIC) and Asbestos Cement Products Manufacturers' Association (ACPMA) act like agents of Canadian asbestos industry. The Asbestos Information Centre (AIC) in India recently launched a Public Relations Campaign to publicize the benefits and advantages offered by asbestos”. (http://asbestos-institute.ca/india.html)

According to information provided by the Information Commissioner of Canada, “Canada is working with other countries to promote chrysotile asbestos. The Indian government has worked diligently in cooperation with the Indian AIC and the Canadian Asbestos Institute.” Canadian High Commission in India says, “A ruling which states that subjecting a worker to asbestos is a violation of human rights could have far reaching consequences whether or not it is binding”. It also notes, “AIC is of the belief that problems with safe use of asbestos will arise in the unorganised sector. These include small manufacturers who cannot afford to either install the equipment necessary to safely use asbestos or invest in the health needs of their workers.” AIC accepts that “unorganised sector does use imported products that they acquire through agents.” It is noteworthy that Indian Government consults and trusts this very AIC in matters related to continued use of Chrysotile.

The profound tragedy of the asbestos epidemic is that all illnesses and deaths related to asbestos are/were entirely preventable by not using asbestos. The threat to health was known and alternative viable substitutes were available. It is possible to eliminate the use of asbestos by redesigning the job or product, or by using another safer material.

Lust for profit and the lack of political will is letting the unpardonable criminal act of exposing humans to the killer fiber goes on and yet Canada calls itself a civilized country. Indian National Congress led coalition Government too remains a callous collaborator in the ongoing acts of barbarism. Government of India’s Office Memorandum NO.6 (6)/94 – Cement of the Ministry of Industry has stated: “The Department has generally not been recommending any case of Industrial License to any new unit for the creation of fresh capacity of asbestos products in the recent past due to the apprehension that prolonged exposure to asbestos leads to serious health hazards”. But under tremendous influence of the industry, the government has changed its stance and has not only ignored in the global evidence against this killer fiber but also has consistently made asbestos artificially cheaper.

BANI demands criminal prosecution of those responsible for letting workers and citizens suffer asbestos exposures. It is alarming to note the misinformation by the Chrysotile asbestos cement industry and AIC since they will have Indians believe that the pattern of asbestos is entirely different in India hence most of the diseases pattern seen in the West bear no relevance to the magnitude of Indian experience. It is in this backdrop that the outcome of the Chrysotile asbestos study by at National Institute of Occupational Health (NIOH), Ahmedabad is highly suspect because it has been partly funded by the Chrysotile asbestos industry along with Union Ministry of Chemicals.

Even a Committee headed Secretary, Union Ministry of Environment and Forests submitted to the Supreme Court in August 2006 that 16 % of the workers exposed to asbestos are suffering from asbestos related diseases. Although the apex court of India has ruled that the Government of India must comply with ILO resolutions, so far the ILO resolution (June 14, 2006) stating “the elimination of the future use of asbestos and the identification and proper management of asbestos currently in place are the most effective means to protect workers from asbestos exposures and to prevent future asbestos-related disease and deaths” has not been acted upon.

When the world is preparing and planning to get rid of all forms of asbestos, it makes India look stupid to be still importing it. Government should devote its scarce resources to prevent the impending disaster by banning it at the earliest.

Monday, August 06, 2007

Bombs, Bombs Everywhere

ON 6 AUGUST, 2007, AN ATOM BOMB WAS DROPPED ON THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF HIROSHIMA BY THE GOVERNMENT OF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

An American B-52 called the Enola Gay dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. A

http://uruknet.info/?p=m35094&s1=h

Remembering Hiroshima

Editor's note: The following is an encore presentation of David R. Henderson's column of July 31, 2006.

Sometimes, something happens that is so awful that we find ourselves rationalizing it, talking as if it had to happen, to make ourselves feel better about the horrible event. For many people, I believe, President Truman's dropping the atomic bomb on Hiroshima on Aug. 6, 1945, and on Nagasaki on Aug. 9, 1945, were two such events. After all, if the leader of arguably the freest country in the world decided to drop those bombs, he had to have a good reason, didn't he? I grew up in Canada thinking that, horrible as it was, dropping the atomic bombs on those two cities was justified. Although I never believed that the people those bombs killed were mainly guilty people, I could at least tell myself that many more innocent people, including American military conscripts, would have been killed had the bombs not been dropped. But then I started to investigate. On the basis of that investigation, I have concluded that dropping the bomb was not necessary and caused, on net, tens of thousands, and possibly more than a hundred thousand, more deaths than were necessary.

What I write below will not come as a surprise to those who are particularly well-informed about the issue: the Gar Alperovitzes, Barton Bernsteins, Dennis Wainstocks, and Ralph Raicos of the world. But it did come as a surprise to me and will surprise, I believe, many of the people reading this article. There were four surprises: (1) how Truman himself couldn't seem to keep his story straight about why he dropped the bomb and even whom he dropped the first one on; (2) how strong the opinion was among the informed, including many military and political leaders, against dropping the bomb; (3) how strong a case can be made that the Japanese government was about to surrender and that the U.S. insistence on unconditional surrender had already delayed their surrender for months; and (4) how the proponents of dropping the bomb systematically and successfully convinced Americans that dropping the bomb saved many American lives. On the third issue, in particular, I highlight a May 1945 memo to President Truman from former President Herbert Hoover, the person who founded the Hoover Institution, at which I am proudly, given his views on this, a research fellow.

Truman's Story

Start with Truman. In a long, rambling speech to the American people on radio on Aug. 9, three days after the Enola Gay dropped the bomb on Hiroshima and hours after Bockscar dropped it on Nagasaki, Truman announced, "The world will note that the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a military base. That was because we wished in this first attack to avoid, insofar as possible, the killing of civilians." Actually, of course, it was not a military base, but a city, a fact that Truman must have known before he made the decision. And if he didn't know it, then how horrible is that? Someone who wants to drop a nuclear bomb on a target should surely do due diligence to find out what the target is. That seems like a minimal requirement.

Nevertheless, whatever he knew or didn't know, Truman clearly stated above that he wanted to avoid killing civilians. But did he? In response to a clergyman who criticized his decision, Truman wrote:

"Nobody is more disturbed over the use of Atomic bombs than I am but I was greatly disturbed over the unwarranted attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor and their murder of our prisoners of war. The only language they seem to understand is the one we have been using to bombard them. When you have to deal with a beast you have to treat him as a beast. It is most regrettable but nevertheless true."[1]

Here, Truman sounds more like a man bent on vengeance than a man worrying about needless loss of civilian lives.

