Fallout of a Pregnant Deal

"The Indian side said the agreement did not go an inch beyond the prime minister's assurance in Parliament. The US negotiator said the agreement is 'completely consistent with the Hyde Act and well within the bounds of the Hyde Act itself.' Both these cannot be true at once, as the prime minister's position was contradictory to the provisions of the Hyde Act."

The text of the Indo-US agreement for operationalisation of the civil nuclear deal will be made public on 3rd August, 2007. The text of 123 agreement will be released simultaneously in New Delhi and in Washington as per an understanding between the two countries. The document will be put on the website of the Ministry of External Affairs for comments and a debate on the significant agreement. The agreement was approved by the Union Cabinet at the end of July 2007. It will be placed in Parliament when it meets for the monsoon session on August 10.

"A popular UN dictum states that negotiations can be considered successful if the parties are equally unhappy about the outcome. If any side is in jubilation, the agreement is likely to run into trouble," says T P Sreenivasan, a former member of the Indian Foreign Service, was India's ambassador to the United Nations, Vienna, and governor for India, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna.

The agreement-under the ‘123’ section of the US Atomic Energy Act- that the US signs such cooperation agreements with other countries. India started its nuclear energy programme with international cooperation, including with the US, and in fact signed on to a Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963.

But later the US and the USSR pushed through a discriminatory Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970, after China had conducted her first nuclear test in 1964, India refused to join.

In 1971, the nuclear armed USS Enterprise sailed into the Bay of Bengal. India tested a nuclear device in 1974. US passed domestic laws to curtail the flow of all dual use technology to India. In 1975, Nuclear Suppliers Group was established to ensure that a global nuclear technology denial regime.

In 1998, India conducted five nuclear tests and declared herself a nuclear weapon state.

After the deal "there are still further steps to be taken and obstacles to be overcome. The Nuclear Suppliers Group has to be persuaded to make the same exception for India--will China agree, without some provision for Pakistan? India has to negotiate a sui generis India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA for her civilian reactors, the US Congress has to approve the whole deal after it is completed, not necessarily a foregone conclusion. In India, opposition Parties, particularly the Left front have to concur-an uncertain eventuality", says Arundhati Ghose, formerly India's permanent representative/ambassador to the United Nations.

The Economist takes note of the Indo-US nuclear deal in a piece "America, India and the China bogey: A price too high" on August 2, 2007.

Here is the text of what it says:

The rise of China is no reason to trample on the non-proliferation regime

SLOWLY but seemingly relentlessly, America's deal with India on nuclear co-operation is wending its way to fruition. Two years after it was first announced in Washington by George Bush and Manmohan Singh, India's prime minister, the two countries have concluded negotiations on the terms of a technical agreement governing that co-operation. Both sides have claimed a great breakthrough. Nicholas Burns, the State Department official who has shepherded the deal through a maze of complications, called it “perhaps the single most important initiative in the 60 years of our relationship”. M.K. Narayanan, Mr Singh's national-security adviser, called it “a touchstone of a transformed bilateral relationship”. That once distant ties between America and India are warming up is indeed cause for celebration. But the heat also burns a huge hole in the global non-proliferation regime. As this newspaper has argued ever since the deal was first mooted, this is wrong, dangerous and unnecessary.

India first tested a nuclear device in 1974 (and became a declared nuclear-weapons state in 1998), inspiring the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it, like Pakistan and Israel, never signed, and which its agreement with America perhaps fatally undermines. Yet in both Delhi and Washington, DC, opposition to the agreement tends to be dismissed as nitpicking that ignores a fundamental shift. India, which tilted Soviet-wards during the cold war, and remains by far the most powerful exponent of “non-alignment”, is entering a “strategic partnership” with America. The world's oldest democracy is at last going to be on the closest of terms with its largest democracy. What could make more sense, when, in the background, a potentially hostile, undemocratic Asian giant is rapidly gaining economic weight, and adding military muscle? To spare everybody's blushes, the rise of China is rarely mentioned as a factor in America's nuclear exception for India. But it is perhaps the fundamental impulse behind it.

Yet linking an end to India's nuclear isolation to the need for a strategic hedge against the rise of China makes no sense. No threat from China is either so great or so pressing. Its army is indeed modernising and spending lavishly. But as our briefing points out (see article), its military budget, in hard-currency terms, is not much bigger than France's. It remains decades away from being able to mount a credible military challenge to American pre-eminence. Moreover, whereas conflict remains possible, especially over Taiwan, China's priorities are internal: coping with the social and political dislocation that its economic revolution entails.