And how regrettable was it to Truman? He later wrote, "I telephoned Byrnes [his secretary of state] aboard ship to give him the news and then said to the group of sailors around me, 'This is the greatest thing in history.'" In response to a story in the Aug. 7 Oregon Journal headlined "Truman, Jubilant Over New Bomb, Nears U.S. Port," Lew Wallace, a Democratic politician from Portland, Oregon, telegrammed Truman:

"We on the Pacific Coast and all Americans know that no president of the United States could ever be jubilant over any device that would kill innocent human beings. Please make it clear that it is not destruction but the end of destruction that is the cause of jubilation."

Truman replied on Aug. 9:

"I appreciated your telegram very much but I think if you will read the paper again you will find that the good feeling on my part was over the fact Russia had entered into the war with Japan and not because we had invented a new engine of destruction."

There are two small problems with Truman's version. First, Truman wasn't jubilant about Russia's entry. Second and more important, the timing doesn't work. When Truman claimed to have been jubilant about Russia's entry into the war, Russia hadn't yet entered. Russia entered the war on Aug. 8.

The Opposition to Dropping the Bomb

Start with this shocking quote – shocking because of the source:

"Careful scholarly treatment of the records and manuscripts opened over the past few years has greatly enhanced our understanding of why the Truman administration used atomic weapons against Japan. Experts continue to disagree on some issues, but critical questions have been answered. The consensus among scholars is that the bomb was not needed to avoid an invasion of Japan and to end the war within a relatively short time. It is clear that alternatives to the bomb existed and that Truman and his advisers knew it."

The author of the above quote: J. Samuel Walker, chief historian of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.[2]

But what about the idea that the Japanese would fiercely resist an invasion of their main islands? It is one of those myths that have come about with few apparent facts to support it. The various military men who were close to the action were quite confident that the Japanese had been so thoroughly bombed and their infrastructure so thoroughly destroyed that there was no need for the atom bomb. The literature is rife with quotes to that effect.

Take, for example, Curtis E. LeMay, the Air Force general who led B-29 bombing of Japanese cities late in the war. LeMay once said, "There are no innocent civilians, so it doesn't bother me so much to be killing innocent bystanders." And he was as good as his word: in one night of fire-bombing Tokyo, he and his men killed 100,000 civilians. So we can be confident that any doubts he had about dropping the atom bomb would not be based on concern for Japanese civilians. But consider the following dialogue between LeMay and the press.

"LeMay: The war would have been over in two weeks without the Russians entering and without the atomic bomb.

"The Press: You mean that, sir? Without the Russians and the atomic bomb?

"LeMay: Yes, with the B-29…

"The Press: General, why use the atomic bomb? Why did we use it then?

"LeMay: Well, the other people were not convinced…

"The Press: Had they not surrendered because of the atomic bomb?

"LeMay: The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all."[3]

Nor was LeMay alone. Other Air Force officers, all documented in Alperovitz, had reached similar conclusions. And Navy admirals and Army generals also believed that dropping the bomb was a bad idea. Fleet Admiral Leahy, for instance, the chief of staff to the president and a friend of Truman's, thought the atom bomb unnecessary. Furthermore, he wrote, "in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages."[4] Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet and chief of Naval Operations, thought the war could be ended well before a planned November 1945 naval invasion. And in a public speech on Oct. 5, 1945, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, said, "The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace before the atomic age was announced to the world with the destruction of Hiroshima and before the Russian entry into the war."[5]

Many Army leaders had similar views. Author Norman Cousins writes of Gen. Douglas MacArthur:

"[H]e saw no military justification for the dropping of the bomb. The war might have ended weeks earlier, he said, if the United States had agreed, as it later did anyway, to the retention of the institution of the emperor."[6]

Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, the supreme commander of the Allied Forces in Europe, was also against the bomb. Eisenhower biographer Stephen Ambrose writes:

"There was one additional matter on which Eisenhower gave Truman advice that was ignored. It concerned the use of the atomic bomb. Eisenhower first heard of the bomb during the Potsdam Conference; from that moment on, until his death, it occupied, along with the Russians, a central position in his thinking. …

"When [Secretary of War] Stimson said the United States proposed to use the bomb against Japan, Eisenhower voiced '… grave misgivings….' Three days later, on July 20, Eisenhower flew to Berlin, where he met with Truman and his principal advisors. Again Eisenhower recommended against using the bomb, and again was ignored."[7]

These are a few of the many quotes in Alperovitz from military leaders who thought the bomb's use on Japan unnecessary and/or immoral.

Much of what I've written in this section is subject to the criticism that, of course, these leaders wanted to distance themselves from a bad decision, but that that doesn't necessarily mean they were opposed at the time or, more important, expressed their opposition at the time. In short, all these people could be lying. However, Alperovitz gives enough evidence to conclude, at the very least, that not all of them were lying. Some of the documents are memos written well before Aug. 6, 1945.
The Weak Case for Using the Bomb

Even though it's clear that not all of these opponents lied after the fact about their opposition, assume for a minute that they had. There still would be no good case for using the bomb. Roosevelt and Truman had made clear that they were seeking "unconditional surrender" from Japan. But Truman adamantly refused to clarify what "unconditional surrender" meant.

One of the key issues in the U.S. government's call for the Japanese government's unconditional surrender was whether the Japanese would be able to keep their emperor. Former President Herbert Hoover was very active in trying to end the war with Japan. On May 16, 1945, he sent a memo to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, who had been Hoover's secretary of state, outlining his views on the war. On May 28, he met with President Truman and discussed how to end the war. At Truman's request, Hoover wrote a memo in which he urged that the terms of Japan's surrender be clarified. He emphasized that the U.S. government should make clear to Japan's government that "the Allies have no desire to destroy either the Japanese people or their government, or to interference [sic] in the Japanese way of life."[8] Truman gave the Hoover memo to Stimson and undersecretary of state Joseph Grew for comments. On June 14, fully seven weeks before the bomb was dropped, Stimson's staff gave its assessment:

"The proposal of a public declaration of war aims, in effect giving definition to 'unconditional surrender,' has definite merit if it is carefully handled."[9]

There is ample evidence that the Japanese government was willing to surrender months before Aug. 6 if only it could keep its emperor. Much of this evidence is given in Alperovitz's book and much in Dennis D. Wainstock, The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996). Wainstock (pp. 22-23) tells of many attempts by the Japanese to clarify the terms and to make clear their willingness to surrender if they could only keep their emperor untouched. For example, on April 7, 1945, acting Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru asked Swedish Ambassador Widon Bagge in Tokyo "to ascertain what peace terms the United States and Britain had in mind." Shigemitsu emphasized that "the Emperor must not be touched." Bagge passed the message on to the U.S. government, but Secretary of State Edward Stettinius told the U.S. ambassador in Sweden to "show no interest or take any initiative in pursuit of this matter."[10]

So the Japanese government tried another route. On May 7, 1945, Masutard Inoue, counselor of the Japanese legation in Portugal, approached an agent of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Inoue asked the agent to contact the U.S. embassy and "find out exactly what they plan to do in the Far East." He expressed his fear that Japan would be smashed, and he emphasized, "there can be no unconditional surrender." The agent passed the message on, but nothing came of it.

Three times is a charm, goes the saying. But not for the hapless Japanese. On May 10, 1945, Gen. Onodera, Japan's military representative in Sweden, tried to get a member of Sweden's royal family to approach the Allies for a settlement. He emphasized also that Japan's government would not accept unconditional surrender and must be allowed to "save face." The U.S. government urged Sweden's government to let the matter drop.

But if you can't at first surrender, try, try again. On July 12, with almost four weeks to go before the horrible blast, Kojiro Kitamura, a representative of the Yokohama Specie Bank in Switzerland, told Per Jacobson, a Swedish adviser to the Bank for International Settlements, that he wanted to contact U.S. representatives and that the only condition Japan insisted on was that it keep its emperor. "He was acting with the consent of Shunichi Kase, the Japanese minister to Switzerland, and General Kiyotomi Okamoto, chief of Japanese European intelligence, and they were in direct contact with Tokyo."[11] On July 14, Jacobson met in Wiesbaden, Germany with OSS representative Allen Dulles (later head of the CIA) and relayed the message that Japan's main demand was "retention of the Emperor." Dulles passed the information to Stimson, but Stimson refused to act on it.

Interestingly, Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy drafted a proposed surrender demand for the Committee of Three (Grew, Stimson, and Navy Secretary James Forrestal.) Their draft was part of Article 12 of the Potsdam Declaration, in which the Allies specified the conditions for Japan's surrender. Under their wording, Japan's government would have been allowed to keep its emperor as part of a "constitutional monarchy." Truman, though, who was influenced by his newly appointed Secretary of State James Byrnes on the ship over to the Potsdam Conference, changed the language of the surrender demand to drop the reference to keeping the emperor.

The bitter irony, of course, is that Truman ultimately allowed Japan to keep its emperor. Had this condition been dropped earlier, there would have been no need for the atom bomb. Rather than let Japan's government "save face," Truman destroyed almost 200,000 faces.

Why did this happen? Why did Truman persist in refusing to clarify what unconditional surrender meant? Alperovitz speculates, with evidence that some will find convincing and others won't, that the reason was to send a signal to Joseph Stalin that the U.S. government was willing to use some pretty vicious methods to dominate in the postwar world. My own view is that Truman and Byrnes wanted vengeance, plain and simple, and cared little about the loss of innocent lives. Let's face it: dropping an atom bomb on two non-militarily strategic cities was not different in principle from fire-bombing Tokyo or Dresden.

Rewriting History

Why is it that when people talk Hiroshima and Nagasaki today, the standard response from defenders of the decision is that dropping these bombs saved hundreds of thousands and, in some versions, millions, of American lives? The reason is that some of those who had most favored using the bomb, or who had gone along with the decision, participated in a highly successful attempt to craft history.

Even Jimmy Byrnes, the aforementioned secretary of state and one of the strongest advocates of using the bomb, claimed in his memoirs only the following: "Certainly, by bringing the war to an end, the atomic bomb saved the lives of thousands of American boys."[12] But, by 1991, President George H.W. Bush was claiming that the decision to use the bomb "spared millions [emphasis mine] of American lives." What happened that made Americans take this kind of claim seriously?

Within a year of the war's end, articles started appearing in the U.S. that questioned the need for dropping the bomb or that simply laid out, in very human terms, its devastating consequences. In a June 1946 article in Saturday Review, for example, editor Norman Cousins and co-author Thomas K. Finletter, a former assistant secretary of state and, later, secretary of the Air Force, raised the question of why the bomb was dropped. They speculated:

"Can it be that we were more anxious to prevent Russia from establishing a claim for full participation in the occupation against Japan than we were to think through the implications of unleashing atomic warfare?"[13]

Other popular articles followed. On Aug. 19, 1946, the New York Times reported that Albert Einstein deplored the use of the bomb and speculated that it was a way of getting to Japan before the Russians did. On Aug. 31, The New Yorker devoted its entire issue to John Hersey's Hiroshima, which laid out the horrible human tragedy. It didn't help the proponents' case that in July 1946, the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey's book, Japan's Struggle to End the War, was published. It concluded that Japan would have surrendered without the bomb, without the Soviet declaration of war, and without even a U.S. invasion.

In the minds of proponents of using the bomb, something had to be done. James B. Conant, for example, Harvard University's president and one of the leading advocates of the bomb's use, concluded that an article was needed to counter this growing wave of criticism. The best candidate for the job, he concluded, was Henry Stimson. Stimson had been in both Hoover's and Truman's administrations and was highly respected. Conant suggested to Harvey Bundy, who had been one of the main overseers of the Manhattan Project that had developed the bomb, that he draft an article for Stimson's signature. The actual author of the article was Harvey Bundy's young son, McGeorge Bundy, who later figured so prominently as a Kennedy administration official in favor of the Vietnam war. Alperovitz tells the story so well (pp. 448-497) that I can't do justice to it here. But here are two highlights of the points the article was to make:

* That if the bomb hadn't been used, "thousands and perhaps hundreds of thousands of American soldiers might be [sic] killed or permanently injured."
* That "nobody in authority in Potsdam was satisfied that the Japanese would surrender on terms acceptable to the Allies without further bitter fighting."

As we have seen, both of these claims were false. Conant, moreover, successfully persuaded Bundy to drop mention of the issue of "unconditional surrender." This is like asking a sports writer writing about football player Terrell Owens' conflicts to drop any mention of his criticism of Philadelphia Eagles' quarterback Donovan McNabb. Why confuse readers with the facts?

The final draft was published in the February 1947 Harper's and widely reprinted. It silenced all but the most-independent critics. If you find yourself making claims about all the American lives saved and about the Japanese intransigence in the face of certain defeat, as I used to, you can probably thank McGeorge Bundy, Henry Stimson, and James B. Conant. But if you want the facts, read pp. 448-497 of Alperovitz.

Notes

1. Quoted in Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995, p. 563.

2. J. Samuel Walker, "The Decision to Use the Bomb: A Historiographical Update," Diplomatic History, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 97-114. (Quoted in Alperovitz, 1995.)