Nor is the nuclear prize going to buy undivided Indian loyalty. Mr Singh's leftist parliamentary allies will balk at anything that smacks of toeing America's line, and especially of jettisoning close ties with Iran, an American priority. Nehruvian “non-alignment” runs deep. Even Mr Singh—liberal economist and leader of the drive for better relations with America—felt compelled last year to call Fidel Castro “one of the greatest men of our times”. The main opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), in government when India went nuclear in 1998, is stridently nationalist. Yashwant Sinha, the BJP's most recent foreign minister, has criticised the government already for giving America too much.

Conversely, the collapse of the deal is not going to fling India into any sort of embrace with China. Relations, still scarred by their war in 1962, are improving apace. China will soon be India's largest trading partner. But mutual suspicion and rivalry for resources mean that China will remain India's main strategic threat—the one it cited to justify the 1998 nuclear tests. No matter what nuclear stance America takes, India can be relied on to keep a healthy distance from China.

How to send all the wrong messages
China, then, is no justification for the damage America's nuclear concessions to India will do. They may yet trip at the remaining hurdles: in the American Congress; at the International Atomic Energy Agency; or the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group. The text of the latest agreement has not been made public. But from what has been said about it, it makes the damage far worse, by allowing India to reprocess American-supplied nuclear fuel, and by permitting it to build fuel stockpiles and hence withstand any future cut-off of supplies should it test another bomb. America claims that other aspirant nuclear powers, notably Iran, will learn the benefits of good behaviour—ie, of India's fairly respectable record on non-proliferation. More likely, however, the rewards India (and North Korea) are reaping will encourage countries without the bomb to strive to acquire one as soon as possible.

Comments

Gopal Krishna said…
Agreement for Cooperation Between The Government of India and The Government of The United States of America Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy -03/08/2007
here it is
http://www.esnips.com/doc/25143dd6-22a9-4494-be99-6208cc3c99e8/nuclear-agreement
Anonymous said…
The announcement on July 27, 2007 that negotiations had been completed on the US-India Civilian Nuclear Deal, meant that the Joint Text had been mutually agreed.
Anonymous said…
"Implementation of Hyde Act would mean shifting of goalposts"

Anil Kakodkar, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, articulates his concerns on the still unfolding Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. Excerpts from an interview:


Anil Kakodkar: "If all our concerns are met, certainly it is a win-win situation for us."

The Hyde Act, passed by the U.S. Congress last December, is intended to enable nuclear commerce with India. Is the Act consistent with the July 2005 Indo-U.S. agreement?

The July 18 [2005] joint statement and the March 2 [2006] separation plan — agreed by both sides — are the basis for us to carry forward civil nuclear cooperation. When the legislation was in the making in the U.S. Congress, several concerns arose. Those were very clearly articulated in the Prime Minster's statement in the Rajya Sabha last August. The Hyde Act is the final form of this legislation [but] some of the concerns still remain. And as the Prime Minister has said, we need to seek clarifications because the U.S. side maintains it would be possible for them to sort of meet all the requirements embedded in the July 18 joint statement and the March 2 separation plan.

What are the key areas of concern arising from the Hyde Act?

The most important thing is the July 18 joint statement clearly stated India as a responsible country with advanced nuclear technology should have the same benefits and advantages as countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the U.S. Now, India has a nuclear weapons programme. The July 18 statement was about civil nuclear cooperation to be done in such a manner that there is no impingement whatsoever on India's strategic programme.

And the Hyde Act impinges on the strategic programme?

This is the main concern and we need to seek clarification, because whether you take it at the level of the sense of Congress, the level of U.S. policy or the assessment and reporting requirement, there are a fairly large number of sections which essentially seek to, sort of, contain or cap the Indian strategic programme, And, in fact, in some places, it also articulates a policy or philosophy of rollback. This is a very serious issue and we need to seek clarifications. This is one of the most important things. There are of course many others.

If we accept the Hyde Act now, is it clear that we will never be able to conduct a nuclear explosion?

The Act says that if India conducts a nuclear test, cooperation would cease. In fact, it goes beyond to say that all the equipment and reactor vessels and materials have to be returned. I don't understand how that's possible. India has declared a kind of unilateral moratorium. It cannot be converted into any kind of bilateral or multilateral legality. So this is another area where we have to seek clarification.

So the Hyde Act is not acceptable to the Department of Atomic Energy?

Well, it is a U.S. Act ...

But it impinges on your programme?

Yes, to that extent we have serious concerns.

Weren't the tests of 1974 and 1998 enough?