3. Quoted in Alperovitz, 1995, p. 336.

4. William D. Leahy, I Was There, pg. 441, quoted at http://www.doug-long.com/leahy.htm.

5. Alperowitz, p. 329.

6. Cousins, Pathology of Power, 1987, p. 71, quoted in Alperovitz, 1995.

7. Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, Vol I: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 1890-1952 (New York, 1983), pp. 425-426, quoted in Alperovitz, p. 358.

8. Quoted in Alperovitz, p. 44.

9. Quoted in Alperovitz, p. 44.

10. Quoted in Wainstock, p. 22.

11. Wainstock, p. 23.

12. James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947, p. 264.

13. Quoted in Alperovitz, p. 443.

Sunday, August 05, 2007

JudgeWatch

DISQUIETING FACTS, DISTURBING IMPLICATIONS


The issue of accountability of the higher judiciary has long been troubling all sections of society. While the power of the higher judiciary has greatly increased over the years because of the poor popular perception of the political class, which the judiciary has used to enhance the scope of Its actions, its accountability has been gradually reduced. The V. Rarnaswami case showed the impracticality of impeachment as a remedy for judicial misconduct. Since then there has been a lot or talk of an independent National Judicial Commission for enforcing judicial accountability, but none has been constituted, in the teeth of the steadfast opposition of the JudiCiary to any independent disciplinary body over them. Meanwhile the Supreme Court by judicial fiat has restrained even the registration of any FIR against a sitting judge, without the prior permission of the Chief Justice of India. All this, while a draconian Contempt law has been used to silence any public and media scrutiny of judicial misconduct. And now, there is as attempt to effectively insulate the judiciary from the Right to Information Act. However, the silver lining is that the Parl:ament hns recently amended the Contempt of Courts Act to allow truth as a defence to a Contempt Action. It therefore becomes very important for all, particularly the media, to diligently investigate and truthfully expose cases of judicial misconduct.


The recent outburst of the Apex Court against the TV journalist Vijay Shekhar on his sting operation to show the reckless and corrupt manner in which arrest walTants can be obtained from the Gujarat Courts only strengthen the public perception that the Judiciary will try to use its powers of contempt to hide the rot within the judiciary. This must be stoutly resisted by the media and Civil Society. If we allow ourselves to be intimidated by such tactics, we will be guilty of allowing an unaccountable judicial dictatorship to flourish within our republic. No court will use its power of contempt in such cases if the media and civil society stand up together against it.
The Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Reforms was set up by a National People's Convention held at Delhi in March this year. Th.: object is to Organize Civil Society, who are the real consumers of justice to take up a Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Reforms. It was set up after a painful realization that neither successive governments nor the judiciary have been serious about repairing the decrepit judicial system, nor about introducing any real accountability for the higher judiciary. We realized that nothing substanthl would be done unless there is a strong and vocal campaign by the common people of this country who are the real stakeholders in the system of justice. OUf campaign is a small beginning to highlight issues involving systemic problems with the judiciary as well as individual cases of judicial misconduct. We have set up a website of the Campaign which has sections on judicial reforms, 11ldge Watch, Judgement Watch etc. Several case studies of past instances of judicial misconduct are put up on the website. We now present a very recent and serious case study of sllr.h mjsconduct which took place at the very highest levels of the judiciary.

On 16'" February 2006, the then Chief Justice of India, Y.K. Sabharwal passed a detailed order setting into motion the process of sealing of properties in designated residential areas of Delhi which were being used for commercial purposes. In the drive that followed to implement the order, thousands of premises being used for commercial purposes such as shops and offices, many of which had been functioning for decades, were sealed, forcing them to buy or rent premises in shopping malls and commercial complexes. This sealing went on relentlessly under the continuous supervision of Chief Justice Sabharwal's bench, monitored and directed by a Court appointed monitoring committee.

The Court's orders were ostensibly made to implement the rule of law as embodied by the Delhi Master Plan 200 I, which hod designated the land use of those areas as residential. There were however two ways of implementing the rule of law in such circumstances. Either order sealing of residential premises put to commercial use, or order the authorities to alter the master plan and change the land use of areas which were essentially being used for commercial activity for a long period of time. In fact, the government did come up with a new master plan of 2021 which allowed mixed use and commercial activity in many of the areas which were designated as residential. Despite this new master plan which took away the raison de etre of the sealing orders, The court ordered the sealing to continue even in such areas on the basis that their owners had given undenakings that they would stop the commercia1 activity by 30th June/30 th September 2006. The court said that they could not be permitted to "violate" their undertaking, despite the fact that the new master plan permitted them to use their premises for commercial purposes.

The courts orders created havoc and panic in the city and many questioned the excessive zeal with which the court supervised and monitored the sealing drive. More than a lakh shops and commercial establishments were shut down during the time and were forced to shift to shopping malls and commercial complexes. The prices of shops and offices in the shopping malls and commercial complexes doubled and tripled almost overnight making many people question whether the sealing drive was being undertaken for the benefit of the Mall and Commercial complex developers. All this is a matter of public record. What is not publicly known is that during this time that these orders were being made by Justice Sabharwal, his two sons, Chetan a'1d Nitin who until then had small export import businesses, had entered into partnerships with big Mall and Commercial complex developers and had become big Commercial complex developers themselves.

Here are the facts, which have been dug out essentially from documents filed by Chetan and N itin Sabharwal with the Department of Company affairs. Till 2004, the Sabharwals owned 3 companies ostensibly doing small time export import business, whose profits were in lakhs. These were named, Pawan Impex, Sabs exports and Sug exports. Interestingly, their registered offices were at the Sabharwals' family home at 3/81 Punjabi Bagh. In January 2004 they were shifted to Justice Sabharwal's official residence at 6 Moti Lal Nehru Marg. Could it be a coincidence that on 7'" May 2004, Justice Sabharwal had ordered the sealing of properties where industries had been running in residential areas? Obviously, a strict implementation of his order would ha\'e required the sealing of his Punjabi Bagh residence, but his official residence could hardly be sealed. Howf'ver, (m 23rd October 2004, the promoter of one of the biggest developers of shopping malls and commercial complexes (Kabul Chawla of the BPTP group) was inducted in Pawan Impex as a 50% shareholder and Director. On the same day, the registered otfice of Pawan lmpex was shifted back to 3/81 Punjabi Bagh. Soon thereafter, on 12/2/05, Kabul Chawla's wife, Anjali Chawla was also inducted as Director.

On 8/4/05, Chetan and Nitin set up another company, Harpawan Constructors, this time with the object of constructing Commercial complexes. On 25/10/05, Purshottam Bagheria, another big builder of Delhi was inducted as a partner in this new enterprise. Soon after entering into partnership with the SabhaIWals, Bagheria soon went on to announce his plans to develop "Square I Mall", in Saket which was touted as one of the largest and most luxurious Malls in Delhi.
By 16Th February 2006, when then Chief Justice Sabharwal passed the tough order setting in motion the sealing of commercial establishments operating in residential areas of Delhi, his sons were well on their way to entering the business of Malls and commercial complexes in a big way, having sewn up partnerships with two of the biggest Commercial estate developers in Delhi. This Commercial complex development business of the Sabharwals really took off thereafter. On 21/6/06, the share capital of Pawan Impex was increased from Rs. 1 lakh to Rs. 3 Crares. Immediately thereafter, on 30/9/06, the Chaw las of BPTP developers invested Rs.l.5 Crores (50%) in the company. On 22/8/06, Pawan Impex was given a loan of 28 Crores by the Union Bank oflndia, Connaught Place. The loan was secured by Mortgaging the "plant, machinery and other assets" lying at plot Nos A 3, 4, &, 5 in Sector 125, Noida. There is no plant or machinery at these plots. Instead, a huge 1.T. park (5 lac Sq Ft, worth hundreds of crores) is being constructed there by BPTP. When questioned about this, the General Manager of the Union Bank asserted that the Sabharwals had matched this by putting in 28 Crores of their own. When questioned further about this, he explained that this consisted of 3 crores of Share Capital, 7 Crores of unsecured loans! And 18 crares of "projected income from prospective buyers!" If every bank were as liberal to give loans on the security of projected income from prospective buyers, we would have had non perfonning assets of severallakh crores.

Interestingly, these 3 huge plots of 12,000 Sq. Metres in a prime sector of Noida were allotted to Pawan Impex on 29 Dec 2004 by the Mulayam Singh/Amar Singh government of U.P. at a rate of only Rs. 3,700/sq Metre, when the market price of commercial land here was at least Rs. 30,OOO/sq Metre at that time). This is itself a largesse of at least 30 Crares. These are however not the only plots in Naida allotted to the Sabharwals. Another huge commercial plot of 12,000 sq metres (plot 12A, in Sector 68, which appears to have been carved out later as an afterthought) was allotted to the other Sabharwal Company, Sabs exports, as recently as 10 November 2006, at a price of 4000 Rs/sq metre, when the market price of commercial plots there was at least 10 times as much. This meant a largesse of another 50 Crores! But these are not the only plots allotted at throwaway prices to the Sabharwals. Sabs exports was earlier on 6, Nov 2000 allotted another 3 plots (C1033, lO4 and 105) of 800 Sq M each in Sector 63 at a rate of Rs. 2, I 00 each, when the market price was several times that. They also appear to have other plots in Sector 8 Noida, where they have recently collstructed a fancy factory and Office Complex. This is on top of the allotment of a House Plot in the fancy Sector 44 of Noida to Justice Sabharwal's daughter in law, Sheeba Sabharwal in 2005. This was part of the infamous Noida allotment scam, where the media exposed that most allotments were made to V .I.P.s in a supposed draw of lots. Embarrased by this exposure, the allotments had to be cancelled by the U.P. Government. Curiously, the CBI investigation into the allotments ordered by the Allahabad High Court was immediately stayed by Justice B.P. Singh of the Supreme Court. In this context, it is also very significant that the publication of the infamous Amar Singh tapes, which showed him involved in various crimes and' sleaze was stayed by Justice Sabharwal himself on the matter being merely mentioned before him.

Thus, from owning small time export import firms till 2004, the Sabharwals in just two years time, got into the business of developing Commercial complexes and appear to be rolling in money. All this happened during the time when Justice Sabharwal was a senior judge and then Chief Justice, dealing with the sealing cases and passing orders which directly stood to benefit his sons and their partners. In this context, it is !1oteworthy that the Sabharwal sons Chetan and Nitin, have recently in March 2007, purchased a 1150 sq Yard bungalow, (B-9 Maharani Bagh, from the heirs of fomler Law Minister Jagannath Kaushal) for a stated consideration ofRs.16 Crores!

The IT Dept has finally woken up and has send a notice on 28"' May 2007 to Pawan Impex seeking details of their business activities, accounts, assets, sources of funds etc. The matter however is more serious than that. The conduct of Justice Sabharwal and his sons appear to involve offences and misdemeanors beyond the Income Tax Act. In the first place, it was totally improper on his part to have heard the sealing case and passed orders in it, since his sons clearly stood to henefit from his orders. His orders are against the principles of natural justice, which say that no judge can hear a case in which he is personally interested. There was a serious conflict of interest in this case which renders his orders a nullity. It is in fact arguable that his dealing with this case in such circumstances involves an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

For more information: http://judicialaccontbility.blogspot.com/

DISQUIETING FACTS, DISTURBING IMPLICATIONS


The issue of accountability of the higher judiciary has long been troubling all sections of society. While the power of the higher judiciary has greatly increased over the years because of the poor popular perception of the political class, which the judiciary has used to enhance the scope of Its actions, its accountability has been gradually reduced. The V. Rarnaswami case showed the impracticality of impeachment as a remedy for judicial misconduct. Since then there has been a lot or talk of an independent National Judicial Commission for enforcing judicial accountability, but none has been constituted, in the teeth of the steadfast opposition of the JudiCiary to any independent disciplinary body over them. Meanwhile the Supreme Court by judicial fiat has restrained even the registration of any FIR against a sitting judge, without the prior permission of the Chief Justice of India. All this, while a draconian Contempt law has been used to silence any public and media scrutiny of judicial misconduct. And now, there is as attempt to effectively insulate the judiciary from the Right to Information Act. However, the silver lining is that the Parl:ament hns recently amended the Contempt of Courts Act to allow truth as a defence to a Contempt Action. It therefore becomes very important for all, particularly the media, to diligently investigate and truthfully expose cases of judicial misconduct.


The recent outburst of the Apex Court against the TV journalist Vijay Shekhar on his sting operation to show the reckless and corrupt manner in which arrest walTants can be obtained from the Gujarat Courts only strengthen the public perception that the Judiciary will try to use its powers of contempt to hide the rot within the judiciary. This must be stoutly resisted by the media and Civil Society. If we allow ourselves to be intimidated by such tactics, we will be guilty of allowing an unaccountable judicial dictatorship to flourish within our republic. No court will use its power of contempt in such cases if the media and civil society stand up together against it.
The Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Reforms was set up by a National People's Convention held at Delhi in March this year. Th.: object is to Organize Civil Society, who are the real consumers of justice to take up a Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Reforms. It was set up after a painful realization that neither successive governments nor the judiciary have been serious about repairing the decrepit judicial system, nor about introducing any real accountability for the higher judiciary. We realized that nothing substanthl would be done unless there is a strong and vocal campaign by the common people of this country who are the real stakeholders in the system of justice. OUf campaign is a small beginning to highlight issues involving systemic problems with the judiciary as well as individual cases of judicial misconduct. We have set up a website of the Campaign which has sections on judicial reforms, 11ldge Watch, Judgement Watch etc. Several case studies of past instances of judicial misconduct are put up on the website. We now present a very recent and serious case study of sllr.h mjsconduct which took place at the very highest levels of the judiciary.