That's not the point. We are talking not just of near term. We are talking about how things are likely to unfold. Should there be situations which evolve, where, say, some other countries start doing tests, or there are changes in technology, the question would arise that at that time what should India do. We are at this moment wedded to the policy of our own unilateral moratorium, but that is based on conditions as they exist and we hope they will remain like that. But to ensure the security concerns of India, we should remain in a position to address [changes] properly.

How did we allow the goalposts to shift from civil nuclear cooperation to something that could impinge on our strategic programme?

It's like this. We've been talking all along, discussing essentially civil nuclear cooperation in a manner that does not impinge on the country's strategic programme. Now the processes in the U.S. Congress are something quite independent. We have little role to play there but, when we negotiate and discuss bilateral matters, certainly we have to take that into account.

And the goalposts have been shifted from civil nuclear cooperation to capping India's programme?

Well, if the Hyde Act is implemented as a part of the actions on the U.S. side, certainly it would mean shifting of goalposts.

In the process of legislation, we seem to have lost this assurance of lifetime fuel supply. How big a concern is that?

That's a crucial matter. The separation plan clearly states there would be multi-layered assurances for fuel supplies and that includes the ability to build a stockpile to meet the lifetime requirements of the reactors. If that doesn't get into reality, there are serious concerns because we have this Tarapur example glaring at us. So we can't have problems similar to Tarapur, but of a much larger magnitude.

It is said that some of these concerns will get addressed in the "123 agreement," which is still to be negotiated.

That's right. We'll certainly seek clarifications on these matters.

But this will not be the first 123 agreement India negotiated. Tarapur was also a 123 agreement.

Yes, the Tarapur 123 agreement had very clear kind of provisions for reliable supply for the whole life. But in spite of that, we had difficulties. So we have to protect ourselves. We have to negotiate this whole process quite well.

You're still hopeful the 123 Agreement will in some respects be able to accommodate your concerns?

I always approach things with a very positive attitude. The point is we are talking about developing civil nuclear cooperation as a solution to India's energy problem. Our energy requirements are going to increase 10-12 fold in the next 4-5 decades. If we don't develop new energy sources that address environmental or global climate change issues and if India carries on in `business as usual' mode, it's also going to be a serious problem globally.

So, India was looking at the global good?

No, India was looking at India's good. But it was understood that it also has global benefits and that is how it was a kind of win-win situation. We still approach this from the same spirit.

Is it still a win-win situation for the Americans?

Yes, I think so.

How would you categorise it for India?

If all our concerns are met, certainly it is a win-win situation for us.

What about the issue of `fallback safeguards'?

What has been agreed to is IAEA safeguards. So getting into fallback or bilateral safeguards is certainly a matter extraneous to this.

The Prime Minister said he will not allow American inspectors to roam around reactors. Is that something you also strongly believe in?

That's exactly correct.

So, in this `work in progress,' will you be able to conduct an independent strategic programme, or will we have Americans looking over our shoulders?

There is no question of that. We have to maintain autonomy in our strategic programme. We have to maintain autonomy in the development of the 3-stage nuclear programme because ultimately we have to develop our energy systems that are based on the energy resources available in the country. Which in turn means as far as nuclear is concerned we have to be able to go to the third stage of the nuclear programme, which is based on thorium. This is a sequential technology development process. We have come some distance but we have to be able to go forward in an autonomous manner on that programme and these are linked with the fuel cycle activities and that's where it is important that we maintain that autonomy. Similarly R&D, we must be able to carry our R&D based on our own autonomous decisions.

India was also supposed to get full nuclear cooperation.

The July 18 joint statement talked about full civil nuclear cooperation. After all, India is a unique case. So consistent with the unique situation of India, one would expect that this provision of the July 18 joint statement would be brought into reality. It is important because even in the civil domain, reprocessing and enrichment, heavy water are all very important areas and if the two countries have agreed that there will be full civil nuclear cooperation then it stands to reason that that determination has to be translated into reality.

What happens if we don't get the 123 Agreement?

Well, the domestic programme is there, we will carry on.

So will we just chug along slowly, or can we expedite it?

No, no our programme is moving quite fast. We are half way through the first stage, we have begun the second stage already and in fact even today, I can say with a degree of pride that if you look at the totality of the nuclear power and nuclear fuel cycle technology, India is one of the very few countries which has a total mastery on all aspects, so our mission is to go through thermal reactors, to fast reactors, to thorium reactors and we are moving rapidly on that path. That will continue.

In the end, what is your outlook on the future negotiations on the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal?