On 16'" February 2006, the then Chief Justice of India, Y.K. Sabharwal passed a detailed order setting into motion the process of sealing of properties in designated residential areas of Delhi which were being used for commercial purposes. In the drive that followed to implement the order, thousands of premises being used for commercial purposes such as shops and offices, many of which had been functioning for decades, were sealed, forcing them to buy or rent premises in shopping malls and commercial complexes. This sealing went on relentlessly under the continuous supervision of Chief Justice Sabharwal's bench, monitored and directed by a Court appointed monitoring committee.

The Court's orders were ostensibly made to implement the rule of law as embodied by the Delhi Master Plan 200 I, which hod designated the land use of those areas as residential. There were however two ways of implementing the rule of law in such circumstances. Either order sealing of residential premises put to commercial use, or order the authorities to alter the master plan and change the land use of areas which were essentially being used for commercial activity for a long period of time. In fact, the government did come up with a new master plan of 2021 which allowed mixed use and commercial activity in many of the areas which were designated as residential. Despite this new master plan which took away the raison de etre of the sealing orders, The court ordered the sealing to continue even in such areas on the basis that their owners had given undenakings that they would stop the commercia1 activity by 30th June/30 th September 2006. The court said that they could not be permitted to "violate" their undertaking, despite the fact that the new master plan permitted them to use their premises for commercial purposes.

The courts orders created havoc and panic in the city and many questioned the excessive zeal with which the court supervised and monitored the sealing drive. More than a lakh shops and commercial establishments were shut down during the time and were forced to shift to shopping malls and commercial complexes. The prices of shops and offices in the shopping malls and commercial complexes doubled and tripled almost overnight making many people question whether the sealing drive was being undertaken for the benefit of the Mall and Commercial complex developers. All this is a matter of public record. What is not publicly known is that during this time that these orders were being made by Justice Sabharwal, his two sons, Chetan a'1d Nitin who until then had small export import businesses, had entered into partnerships with big Mall and Commercial complex developers and had become big Commercial complex developers themselves.

Here are the facts, which have been dug out essentially from documents filed by Chetan and N itin Sabharwal with the Department of Company affairs. Till 2004, the Sabharwals owned 3 companies ostensibly doing small time export import business, whose profits were in lakhs. These were named, Pawan Impex, Sabs exports and Sug exports. Interestingly, their registered offices were at the Sabharwals' family home at 3/81 Punjabi Bagh. In January 2004 they were shifted to Justice Sabharwal's official residence at 6 Moti Lal Nehru Marg. Could it be a coincidence that on 7'" May 2004, Justice Sabharwal had ordered the sealing of properties where industries had been running in residential areas? Obviously, a strict implementation of his order would ha\'e required the sealing of his Punjabi Bagh residence, but his official residence could hardly be sealed. Howf'ver, (m 23rd October 2004, the promoter of one of the biggest developers of shopping malls and commercial complexes (Kabul Chawla of the BPTP group) was inducted in Pawan Impex as a 50% shareholder and Director. On the same day, the registered otfice of Pawan lmpex was shifted back to 3/81 Punjabi Bagh. Soon thereafter, on 12/2/05, Kabul Chawla's wife, Anjali Chawla was also inducted as Director.

On 8/4/05, Chetan and Nitin set up another company, Harpawan Constructors, this time with the object of constructing Commercial complexes. On 25/10/05, Purshottam Bagheria, another big builder of Delhi was inducted as a partner in this new enterprise. Soon after entering into partnership with the SabhaIWals, Bagheria soon went on to announce his plans to develop "Square I Mall", in Saket which was touted as one of the largest and most luxurious Malls in Delhi.
By 16Th February 2006, when then Chief Justice Sabharwal passed the tough order setting in motion the sealing of commercial establishments operating in residential areas of Delhi, his sons were well on their way to entering the business of Malls and commercial complexes in a big way, having sewn up partnerships with two of the biggest Commercial estate developers in Delhi. This Commercial complex development business of the Sabharwals really took off thereafter. On 21/6/06, the share capital of Pawan Impex was increased from Rs. 1 lakh to Rs. 3 Crares. Immediately thereafter, on 30/9/06, the Chaw las of BPTP developers invested Rs.l.5 Crores (50%) in the company. On 22/8/06, Pawan Impex was given a loan of 28 Crores by the Union Bank oflndia, Connaught Place. The loan was secured by Mortgaging the "plant, machinery and other assets" lying at plot Nos A 3, 4, &, 5 in Sector 125, Noida. There is no plant or machinery at these plots. Instead, a huge 1.T. park (5 lac Sq Ft, worth hundreds of crores) is being constructed there by BPTP. When questioned about this, the General Manager of the Union Bank asserted that the Sabharwals had matched this by putting in 28 Crores of their own. When questioned further about this, he explained that this consisted of 3 crores of Share Capital, 7 Crores of unsecured loans! And 18 crares of "projected income from prospective buyers!" If every bank were as liberal to give loans on the security of projected income from prospective buyers, we would have had non perfonning assets of severallakh crores.

Interestingly, these 3 huge plots of 12,000 Sq. Metres in a prime sector of Noida were allotted to Pawan Impex on 29 Dec 2004 by the Mulayam Singh/Amar Singh government of U.P. at a rate of only Rs. 3,700/sq Metre, when the market price of commercial land here was at least Rs. 30,OOO/sq Metre at that time). This is itself a largesse of at least 30 Crares. These are however not the only plots in Naida allotted to the Sabharwals. Another huge commercial plot of 12,000 sq metres (plot 12A, in Sector 68, which appears to have been carved out later as an afterthought) was allotted to the other Sabharwal Company, Sabs exports, as recently as 10 November 2006, at a price of 4000 Rs/sq metre, when the market price of commercial plots there was at least 10 times as much. This meant a largesse of another 50 Crores! But these are not the only plots allotted at throwaway prices to the Sabharwals. Sabs exports was earlier on 6, Nov 2000 allotted another 3 plots (C1033, lO4 and 105) of 800 Sq M each in Sector 63 at a rate of Rs. 2, I 00 each, when the market price was several times that. They also appear to have other plots in Sector 8 Noida, where they have recently collstructed a fancy factory and Office Complex. This is on top of the allotment of a House Plot in the fancy Sector 44 of Noida to Justice Sabharwal's daughter in law, Sheeba Sabharwal in 2005. This was part of the infamous Noida allotment scam, where the media exposed that most allotments were made to V .I.P.s in a supposed draw of lots. Embarrased by this exposure, the allotments had to be cancelled by the U.P. Government. Curiously, the CBI investigation into the allotments ordered by the Allahabad High Court was immediately stayed by Justice B.P. Singh of the Supreme Court. In this context, it is also very significant that the publication of the infamous Amar Singh tapes, which showed him involved in various crimes and' sleaze was stayed by Justice Sabharwal himself on the matter being merely mentioned before him.

Thus, from owning small time export import firms till 2004, the Sabharwals in just two years time, got into the business of developing Commercial complexes and appear to be rolling in money. All this happened during the time when Justice Sabharwal was a senior judge and then Chief Justice, dealing with the sealing cases and passing orders which directly stood to benefit his sons and their partners. In this context, it is !1oteworthy that the Sabharwal sons Chetan and Nitin, have recently in March 2007, purchased a 1150 sq Yard bungalow, (B-9 Maharani Bagh, from the heirs of fomler Law Minister Jagannath Kaushal) for a stated consideration ofRs.16 Crores!

The IT Dept has finally woken up and has send a notice on 28"' May 2007 to Pawan Impex seeking details of their business activities, accounts, assets, sources of funds etc. The matter however is more serious than that. The conduct of Justice Sabharwal and his sons appear to involve offences and misdemeanors beyond the Income Tax Act. In the first place, it was totally improper on his part to have heard the sealing case and passed orders in it, since his sons clearly stood to henefit from his orders. His orders are against the principles of natural justice, which say that no judge can hear a case in which he is personally interested. There was a serious conflict of interest in this case which renders his orders a nullity. It is in fact arguable that his dealing with this case in such circumstances involves an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Friday, August 03, 2007

Cold War hots up in Arctic Ocean

The Arctic's untapped resources include huge reserves of fuel and minerals. Now Moscow has raised tensions by dispatching an expedition to annex a vast expanse of the ocean.

The Guardian reported on 29 July 2007 that "Russia leads race for North Pole oil"

The Moscow Times noted on 3rd August "Subs Find Bottom on Arctic Endeavor"

A Russian flag was planted on the North Pole seabed as man reached the bottom of the top of the world for the first time in an expedition likely to accelerate the scramble for rich underwater deposits.

Two mini-submarines, Mir-1 and Mir-2, carried three-man crews more than four kilometers below the Arctic surface and back up again in a nine-hour operation. A mechanical arm dropped the rust proof flag on the seabed from Mir-1 as part of Russia's attempts to bolster its claim for a vast part of the Arctic floor.

"It was a soft landing," Alexander Begak, the expedition's press attache, said by telephone from on board the research vessel Akademik Fyodorov, which along with the nuclear icebreaker Rossia made up the expedition.

On board the submarines were polar explorer Artur Chilingarov, who is deputy speaker in the State Duma and President Vladimir Putin's envoy to the Arctic, Duma Deputy Vladimir Gruzdev and Anatoly Sagalevich, chief of the Oceanology Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

"The landing was smooth, the yellowish ground is around us and no sea dwellers are visible," Chilingarov was quoted as saying from the bottom by Itar-Tass.

The second submarine was manned by Swedish businessman Frederik Paulsen and Australian adventurer Mike McDowell. NTV television reported Wednesday that McDowell paid $3 million to go on the privately funded expedition.

The crew took samples from the seabed as part of an attempt to claim a large chunk of the Arctic. Russia maintains that the Lomonosov Ridge, an underwater shelf that runs through the Arctic, is part of Russia's offshore territory.

"The aim of the expedition is to prove that our shelf extends to the North Pole," Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was quoted as saying by Interfax. Lavrov added that Russia's claims would be pursued through international legal channels.

Other countries with Arctic territory were quick to dismiss the act.

"This isn't the 15th century. You can't go around the world and just plant flags and say 'We're claiming this territory,'" Canadian Foreign Minister Peter MacKay was quoted as saying in televised remarks by Reuters. "There is no threat to Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic ... we're not at all concerned about this mission -- basically it's just a show by Russia."

"I think in a few days U.S. explorers will be in the area," said Hali Ullen, of the Institute of Oceanology, which provided the two submarines.

Chilingarov said the United States was keeping a careful eye on events and that UN and NATO planes were also spotted watching the expedition.

The two submarines descended from a 25-meter-by-10-meter opening in the ice early Thursday morning. The first vessel was piloted by Sagalevich, who manned the submarine that took the footage of the wreck of the Titanic used in the Hollywood film by the same name.

"The most difficult part of the operation was surfacing," said Begak.

The submarines, which are only 8 meters long, had to make sure they found the opening, and not the 1 1/2-meter-thick ice. Begak said it was "like hitting a hole the size of the eye of a needle."

Mir-1 appeared above the water eight hours and 40 minutes after submerging, spending 40 minutes below the ice before it found open sea, Begak said. Mir-2 surfaced an hour later.

Currently no country has exclusive jurisdiction over the Arctic. Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States each control a 320-kilometer economic zone beyond their shores.

Moscow first tried to claim the Arctic territory in 2001, but that claim was rejected. It has been gathering evidence since then in preparation for its next opportunity to submit the claim to a UN commission in 2009. To claim the area, Russia must prove that the area in question is linked to its territory as part of the same continental shelf.

The economic interests involved are immense, as the Arctic region could hold up to one-quarter of the planet's remaining untapped oil and gas reserves, according to some estimates.

"This expedition is symbolic of a new era in the exploration and extraction of oil in the Arctic Ocean," said Vladimir Chuprov, the head of the energy unit for Greenpeace Russia. "Its a scientific and a geopolitical expedition."

Chuprov said drilling for oil in the Arctic would only mean increased greenhouse gas emissions and the destruction of one of the cleanest areas left on the planet.

"It goes against the activities and aims of mankind to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 2050," he said, referring to the target agreed upon at the Group of Eight summit in Germany in June.

The Institute of Oceanology's Ullen insisted that it was too early to be concerned about the threat to the Arctic's environment.

"It is a question for 30 to 40 years from now," Ullen said. "Scientific research should be done.

"This expedition shows the ability of Russian technology and Russian science," he said, adding that the Arctic's future had to be decided through multilateral negotiations. "A united effort to explore the area is the best approach."

At home, the expedition has been spun to appeal to patriotic Russians who remember Soviet displays of derring-do. Russia has a long history of polar exploration, having created the first floating polar research station in 1937.