We have to be clear that we are operating within the ambit of the July 18 and March 2 documents. In so doing, one has to ensure that while we are able to develop civil nuclear cooperation to address `additionality' to the energy requirements of the country, this should in no way impinge on both the strategic programme as well as the domestic development of the three-stage nuclear programme and domestic R&D in the nuclear area.

So this where we have to seek clarifications, be clear about it ourselves and only that can be the basis for moving forward.

Pallava Bagla, correspondent for Science magazine and Science Editor for NDTV.)
Anonymous said…
Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005 (Placed on Calendar in Senate)
Beginning
June 20, 2005

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF CONGRESS.

TITLE I--MISSION AND BUDGET OF THE UNITED NATIONS

SEC. 101. UNITED STATES FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

`SEC. 11. UNITED STATES FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

SEC. 102. WEIGHTED VOTING.

SEC. 103. BUDGET CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.

SEC. 104. ACCOUNTABILITY.

SEC. 105. TERRORISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS.

SEC. 106. UNITED NATIONS TREATY BODIES.

SEC. 107. EQUALITY AT THE UNITED NATIONS.

SEC. 108. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS REFORM.

SEC. 109. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL.

SEC. 110. REPORT ON UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

SEC. 111. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND LEBANON.

SEC. 112. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO EXPANSION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

SEC. 113. GENOCIDE AND THE UNITED NATIONS.

SEC. 114. ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS.

TITLE II--HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (ECOSOC)

SEC. 201. HUMAN RIGHTS.

SEC. 202. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (ECOSOC).

SEC. 203. UNITED NATIONS DEMOCRACY FUND.

TITLE III--INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

SEC. 301. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY.

SEC. 302. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE NUCLEAR SECURITY ACTION PLAN OF THE IAEA.

TITLE IV--PEACEKEEPING

SEC. 401. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

SEC. 402. STATEMENT OF POLICY RELATING TO REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

SEC. 403. CERTIFICATION.

SEC. 404. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION RELATING TO PROTECTION OF UNITED STATES OFFICIALS AND MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES.

TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

SEC. 501. POSITIONS FOR UNITED STATES CITIZENS AT INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

SEC. 502. BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FOR REGULAR ASSESSED BUDGET OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

SEC. 503. REVIEW AND REPORT.

SEC. 504. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE.

TITLE VI--CERTIFICATIONS AND WITHHOLDING OF CONTRIBUTIONS

SEC. 601. CERTIFICATIONS AND WITHHOLDING OF CONTRIBUTIONS.

June 21, 2005

http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c109:4:./temp/~c109LkOa9u::
Anonymous said…
Henry J. Hyde United Nations Reform Act of 2005 (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by House)
Beginning

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF CONGRESS.

TITLE I--MISSION AND BUDGET OF THE UNITED NATIONS

SEC. 101. UNITED STATES FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

`SEC. 11. UNITED STATES FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

SEC. 102. WEIGHTED VOTING.

SEC. 103. BUDGET CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.

SEC. 104. ACCOUNTABILITY.

SEC. 105. TERRORISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS.

SEC. 106. UNITED NATIONS TREATY BODIES.

SEC. 107. EQUALITY AT THE UNITED NATIONS.

SEC. 108. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS REFORM.

SEC. 109. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL.

SEC. 110. REPORT ON UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

SEC. 111. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND LEBANON.

SEC. 112. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO EXPANSION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

SEC. 113. GENOCIDE AND THE UNITED NATIONS.

SEC. 114. ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS.

TITLE II--HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (ECOSOC)

SEC. 201. HUMAN RIGHTS.

SEC. 202. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL (ECOSOC).

SEC. 203. UNITED NATIONS DEMOCRACY FUND.

TITLE III--INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

SEC. 301. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY.

SEC. 302. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE NUCLEAR SECURITY ACTION PLAN OF THE IAEA.

TITLE IV--PEACEKEEPING

SEC. 401. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

SEC. 402. STATEMENT OF POLICY RELATING TO REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

SEC. 403. CERTIFICATION.

SEC. 404. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION RELATING TO PROTECTION OF UNITED STATES OFFICIALS AND MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES.

TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

SEC. 501. POSITIONS FOR UNITED STATES CITIZENS AT INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

SEC. 502. BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FOR REGULAR ASSESSED BUDGET OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

SEC. 503. REVIEW AND REPORT.

SEC. 504. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE.

TITLE VI--CERTIFICATIONS AND WITHHOLDING OF CONTRIBUTIONS

SEC. 601. CERTIFICATIONS AND WITHHOLDING OF CONTRIBUTIONS.

http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c109:3:./temp/~c109LkOa9u::

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