"Our aim is to remind the whole world that Russia is a great polar- and scientific-research power," Chilingarov was quoted as saying by Interfax.

Chilingarov previously compared the feat to space exploration. "To stand on one's feet at such a depth -- it is like the first step on the moon," he said.

To underline the comparison, the submarine crew spoke with the Russian crew of the international space station via a telephone linkup, Begak said. "They asked each other a few questions," he said, and then the connection was broken.

Channel One television noted that the crew did not wear shoes before they got into the submarine, just like cosmonauts.

Thursday, August 02, 2007

Fallout of a Pregnant Deal

"The Indian side said the agreement did not go an inch beyond the prime minister's assurance in Parliament. The US negotiator said the agreement is 'completely consistent with the Hyde Act and well within the bounds of the Hyde Act itself.' Both these cannot be true at once, as the prime minister's position was contradictory to the provisions of the Hyde Act."

The text of the Indo-US agreement for operationalisation of the civil nuclear deal will be made public on 3rd August, 2007. The text of 123 agreement will be released simultaneously in New Delhi and in Washington as per an understanding between the two countries. The document will be put on the website of the Ministry of External Affairs for comments and a debate on the significant agreement. The agreement was approved by the Union Cabinet at the end of July 2007. It will be placed in Parliament when it meets for the monsoon session on August 10.

"A popular UN dictum states that negotiations can be considered successful if the parties are equally unhappy about the outcome. If any side is in jubilation, the agreement is likely to run into trouble," says T P Sreenivasan, a former member of the Indian Foreign Service, was India's ambassador to the United Nations, Vienna, and governor for India, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna.

The agreement-under the ‘123’ section of the US Atomic Energy Act- that the US signs such cooperation agreements with other countries. India started its nuclear energy programme with international cooperation, including with the US, and in fact signed on to a Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963.

But later the US and the USSR pushed through a discriminatory Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970, after China had conducted her first nuclear test in 1964, India refused to join.

In 1971, the nuclear armed USS Enterprise sailed into the Bay of Bengal. India tested a nuclear device in 1974. US passed domestic laws to curtail the flow of all dual use technology to India. In 1975, Nuclear Suppliers Group was established to ensure that a global nuclear technology denial regime.

In 1998, India conducted five nuclear tests and declared herself a nuclear weapon state.

After the deal "there are still further steps to be taken and obstacles to be overcome. The Nuclear Suppliers Group has to be persuaded to make the same exception for India--will China agree, without some provision for Pakistan? India has to negotiate a sui generis India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA for her civilian reactors, the US Congress has to approve the whole deal after it is completed, not necessarily a foregone conclusion. In India, opposition Parties, particularly the Left front have to concur-an uncertain eventuality", says Arundhati Ghose, formerly India's permanent representative/ambassador to the United Nations.

The Economist takes note of the Indo-US nuclear deal in a piece "America, India and the China bogey: A price too high" on August 2, 2007.

Here is the text of what it says:

The rise of China is no reason to trample on the non-proliferation regime

SLOWLY but seemingly relentlessly, America's deal with India on nuclear co-operation is wending its way to fruition. Two years after it was first announced in Washington by George Bush and Manmohan Singh, India's prime minister, the two countries have concluded negotiations on the terms of a technical agreement governing that co-operation. Both sides have claimed a great breakthrough. Nicholas Burns, the State Department official who has shepherded the deal through a maze of complications, called it “perhaps the single most important initiative in the 60 years of our relationship”. M.K. Narayanan, Mr Singh's national-security adviser, called it “a touchstone of a transformed bilateral relationship”. That once distant ties between America and India are warming up is indeed cause for celebration. But the heat also burns a huge hole in the global non-proliferation regime. As this newspaper has argued ever since the deal was first mooted, this is wrong, dangerous and unnecessary.

India first tested a nuclear device in 1974 (and became a declared nuclear-weapons state in 1998), inspiring the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it, like Pakistan and Israel, never signed, and which its agreement with America perhaps fatally undermines. Yet in both Delhi and Washington, DC, opposition to the agreement tends to be dismissed as nitpicking that ignores a fundamental shift. India, which tilted Soviet-wards during the cold war, and remains by far the most powerful exponent of “non-alignment”, is entering a “strategic partnership” with America. The world's oldest democracy is at last going to be on the closest of terms with its largest democracy. What could make more sense, when, in the background, a potentially hostile, undemocratic Asian giant is rapidly gaining economic weight, and adding military muscle? To spare everybody's blushes, the rise of China is rarely mentioned as a factor in America's nuclear exception for India. But it is perhaps the fundamental impulse behind it.

Yet linking an end to India's nuclear isolation to the need for a strategic hedge against the rise of China makes no sense. No threat from China is either so great or so pressing. Its army is indeed modernising and spending lavishly. But as our briefing points out (see article), its military budget, in hard-currency terms, is not much bigger than France's. It remains decades away from being able to mount a credible military challenge to American pre-eminence. Moreover, whereas conflict remains possible, especially over Taiwan, China's priorities are internal: coping with the social and political dislocation that its economic revolution entails.

Nor is the nuclear prize going to buy undivided Indian loyalty. Mr Singh's leftist parliamentary allies will balk at anything that smacks of toeing America's line, and especially of jettisoning close ties with Iran, an American priority. Nehruvian “non-alignment” runs deep. Even Mr Singh—liberal economist and leader of the drive for better relations with America—felt compelled last year to call Fidel Castro “one of the greatest men of our times”. The main opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), in government when India went nuclear in 1998, is stridently nationalist. Yashwant Sinha, the BJP's most recent foreign minister, has criticised the government already for giving America too much.

Conversely, the collapse of the deal is not going to fling India into any sort of embrace with China. Relations, still scarred by their war in 1962, are improving apace. China will soon be India's largest trading partner. But mutual suspicion and rivalry for resources mean that China will remain India's main strategic threat—the one it cited to justify the 1998 nuclear tests. No matter what nuclear stance America takes, India can be relied on to keep a healthy distance from China.

How to send all the wrong messages
China, then, is no justification for the damage America's nuclear concessions to India will do. They may yet trip at the remaining hurdles: in the American Congress; at the International Atomic Energy Agency; or the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group. The text of the latest agreement has not been made public. But from what has been said about it, it makes the damage far worse, by allowing India to reprocess American-supplied nuclear fuel, and by permitting it to build fuel stockpiles and hence withstand any future cut-off of supplies should it test another bomb. America claims that other aspirant nuclear powers, notably Iran, will learn the benefits of good behaviour—ie, of India's fairly respectable record on non-proliferation. More likely, however, the rewards India (and North Korea) are reaping will encourage countries without the bomb to strive to acquire one as soon as possible.